Emotions have long been of interest to philosophers and have deep historical roots going back to the Ancients. They have also become one of the most exciting areas of current research in philosophy, the cognitive sciences, and beyond. -/- This book explains the philosophy of the emotions, structuring the investigation around seven fundamental questions: What are emotions? Are emotions natural kinds? Do animals have emotions? Are emotions epistemically valuable? Are emotions the foundation for value and morality? Are emotions the basis (...) for responsibility? Do emotions make us better people? -/- In the course of exploring these questions, the book also discusses cutting-edge empirical research on emotion, feminist approaches to emotions and their value, and methodological questions on how to theorize about the emotions. The book also contains in-depth discussions of specific emotions like compassion, disgust, anxiety, and curiosity. It also highlights emerging trends in emotion research. (shrink)

Inspired by the vision of care in Vincent van Gogh's depiction of the parable of the Good Samaritan, this article offers a paradigm for inhabiting compassion. Compassion is understood in this article as a moral emotion that is also a pathocentric virtue. This definition creates a dynamic view of compassion as a desire to alleviate the suffering of others, the capacity to act on behalf of others and a commitment to sustain engagement with the suffering other. To weave this vision (...) of compassion as a habitus rather than a theoretical construct, the article develops three phases of compassion: seeing, companioning and sighing. This framework deepens and augments a pastoral theological paradigm of compassion with the aim of inculcating an inhabited compassion in caregivers and the communities in which they participate. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that moral distress is an emotional response to an ethical dilemma, and that to date, the literature has largely failed to address the fundamental questions that need to be answered in response to this emotional response. Firstly, does moral distress accurately identify a wrong being done to patients? Secondly, if it does, can nurses carry out this ‘wrong doing’, but not be responsible for the consequences of their actions? A narrative that reflects the emotional (...) nature of moral distress is presented, with the aim of providing some answers to these questions. (shrink)

This paper argues for a novel sentimentalist realist metaethical theory, according to which moral wrongness is analyzed in terms of the sentiments one has most reason to have. As opposed to standard sentimentalist views, the theory does not employ sentiments that are had in response to morally wrong action, but rather sentiments that antecedently dispose people to refrain from immoral behavior, specifically the sentiments of compassion and respect.

Although the sufficientarian approach to distributive justice is increasingly popular in contemporary political philosophy, it is not easy to give an appropriate formulation of sufficientarianism. In this article, I aim to show that a proper formulation of sufficientarianism should satisfy three conditions: the Distinctiveness condition, the Intermediacy condition, and the Universality condition. However, I argue that it is very difficult to propose a substantial account of sufficiency that can satisfy the three conditions altogether. After examining several influential sufficientarian accounts, I (...) contend that none of them can satisfy the three conditions on sufficientarianism. (shrink)

Compassion is often understood as central to nursing and as important to ensure quality nursing and healthcare. In recent years, there has been a focus on strategies in nursing education to ensure compassionate nurses. However, it is not always clear how the concept of compassion is understood. Theoretical conceptualisations that lie behind various understandings of compassion have consequences for how we approach compassion in nursing education. We present some ways in which compassion is often understood, their philosophical underpinnings and the (...) consequences these understandings can have for nursing education. We argue that it is useful for nursing education to understand compassion as a cognitive emotion and discuss how such an understanding can inform educational approaches to compassion. (shrink)

De nombreuses recherches ont mis en évidence le fait que les épicuriens n’étaient pas complètement hostiles à la poésie en général mais qu’ils refusaient probablement les compositions ou procédures poétiques qui ne conduisent pas à la fin naturelle du plaisir « catastématique », c’est-à-dire le bonheur. Dans cet article, nous nous demanderons donc si les épicuriens ont inventé une poésie cathartique de type positif ou s’ils ont simplement rejeté toutes les formes de catharsis poétique en les décrivant comme des expériences (...) négatives. Nous constaterons dans ce travail de recherche, divisé en trois parties, que la première hypothèse est plus probable que la seconde. Dans un premier temps, nous démontrerons que les épicuriens ont effectivement reconnu l’existence d’une catharsis positive, transmise par la raison et l’enseignement de la philosophie, ayant la capacité de faire disparaître les émotions négatives qui entravent l’accès au bonheur (l’amour, la peur du divin, le désir excessif, etc.). L’idée développée, dans un second temps, établit qu’Épicure et ses disciples pourraient s’être opposés à la catharsis tragique décrite dans la Poétique d’Aristote, parce qu’elle implique de passer par des passions négatives telles que la pitié et la terreur. Cette expérience esthétique entrerait alors en contradiction avec l’idéal épicurien du plaisir comme absence de trouble et d’inquiétude psychique. Enfin, dans un troisième temps, nous exposerons l’idée selon laquelle les épicuriens pourraient avoir accepté une seule forme de catharsis poétique : celle facilitant le processus de purification effectué par la raison et l’enseignement de la philosophie. Un exemple possible de cette pratique est le poème De rerum natura de Lucrèce dans lequel la poésie n’est pas considérée comme cathartique en soi, mais si et seulement si elle assiste la philosophie épicurienne dans sa conquête du bonheur. (shrink)

