Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. There Are No Epistemic Norms of Inquiry.David Thorstad - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-24.
    Epistemic nihilism for inquiry is the claim that there are no epistemic norms of inquiry. Epistemic nihilism was once the received stance towards inquiry, and I argue that it should be taken seriously again. My argument is that the same considerations which led us away from epistemic nihilism in the case of belief not only cannot refute epistemic nihilism for inquiry, but in fact may well support it. These include the argument from non-existence that there are no non-epistemic reasons for (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • There is No Such Thing as Doxastic Wrongdoing.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
    People are often offended by beliefs, expect apologies for beliefs, apologize for their own beliefs. In many mundane cases, people are morally criticized for their beliefs. Intuitively, then, beliefs seem to sometimes wrong people. Recently, the philosophical literature has picked up on this theme, and has started to discuss it under the heading of doxastic wrongdoing. In this paper we argue that despite the strength of such initial intuitions, at the end of the day they have to be rejected. If (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Unifying Epistemic and Practical Rationality.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - Mind.
    Many theories of rational action are predicated on the idea that what it is rational to do in a given situation depends, in part, on what it is rational to believe in that situation. In short: they treat epistemic rationality as explanatorily prior to practical rationality. If they are right in doing so, it follows, on pain of explanatory circularity, that epistemic rationality cannot itself be a form of practical rationality. Yet, many epistemologists have defended just such a view of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Embracing Epistemic Dilemmas.David Christensen - 2021 - In Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles.
    This paper concentrates on a particular sort of case where it’s plausible that epistemic requirements can conflict: cases where an agent’s higher-order evidence supports doubting her reliability in reacting to her ordinary evidence. Conflicting epistemic requirements can be seen as generating epistemic dilemmas. The paper examines two ways that people have sought to recognize conflicting requirements without allowing them to generate epistemic dilemmas: separating epistemic norms into two different varieties, and positing rational indeterminacy in cases where principles conflict. It argues (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Eliminating Epistemic Rationality#.Susanna Rinard - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):3-18.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 1, Page 3-18, January 2022.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Problems with purely pragmatic belief.Ron Avni - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):4151-4163.
    Rinard (2019) brings to our attention the fact that, typically, the questions What should I believe? and What should I do? are treated differently. A typical answer to the first question is Believe according to the evidence, and a typical answer to the second question is Do what is right. But Rinard rejects this dichotomy. In its place, she argues for a view which she calls “Equal Treatment” in which one should believe according to the same considerations that govern what (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark