In his work, Jules Coleman has held that the rule of recognition, if conceived of as a shared cooperative activity, should be the gateway through which to incorporate moral constraints on the content of law. This analysis, however, leaves unanswered two important questions. For one thing, we do not know when or even why morality becomes a criterion of legality. And, for another thing, we still do not know what conception of morality it is that we are dealing with. In (...) this article, we will attempt to clarify in greater depth what relations there are between the social practice of law and morality. We will thus see how the cooperative nature of social practices imbues law with a moral force, and how this makes it possible to establish a "weak" connection between law and morality: To see this, we will need to single out some basic features of cooperative social practices, thus setting out a suitable framework for the view just mentioned. (shrink)

This symposium presents the work of the Italian legal philosopher, Ferrajoli, to the English speaking public. Ferrajoli’s work offers a reflection on law and the constitutional democratic state from a post-positivist perspective, applying the axiomatic method to the theory of law and democracy. Besides his systematic approach, Ferrajoli’s theory is remarkable for a number of original and interesting reflections that he offers on the relationship between normativity and facticity, and on how to reconcile foundamental rights and democracy. In both respects, (...) his work has similarities in scope, if not in approach and not always in substance, with that of Habermas. (shrink)

The author maintains in this article that it is possible an approach between the positivistic legal theory, the one that follows the model of the analytical theory developed by Hart, and those others that apply a socio-legal method. Against what some defenders of both perspectives advocate, who view each others with some disdain, the author asserts the need to integrate legal theory with social sciences in the field of juridical ideas. This supposes opening spaces to develop a socio-legal theory of (...) law that lives equally from categories of conceptual analysis and of sociological research. The author rests specially, in order to defend this position, on authors like Roger Coterrell, Denis Galligan, Nicola Lacey and, above all, Brian Tamanaha and William Twinning, whose arguments are here object of special consideration. (shrink)

Hart's and Kelsen's respective outlooks on the concept of normativity not only differ by the way they explain this concept but also, more importantly, in what they seek to achieve when endeavouring to account for the normative dimension of law. By examining Hart's and Kelsen's models in the light of Korsgaard's understanding of the “normativity problem,” my aim is to emphasise not only their contrasted perspectives, but also the common limit they impose on their theories by dismissing as inappropriate any (...) question regarding the emergence of legal normativity. On the basis of my previous arguments, I shall explain why I deem Raz's analysis of the contrast between Hart's and Kelsen's conceptions of normativity to be misleading. (shrink)