- The Hard Problem of Access for Epistemological Disjunctivism.Grad Paweł - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.details
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Justification is not internal.John Greco - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 257--269.details
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Seeing White and Wrong: Reid on the Role of Sensations in Perception, with a Focus on Color Perception.Lucas Thorpe - 2015 - In Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value (Mind Association Occasional Series). Oxford University Press. pp. 100-123.details
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Whither Evidentialist Reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 307-25.details
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Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals.Sophie Horowitz - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers.Roger White - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):233-250.details
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On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers.Roger White - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):233-250.details
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Interdisciplinary Foundations for the Science of Emotion: Unification without Consilience.Cecilea Mun - 2021 - London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.details
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Hyperintensionality and Overfitting.Francesco Berto - forthcoming - Synthese.details
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Open knowledge and changing the subject.Stephen Yablo - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1047-1071.details
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Frictional coherentism? A comment on chapter 10 of Ernest Sosa’s Reflective Knowledge.Crispin Wright - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):29-41.details
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Moorean responses to skepticism: a defense. [REVIEW]Tim Willenken - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):1 - 25.details
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Moore's paradoxes, Evans's principle and self-knowledge.John N. Williams - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):348-353.details
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Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.details
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The Bootstrapping Problem.Jonathan Weisberg - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.details
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On doing better, experimental-style. [REVIEW]Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):455 - 464.details
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Bootstrapping in General.Jonathan Weisberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525-548.details
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The Temporal Generality Problem.Brian Weatherson - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (1):117-122.details
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Contrastive Hinge Epistemology.Giorgio Volpe - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1222-1249.details
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Skeptical arguments.Jonathan Vogel - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):426–455.details
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Is Thinking a Matter of Knowing?Víctor Martín Verdejo Aparicio - 2013 - Agora 32 (1).details
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Knowing what's not up the road by seeing what's right in front of you: Epistemological disjunctivism's fake barn problem.Michael Veber - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):401-412.details
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The ‘Conditional Position Problem’ for epistemic externalism.Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5203-5224.details
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Sosa on easy knowledge and the problem of the criterion.James Van Cleve - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):19-28.details
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Does Suppositional Reasoning Solve the Bootstrapping Problem?James Van Cleve - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3): 351-363.details
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Varieties of easy knowledge inference: A resolution. [REVIEW]Hamid Vahid - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (3):223-237.details
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The Aim of Justification and Epistemic Difference-Making Principles.Hamid Vahid - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):11-29.details
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On the Significance of Difference‐Making Principles.Hamid Vahid - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):564-574.details
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Unreliable Knowledge.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):529-545.details
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Contingent A Priori Knowledge.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.details
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Tell me you love me: bootstrapping, externalism, and no-lose epistemology.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):119-134.details
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A Metacognitive Account of Phenomenal Force.Lu Teng - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (4):1081-1101.details
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Is justification easy or impossible? Getting acquainted with a middle road.Samuel A. Taylor - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2987-3009.details
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The Truth of Scepticism: on the varieties of epistemological doubt.Guido Tana - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Edinburghdetails
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Epistemological disjunctivism and easy knowledge.Joshua Stuchlik - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2647-2665.details
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Strict moderate invariantism and knowledge-denials.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2029-2044.details
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When Is a Belief Formed in an Epistemically Circular Way?Todd M. Stewart - 2023 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 100 (3):336-353.details
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The Competing Practices Argument and Self-defeat.Todd Stewart - 2005 - Episteme 2 (1):13-24.details
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Scepticism and Perceptual Justification.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):211-224.details
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Internalist Reliabilism.Matthias Steup - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):403-425.details
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Is Epistemic Circularity Bad?Matthias Steup - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):215-235.details
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Easy Knowledge, Circularity, and the Puzzle of Reliability Knowledge.Matthias Steup - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):453-473.details
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Destructive defeat and justificational force: the dialectic of dogmatism, conservatism, and meta-evidentialism.Matthias Steup - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2907-2933.details
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The Archimedean Urge.Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):325-362.details
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Replies to Ram Neta, James Van Cleve, and Crispin Wright for a book symposium on reflective knowledge (OUP, 2009).Ernest Sosa - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):43-59.details
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Dissonant beliefs.Fred Sommers - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):267-274.details
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One dogma of philosophy of action.Matthew Noah Smith - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2249-2266.details
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Undermining versus rebutting: options for responding to evolutionary debunking arguments.Emily Slome - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
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Respecting all the evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.details
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Getting a little closure for closure.James Simpson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12331-12361.details
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