Compassion is often described in terms of suffering. This paper investigates the nature of this suffering. It is argued that compassion involves suffering of a particular kind. To begin with a case is made for the negative claim that compassion does not involve an ordinary, or afflictive, suffering over something. Secondly, it is argued that the suffering of compassion is a suffering for someone else’s sake: If you feel compassion for another person, P, then you suffer over P:s suffering for (...) P:s sake, and if that is all you do, then you are not affected with an afflictive suffering over something. The final section identifies and addresses a problem concerning self-pity, and a suggestion is made on how to specify the proposed account so as to cover both self-directed and other-directed compassion. (shrink)

In contrast to medical care, which is focused on the individual patient, public health is focused on collective health. This article argues that, in order to better protect the individual, discussions of public health would benefit from incorporating the insights of virtue ethics. There are three reasons to for this. First, the collective focus may cause neglect of the effects of public health policy on the interests and rights of individuals and minorities. Second, whereas the one-on-one encounters in medical care (...) facilitate a compassionate and caring attitude, public health involves a distance between professionals and the public. Therefore, public health professionals must use imagination and care to evaluate the effects of policies on individuals. Third, the relationship between public health professionals and the people who are affected by the policies they design is characterized by power asymmetry, demanding a high level of responsibility from those who wield them. Against this background, it is argued that public health professionals should develop the virtues of responsibility, compassion and humility. The examples provided, i.e. breastfeeding information and vaccination policy, illustrate the importance of these virtues, which needed for normative as well as instrumental reasons, i.e. as a way to restore trust. (shrink)

Within the nursing ethics literature, there has for some time now been a focus on the role and importance of character for nursing. An overarching rationale for this is the need to examine the sort of person one must be if one is to nurse well or be a good nurse. How one should be to live well or live a/the good life and to nurse well or be a good nurse seems to necessitate a focus on an agent's character (...) as well as actions because character is (for the most part) expressed in action (e.g. see Laird). This paper will give an overview of the reasons for the role and importance of character in nursing practice and explain its relation to nursing's frequent use of virtue ethics in order to recommend caution. While the paper agrees that the role of character is important in nursing caution is needed in both how much moral and thus normative, emphasis is being placed on the psychology of character and on the drift to virtue ethics. The psychological which may be explanatory needs to be linked with the normative, and a justification for the normative is needed. A justification as virtue ethics is contested, and nursing practice does not need to take on this explanatory and justificatory burden.A tentative proposal raised but not discussed in depth in this paper is that when an ultimate explanation or explanatory ground is needed, nursing practice leads quite naturally to a form of consequentialism as well as a realist metaethic. On this account, there are two levels of moral thinking, and nursing practice entails the virtues at one level and leads quite naturally to moral thinking at another more critical level of the criterion of what makes something right and good independently of character. (shrink)

Philosophical and empirical work on the nature of the emotions is extensive, and there are many theories of emotions. However, all agree that emotions are not knee jerk reactions to stimuli and are open to rational assessment or warrant. This paper's focus is on the condition or conditions for compassion as an emotion and the likelihood that it or they can be met in nursing practice. Thus, it is attempting to keep, as far as possible, compassion as an emotion separate (...) from both moral norms and professional norms. This is because empirical or causal conditions that can make experiencing and acting out of compassion difficult seem especially relevant in nursing practice. I consider how theories of emotion in general and of compassion in particular are somewhat contested, but all recent accounts agree that emotions are not totally immune to reason. Then, using accounts of constitutive conditions of the emotion of compassion, I will show how they are often likely to be quite fragile or unstable in practice and particularly so within much nursing practice. In addition, some of the conditions for compassion will be shown to be problematic for nursing practice. It is difficult to keep ideas of compassion separate from morality, and this connection is noticeable in the claims made of compassion for nursing and so I will briefly highlight one such connection that of the need for normative theory to give an account of the value that emotions such as compassion presume and that compassionate motivation is separate from moral motivation and may conflict with it. The fragility or instability of the emotion of compassion in practice has implications for both what can be expected and what should be expected of compassion; at least if what is wanted is a realist rather than idealist account of “should.”. (shrink)

