- The Semantic Realism/Anti-Realism Dispute and Knowledge of Meanings.Panu Raatikainen - 2009 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5:1-13.details
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Kim on Causation and Mental Causation.Panu Raatikainen - 2018 - E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 25 (2):22–47.details
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Causation, exclusion, and the special sciences.Panu Raatikainen - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (3):349-363.details
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Defending Dispositionalism of Color:色の傾向性理論を擁護する.Yasushi Ogusa - 2018 - Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 45 (1-2):1-21.details
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Are only mental phenomena intentional?Anders Nes - 2008 - Analysis 68 (299):205-215.details
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Intentional and Phenomenal Properties: How not to be Inseparatists.Miklós Márton - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):127-147.details
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Mental causation, compatibilism and counterfactuals.Dwayne Moore - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):20-42.details
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Causal Exclusion and Physical Causal Completeness.Dwayne Moore - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (4):479-505.details
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What Does the Conservation of Energy Have to Do with Physicalism?Barbara Montero - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (4):383-396.details
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Against propositionalism.Michelle Montague - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):503–518.details
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The Illusory Theory of Colours: An Anti-Realist Theory.Barry Maund - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):245-268.details
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Lessons from Blur.Giulia Martina - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
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What is 'conditional probability'?E. J. Lowe - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):218-223.details
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Sensory experience and intentionalism.Pierre Le Morvan - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702.details
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Intentional Objects, Pretence, and the Quasi-Relational Nature of Mental Phenomena: A New Look at Brentano on Intentionality.Frederick Kroon - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):377-393.details
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The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.details
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Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):420-442.details
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Intentionality and Normativity.Uriah Kriegel - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.details
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What is Wrong with Self-Grounding?David Mark Kovacs - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1157-1180.details
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Metaphysically explanatory unification.David Mark Kovacs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1659-1683.details
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Cartesianism and Intersubjectivity in Paranormal Activity and the Philosophy of Mind.Steve Jones - 2017 - Film-Philosophy 21 (1):1-19.details
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Non‐Propositional Attitudes.Alex Grzankowski - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1123-1137.details
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Limits of propositionalism.Alex Grzankowski - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):819-838.details
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Not All Attitudes are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.details
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Attitudes Towards Objects.Alex Grzankowski - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):314-328.details
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Intentionality as intentional inexistence.Laura Gow - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1371-1385.details
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Everything is clear: All perceptual experiences are transparent.Laura Gow - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):412-425.details
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Talking About Intentional Objects.Michael Gorman - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):135-144.details
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Intentionalism, Defeasibility, and Justification.Glüer-Pagin Kathrin - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1007-1030.details
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In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience.Kathrin Glüer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.details
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A Neo-Searlean Theory of Intentionality.Nicholas Georgalis - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (7):475-495.details
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Husserls Irreversibilitätsargument gegen den Materialismus.Christopher Erhard - 2023 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 26 (1):104-137.details
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Illusions in speech sound and voice perception.Anna Drożdżowicz - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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From saying to seeing. [REVIEW]Anna Drożdżowicz - 2019 - Metascience 29 (1):151-154.details
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From saying to seeing: Berit Brogaard: Seeing and saying: the language of perception and the representational view of experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 216 pp, £47.99 HB. [REVIEW]Anna Drożdżowicz - 2020 - Metascience 29 (1):151-154.details
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Do honeybees have concepts?Bernardo Aguilera Dreyse - 2011 - Disputatio 4 (30):1 - 19.details
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The Philosopher and the Grapes: On Descriptive Metaphysics and Why It Is Not ‘Sour Metaphysics’.Giuseppina D'Oro - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):586-599.details
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Idealism and the philosophy of mind.Giuseppina D'Oro - 2005 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):395-412.details
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Brentano and the parts of the mental: a mereological approach to phenomenal intentionality.Arnaud Dewalque - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):447-464.details
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Neo-Pragmatism, Primitive Intentionality and Animal Minds.Laura Danón - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):39-58.details
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Ramsification and the Ramifications of Prior's Puzzle.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2021 - Noûs 55 (4):935-961.details
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Contesto e prospettiva. Note sull’indicalità fenomenologica.Simona Cresti - 2012 - Annali Del Dipartimento di Filosofia 18:99-126.details
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What is the Problem of Non-Existence?Tim Crane - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):417-434.details
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Singular Thought.Tim Crane & Jody Azzouni - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):21-43.details
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Reply to Nes.Tim Crane - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):215–218.details
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Aspects of Psychologism: Précis and Reply to Critics.Tim Crane - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):96-98.details
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Patterns, Noise, and Beliefs.Lajos Ludovic Brons - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (1):19-51.details
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Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and the Problem of Intentionality.Susan Brower-Toland - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):67-110.details
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Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and The Problem of Intentionality.Susan Brower-Toland - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):67-109.details
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Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons.Matteo Bianchin - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):442-461.details
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