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Distributing States' Duties

Stephanie Collins

Journal of Political Philosophy 24 (3):344-366 (2015)

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Are citizens culpable for state action?Anna Stilz - 2023 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 22 (4):381-406.details International law holds that states are holistically responsible for their acts. Yet what does the ascription of responsibility to the state imply about the responsibility of its citizens? This article argues that most citizens in a representative democracy bear culpability in association with their state's wrongful acts. Most democratic citizens can be blamed for empowering representatives to act on their behalf, and then failing to adequately oversee and dissent from the specific wrongful decisions their representatives made. This gives culpable citizens (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
The Claimability Condition: Rights as Action‐Guiding Standards.Cristián Rettig - 2019 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (2):322-340.details Is it justified to hold that an agent S has a (moral) right to P if the duty-bearer is not specified? There is an intense ongoing debate on this question. There are two positions in the literature. On the one hand, O´Neill´s much-discussed account of rights holds that it is justified to say that an agent S has a right to P if and only if the duty-bearer is sufficiently determined – i.e. if and only if it is clear against (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Responsibility for states' actions: Normative issues at the intersection of collective agency and state responsibility.Holly Lawford-Smith & Stephanie Collins - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (11):e12456.details Is the state a collective agent? Are citizens responsible for what their states do? If not citizens, then who, if anyone, is responsible for what the state does? Many different sub-disciplines of philosophy are relevant for answering these questions. We need to know what “the state” is, who or what it's composed of, and what relation the parts stand in to the whole. Once we know what it is, we need to know whether that thing is an agent, in particular (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
How should citizens’ collective liability for state action be grounded?Robert Huseby - 2017 - Journal of Global Ethics 13 (3):366-379.details ABSTRACTThis paper assesses one type of justification for collective liability – the democratic authorization account – according to which citizens can be held liable for what their state does, because they collectively authorize the state’s actions. I argue that the democratic authorization view, properly understood, has an implausibly narrow scope, which risks leaving many victims of injustice without compensation. Hence, I propose a subsidiary account that is wider in scope, and which applies to most cases of state-inflicted harm. This view (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Citizenship as strict liability: a review of Avia Pasternak’s Responsible Citizens, Irresponsible States. [REVIEW]Bennet Francis - 2022 - Ethics and Global Politics 15 (4):107-112.details States commit wrongs that demand redress. In her recent book, Avia Pasternak considers the circumstances under which it is legitimate to impose the cost of redress upon the state’s citizens at large. Her answer is that it is legitimate to impose reparative burdens on citizens only when they participate in their state intentionally, specifically, when they intend to play their part in maintaining state institutions. The book thus has revisionary implications for current international legal practice, given reparative burdens are currently (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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