The paper offers a contribution to the political account of wonder. The rationale for addressing this problem is provided by Hannah Arendt’s observations on the paradoxical relationship between wonder and politics—wonder appears here as both essential and indispensable to politics as the realm of opinions. This quandary corresponds to two common-sense uses of the term “wonder”—as an emotion and as an act of judging. It is argued that the political interpretation of wonder should link these two poles. Drawing on Martha (...) Nussbaum’s account of wonder and its reformulation developed by Jeremy Bendik-Keymer, the paper offers such a synthesis by emphasising the environmental and aesthetic dimensions of the concept. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to offer a mitigated moral justification of a much maligned emotional trait, pity, in the Aristotelian sense of ‘pain at deserved bad fortune’. I lay out Aristotle's taxonomic map of pity and its surrounding conceptual terrain and argue – by rehearsing modern accounts – that this map is not anachronistic with respect to contemporary conceptions. I then offer an ‘Aristotelian’ moral justification of pity, not as a full virtue intrinsically related to eudaimonia but as (...) a positive moral quality that has instrumental value in developing and sustaining a certain intrinsically valuable state of character – namely compassion. The justification offered is mitigated in the sense that it does not elevate pity to a virtuous disposition, constitutive of the good life; yet it does offer a crucial counterweight to Aristotle's own denunciation of pity. (shrink)

The paper discusses the nature and functioning of argumentum ad misericordiam, a well-known but less theorised type of argument. A monograph by D. Walton (1997) offers an overview of definitions of misericordia (which he eventually translates as ‘pity’), as well as the careful analysis of several cases. Appeals to pity, Walton concludes, are not necessarily fallacious. This view seems to be supported and further refined by the critical remarks of H. V. Hansen (2000), as well as the recent work of (...) R. H. Kimball (2001, 2004) and A. Aberdein (2016) focusing on the virtue ethical aspects of such arguments. There is, on this account, a difference between ad misericordiam arguments and fallacies, even though the former may be fallacious in some cases. In this paper I argue for a narrower concept of ad misericordiam, as distinguished from the more generic class of appeals to pity, limiting it to cases in which someone asks for the non-application of a certain rule, clearly relevant to their case, with reference to some (unfavourable) circumstance, which is, however, irrelevant for the application of the rule. (shrink)

In some popular and political discourse, ‘compassion’ is commonly conceived as a simple or ‘given’ aspect of the world. And yet public discussion also focusses on whether ‘compassion' has gone wrong in some way, suggesting that there might be various more or less satisfactory versions of compassion. At the same time, some thinkers doubt whether compassion should any longer be expected of those working in healthcare. This article draws on philosophical and theological resources to argue that the conceptual context which (...) forms compassion is crucial for determining the ethos of healthcare. The discussion explores three themes – politics, suffering and responsibility – which must be addressed in order to understand what is wrong with compassion, to identify lines of future investigation and to develop possible remedies. (shrink)

In order to make progress in the welfare debate, we need a way to decide whether certain cases depict changes in well-being or not. I argue that an intuitive idea by Nagel has received insufficient attention in the literature and can be developed into a test to that purpose. I discuss a version of such a test proposed by Brad Hooker, and argue that it is unsuccessful. I then present my own test, which relies on the claim that if compassion (...) is fitting towards a person due to her having (or lacking) certain properties, then we know that having (or lacking) those properties affect the person’s well-being. I show how my test yields results in cases of deception, which have implications for central questions in the literature on well-being, such as whether what you do not experience can affect your well-being (the so-called Experience Requirement). (shrink)

A large proportion of hospital inpatients are affected by cognitive impairment, posing challenges in the provision of their care in busy, fast-paced acute wards. Signs and symbols, known as visual identifiers, are employed in many U.K. hospitals with the intention of helping healthcare professionals identify and respond to the needs of these patients. Although widely considered useful, these tools are used inconsistently, have not been subject to full evaluation, and attract criticism for acting as a shorthand for a routinized response. (...) In order for visual identifiers to be used effectively in acute care settings, thorough consideration must be given to the ethical and legal issues that are engaged in this context, and their potential benefits and harms must be weighed and balanced. This paper proposes a set of legal and ethical principles that can be used to guide the implementation of visual identifiers. Together, these principles provide a framework applicable in the design and implementation phases to systematically identify relevant considerations arising from the use of these tools. We outline some tensions that arise between principles and conclude that selecting a preferred moral framework could help to guide decision-making, as does clarity around the purpose and objectives of the identifier. (shrink)

