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  1. Risk-limited indulgent permissivism.Guy Axtell - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-15.
    This paper argues for a view described as risk-limited indulgent permissivism. This term may be new to the epistemology of disagreement literature, but the general position denoted has many examples. The paper argues for the need for an epistemology for domains of controversial views, and for the advantages of endorsing a risk-limited indulgent permissivism across these domains. It takes a double-edge approach in articulating for the advantages of interpersonal belief permissivism that is yet risk-limited: Advantages are apparent both in comparison (...)
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  • Moral Lessons from Psychology: Contemporary Themes in Psychological Research and their relevance for Ethical Theory.Henrik Ahlenius - 2020 - Stockholm: Stockholm University.
    The thesis investigates the implications for moral philosophy of research in psychology. In addition to an introduction and concluding remarks, the thesis consists of four chapters, each exploring various more specific challenges or inputs to moral philosophy from cognitive, social, personality, developmental, and evolutionary psychology. Chapter 1 explores and clarifies the issue of whether or not morality is innate. The chapter’s general conclusion is that evolution has equipped us with a basic suite of emotions that shape our moral judgments in (...)
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  • (1 other version)Consequentialism and Virtue.Robert J. Hartman & Joshua W. Bronson - 2021 - In Christoph Halbig & Felix Timmermann (eds.), The Handbook of Virtue and Virtue Ethics. pp. 307-320.
    We examine the following consequentialist view of virtue: a trait is a virtue if and only if it has good consequences in some relevant way. We highlight some motivations for this basic account, and offer twelve choice points for filling it out. Next, we explicate Julia Driver’s consequentialist view of virtue in reference to these choice points, and we canvass its merits and demerits. Subsequently, we consider three suggestions that aim to increase the plausibility of her position, and critically analyze (...)
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  • Against the Character Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):105-118.
    One way to frame the problem of moral luck is as a contradiction in our ordinary ideas about moral responsibility. In the case of two identical reckless drivers where one kills a pedestrian and the other does not, we tend to intuit that they are and are not equally blameworthy. The Character Response sorts these intuitions in part by providing an account of moral responsibility: the drivers must be equally blameworthy, because they have identical character traits and people are originally (...)
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  • Well-Founded Belief and the Contingencies of Epistemic Location.Guy Axtell - 2019 - In Joseph Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. New York: Routledge. pp. 275-304.
    A growing number of philosophers are concerned with the epistemic status of culturally nurtured beliefs, beliefs found especially in domains of morals, politics, philosophy, and religion. Plausibly, worries about the deep impact of cultural contingencies on beliefs in these domains of controversial views is a question about well-foundedness: Does it defeat well-foundedness if the agent is rationally convinced that she would take her own reasons for belief as insufficiently well-founded, or would take her own belief as biased, had she been (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.Guy Axtell - 2018 - Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.
    To speak of being religious lucky certainly sounds odd. But then, so does “My faith holds value in God’s plan, while yours does not.” This book argues that these two concerns — with the concept of religious luck and with asymmetric or sharply differential ascriptions of religious value — are inextricably connected. It argues that religious luck attributions can profitably be studied from a number of directions, not just theological, but also social scientific and philosophical. There is a strong tendency (...)
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  • Moral Luck and The Unfairness of Morality.Robert Hartman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3179-3197.
    Moral luck occurs when factors beyond an agent’s control positively affect how much praise or blame she deserves. Kinds of moral luck are differentiated by the source of lack of control such as the results of her actions, the circumstances in which she finds herself, and the way in which she is constituted. Many philosophers accept the existence of some of these kinds of moral luck but not others, because, in their view, the existence of only some of them would (...)
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  • Luck Theory: A Philosophical Introduction to the Mathematics of Luck.Nicholas Rescher - 2021 - Springer.
    This book is an original—the first-ever treatment of the mathematics of Luck. Setting out from the principle that luck can be measured by the gap between reasonable expectation and eventual realization, the book develops step-by-step a mathematical theory that accommodates the entire range of our pre-systematic understanding of the way in which luck functions in human affairs. In so moving from explanatory exposition to mathematical treatment, the book provides a clear and accessible account of the way in which luck assessment (...)
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  • Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1417-1436.
    Martin Luther affirms his theological position by saying “Here I stand. I can do no other.” Supposing that Luther’s claim is true, he lacks alternative possibilities at the moment of choice. Even so, many libertarians have the intuition that he is morally responsible for his action. One way to make sense of this intuition is to assert that Luther’s action is indirectly free, because his action inherits its freedom and moral responsibility from earlier actions when he had alternative possibilities and (...)
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  • Are random events perceived as rare? On the relationship between perceived randomness and outcome probability.Karl Halvor Teigen & Gideon Keren - 2020 - Memory and Cognition 48:299-313.
    Many daily life events, from lotteries to coincidental encounters, occur partly or entirely randomly or “by chance.” Six experiments, in two different languages, explored how perceptions of randomness are related to the perceived probability of the same events—specifically, whether low-probability events were viewed as more random than similar events that were judged (rightly or wrongly) to be more likely. The experiments suggest that low-probability outcomes of stochastic events are indeed considered as being more random than medium and highly likely outcomes, (...)
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