In 1704, Mary Astell, known by many scholars as the “first English feminist,” published Moderation Truly Stated, her contribution to the national debate over “occasional conformity.” This was the practice of periodic participation in the sacraments of the Church of England—above all, taking communion—in order to become eligible for public office. This practice was defended as an exercise of the virtue of “moderation,” viewed as the opposite of zeal and associated with politeness and reasonableness. In this article I recover Astell’s (...) critique on this new notion of moderation, as well as her own alternative conception of the virtue of moderation as scripture moderation, which she envisioned as zeal and indifference towards the right ends. My aim is threefold. First, to explore the dangers of conceiving of moderation as an “antidote to zeal,” which Astell argued would be detrimental to truth, salvation, and moral progress. Second, to demonstrate that her own conception of moderation as zeal and indifference towards the right ends was a radical subversion of the discourse on moderation at the time. Third, to shed light on the role of the Occasional Conformity debate in the transformation of moderation from a Christian virtue of temperance and control into a “modern” virtue construed as politeness and opposed to zeal, which was to become dominant in eighteenth-century England. (shrink)

This article argues that moderation is a difficult, complex, and elusive concept that challenges our political imagination. It has several faces—epistemological, moral, constitutional, political and religious—and forms a rich intellectual tradition that has yet to be explored in all its complexity. Moderation is “the silken string that runs through the pearl-chain of all virtues” (Joseph Hall). As such, it ought to be examined not only as a virtue but also as a social practice, an intellectual sensibility, a way of life, (...) a particular ethos, and a set of concrete institutions. Finally, moderation is best understood in relation with its synonyms (prudence, civility, compromise) and antonyms (extremism, fanaticism, zealotry). (shrink)

This article examines Plato’s understanding of moderation. I begin with a brief discussion of Plato’s Charmides, the dialogue in which Socrates asks, “What is moderation?” in order to frame a detailed treatment of key passages in Plato’s Republic where we find a definitive answer. I show the progress of the Republic to be an intentional development on Plato’s part, moving readers from a conventional understanding of moderation as mastery to a more compelling ideal: moderation as a harmony of the city (...) and of the soul. Bringing moderation out from under the shadow of justice illuminates the dialogue’s otherwise perplexing presentation of the relationship between these two virtues and helps us to see both the role moderation plays in Plato’s thought, and what his vision might contribute to our own understanding of the virtue. (shrink)

It is the Right that has inherited the ambitious modernist urge to destroy and innovate in the name of a universal project. Through the war in Iraq through the unrequited desire to dismantle public...

In “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy,” Kant holds the seemingly untenable position that lying is always prohibited, even if the lie is addressed to a murderer in an attempt to save the life of an innocent man. This article argues that Kant's position on lying should be placed back in its original context, namely a response to Benjamin Constant about the responsibility of individual agents toward political principles in post-revolutionary times. I show that Constant's theory of political (...) responsibility, which sanctions the lie, is not based on expediency, but on principled realism, whereas Kant endorses a position that I describe as ‘political juridicism.’ This analysis enables us to uncover two plausible Republican theories of political responsibility in post-revolutionary times behind an apparently strictly ethical debate. (shrink)

The principle of moderation can be regarded as an ethical principle of virtue or as a principle of government. On the basis of the former, moderation has a personal, ethical sense—not to go towards extremes. The latter model is more generalized and impersonal: moderation as the limitation of power by power. Both conceptions actually meet, though with the latter model more salient, in the work of Montesquieu. This article outlines Montesquieu’s view of moderation emphasizing the extent to which this view (...) cannot be understood apart from his concept of despotism. It shows that Montesquieu’s understanding of moderation entails the balancing and interaction of different powers in a State. As such, his view is more “dynamic” and relational than “substantive.” By exploring the interaction between the models of moderation as virtue and moderation as government in Montesquieu’s work, I then develop the notion of “ruling fear” in considering the continuing relevance of Montesquieu’s perspective for current understandings of moderation and political power. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Jeremy Waldron has argued that Berlin ignored the importance of institutions and constitutions and worked with an impoverished conception of social and political design. Political structures, legal and political institutions, constitutional design, mechanisms of representation and the rule of law: all this remained untouched by Berlin, who seemed, in Waldron’s opinion, largely uninterested in the actual political institutions of liberal society. In this essay, I argue that what may be missing in Berlin—close and sustained attention to, and interest in, (...) institutions and social context—can be found in the works of his prominent contemporary, Raymond Aron, who also wrote about liberty during the Cold War. As such, Aron’s An Essay on Liberty can and should be read as a complement to Berlin’s essay “Two Concepts of Liberty.”. (shrink)