Would the virtuous person eat animals? According to some ethicists, the answer is a resounding no, at least for the virtuous person living in an affluent society. The virtuous person cares about animal suffering, and so, she will not contribute to practices that involve animal suffering when she can easily adopt a strict plant-based diet. The virtuous person is temperate, and temperance involves not indulging in unhealthy diets, which include diets that incorporate animals. Moreover, it is unjust for an animal (...) to be killed for food when this is unnecessary. By contrast, I argue that the virtuous person in an affluent society would eat animals, at least sometimes. I explain how the very virtues thought to motivate “virtuous modest veganism”—compassion, temperance, and justice—motivate the virtuous person to consume some animals. (shrink)

In this article, I argue for a novel understanding of compassion—what I call a ‘compassion towards thriving’ approach—to inform public mental health ethics. The argument is developed through two main parts. In the first part, I develop an account of compassion towards thriving that builds upon Martha Nussbaum’s philosophical work on compassion. This account expands the ambit of compassion from a focus on the alleviation of existing suffering to the prevention of potential future suffering through the facilitation of personal growth (...) based on a ‘psychosocial’ understanding of mental health. In the second part of the article, I discuss the aims of public mental health and examine compassion towards thriving’s normative synergies with existing approaches in public health ethics. I explain how compassion towards thriving supports a vision of public health ethics which is concerned with solidarity, social justice and flourishing. I then apply this compassion towards thriving approach to evaluate the ‘Every Mind Matters’ public mental health campaign in England, highlighting its affinities with the ethos of the campaign. I also identify and explain two ways in which the application of a compassion towards thriving approach could enhance its delivery. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article aims to bring some understanding to the phenomenon called compassion. The use of particular linguistic expressions to denote the phenomenon of compassion in the East and West can confuse us, as those terms are embedded in unique cultural settings. This article undertakes a historical, etymological, and philosophical exploration of the terms, compassion and karuna. The article will include a short literature review of these concepts and an investigation of the differences and similarities between them. The concluding speculation is (...) that the Western perspective on compassion is founded on an individualistic, self-centred vision, and the karuna of the East is founded on a communitarian, non-self based vision. (shrink)

Many moral philosophers have criticized intensive animal farming because it can be harmful to the environment, it causes pain and misery to a large number of animals, and furthermore eating meat and animal-based products can be unhealthful. The issue of industrially farmed animals has become one of the most pressing ethical questions of our time. On the one hand, utilitarians have argued that we should become vegetarians or vegans because the practices of raising animals for food are immoral since they (...) minimize the overall happiness. Deontologists, on the other hand, have argued that the practices of raising animals for food are immoral because animals have certain rights and we have duties toward them. Some virtue ethicists remain unconvinced of deontic and consequentialist arguments against the exploitation of animals and suggest that a virtue-based approach is better equipped to show what is immoral about raising and using animals for food, and what is virtuous about ethical veganism. (shrink)

The intersection between virtue and care ethics is underexplored in contemporary moral philosophy. This thesis approaches care ethics from a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethical perspective, comparing the two frameworks and drawing on recent work on care to develop a theory thereof. It is split into seven substantive chapters serving three major argumentative purposes, namely the establishment of significant intertheoretical agreement, the compilation and analysis of extant and new distinctions between the two theories, and the synthesis of care ethical insights with neo-Aristotelianism (...) to generate a virtue ethical theory of care. In the first two chapters, I outline virtue ethics and care ethics, and argue for considerable agreement over central premises. Chapter 2 summarises the foundational commitments of care ethics, focusing particularly on their relational ontology and its links to the other ethical claims care ethicists universally ascribe to, namely particularism, partialism, the moral salience of emotions, and the rejection of hard public/private distinctions. Chapter 3 lays out the central concepts in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, including eudaimonism, virtue, and character traits, and drawing a number of comparisons between virtue and care ethics specifically with regard to relational ontology and the meta-ethical commitments it underpins. In addition to doing the necessary expository work for the remainder of the thesis, Chapters 2 and 3 also argue that care ethics and virtue ethics have much more in common than is typically acknowledged – the first major contribution of this thesis to the literature. Chapters 2 and 3 to provide at least a prima facie justification for pursuit of the questions I confront in the remainder of the thesis. In Chapter 4, I ask what differentiates these two ethical theories. I survey some of the differences which philosophers in either camp have identified and offer some of my own. I suggest that several of those differences either rest on misunderstandings of one ethic or the other, or that in erecting a divide between virtue and care ethics they also disunify ethics of care. I do, however, identify two differences which seem defensible. Specifically, they are that virtue ethics seems to lack an account of care, which I define minimally as a response or responsiveness to need, and that virtue and care ethics organise their meta-ethical and normative concepts differently. This chapter thus presents a second contribution to the literature: a study of the differences between virtue ethics and care ethics. It also serves to set the trajectory for the remaining chapters, where I respond to the claim that virtue ethics lack an account of care. I spend the remainder of the thesis constructing what I take to be a satisfying foundation for a virtue ethical theory of care. In Chapter 5, I offer three initially viable means of incorporating care into virtue ethics, all of which treat care as a virtue. These are the analogical approach, according to which care is analogous to an existing virtue; the additive approach, according to which care is a novel virtue; and the bundling approach, according to which care is a bundle of virtues. I also offer and evaluate reasons to reject the claim that care is a virtue, concluding that the claim is indeed a viable one so long as the concept of care is sufficiently thick, and I contend that analogical approaches, and particularly analogies with charity, outperform the others. Chapter 5 therefore serves two ends. First, it proffers a novel meta-analysis of concepts of care as a virtue, and thus makes a third contribution to the literature. In doing so, it makes an inroad into the second: the development of a neo-Aristotelian theory of care. Chapter 6 continues this project. I attempt to show how care can be construed as an act-type and a practice. I argue in this chapter that practices are a subcategory of actions, and that care qualifies as an Anscombean act-type which aims at the meeting of needs relating to the care-recipient’s flourishing. I go on to consider the implications of this account for ethics which deploy care as a moral concept, maintaining that it not only offers a better account of consequences than theories of care which include success criteria, but also that it affords us interesting insights into the distinction between ‘caring about’ and ‘caring for’ which allow us to make sense of certain tenets of neo-Aristotelianism. This represents a contribution to both discourses, since neither care nor virtue ethicists working at the intersection of their respective normative theories have delved very deeply into the philosophy of action. Chapter 7 discusses caring relations, suggesting that a virtue ethical theory of caring relations can lean on the work care ethicists have done, and adding some necessary refinements, such as a distinction between ideal and non-ideal caring relations, and a theory of caring relations as reasons for action. This final chapter also draws these three concepts of care together by arguing that virtuous caregivers who are invested in the flourishing of those for whom they care are also sensitive to the relations those care-recipients bear to their institutional environment. I argue that because they are caring participants in caring relations, virtuous agents are characteristically motivated by states of need and dependency to engage in certain sorts of conventionally political practices. In other words, the virtue or virtues of caring characteristically manifest in certain sorts of political or social practices, relating specifically to those areas of moral life. This allows us to build upon recent work in feminist virtue ethics of the sort offered by Tessman and Friedman. I also offer a novel analysis of migration, suggesting that the account of care presenting here is analytically useful both when it comes to historical cases of migration such as the underground railroads and escapes from Nazi-occupied Europe, but also for contemporary issues such as the migrations occurring in the Southern United States and in much of Europe. I thus conclude not only that virtue ethicists ought to incorporate care into their normative framework, and that the theory of care presented here is a coherent one, but that this leads us naturally into applied topics such as virtue politics. I conclude the thesis by considering some its implications and by identifying some further avenues for research. (shrink)

Compassion is generally thought to be a morally valuable emotion both because it is concerned with the suffering of others and because it prompts us to take action to their behalf. But skeptics are unconvinced. Not only does a viable account of compassion’s evaluative content—its characteristic concern—appear elusive, but the emotional response itself seems deeply parochial: a concern we tend to feel toward the suffering of friends and loved ones, rather than for individuals who are outside of our circle of (...) intimates. In response, I defend a sophisticated, non-cognitivist account of compassion and explain how it avoids the difficulties that undermine other proposals. (shrink)

En comparación con otras emociones, el asco no ha sido exhaustivamente tratado, ni ha gastado tantas páginas y tanta atención por parte de los estudiosos en él. Es por esto que el asco o repugnancia constituye un objeto de estudio privilegiado para la neuroética. En el presente artículo trataré de mostrar cómo el asco no es una mera reacción fisiológica, sino que la evolución biológica y cultural ha hecho de él una emoción enormemente compleja dotada de un gran contenido cognitivo. (...) Veremos qué papel ha jugado el recurso retórico dentro de la repugnancia en distintos procesos de deshumanización y crueldad a lo largo de la historia. Por último, examinaremos cómo funciona la empatía en la agencia moral y analizaremos qué relación tiene este mecanismo psicológico con la repugnancia. (shrink)