In this paper, I provide a philosophical analysis of Pāli texts that treat of a special kind of mental event called bhavaṅga citta. This mental event is a primal sentient consciousness, a passive form of basal awareness that individuates sentient beings as the type of being that they are. My aims with this analysis are twofold, one genealogical and reconstructive, the other systematic. On the genealogical and reconstructive side, I argue for a distinction between two kinds of continuity that are (...) at work in explaining the temporal structure of experience in Pāli Buddhist philosophy. Call these two forms of continuity ‘diachronic’ and ‘affective-motivational’ continuity, respectively. In my analysis of these two forms of continuity, I will focus on the coherence of bhavaṅga citta in its Abhidhammic context. My contention is that the commentarial account of bhavaṅga citta has the resources to explain diachronic continuity but struggles to give a fully workable account of affective-motivational continuity. I argue that the novel view of mental continuity offered by the early twentieth century Burmese monastic exegete Ledi Sayadaw offers another intriguing account of mental continuity, one that can help to explain affective-motivational continuity. Systematically speaking, in spelling out the dynamics of this distinction between types of mental continuity in connection with bhavaṅga, I offer a cross-cultural philosophical analysis of the deep structure of the mind and how affective processes below the threshold of ordinary habits of attention have a profound conditioning effect on our conscious relationship with the world. (shrink)

This article aims to draw attention to the way in which a subset of reactive attitudes make us less free. Vasubandhu’s explanation of reactive attitudes shows us how they make us less free...

There is a consensus in the contemporary literature that mindfulness is a kind of attention. From here the literature divides into two opposing camps:the ‘Quietists’ and the ‘Cognitivists’. For the...

Much of my book Philosophy of Psychedelics is devoted to elaborating and defending two basic claims: that psychedelic therapy works mainly by changing mental representations of the self, and that it has many epistemic benefits consistent with a naturalistic worldview. The commentaries in this symposium generally focus on one or the other of these claims. On the mechanistic front, the commentaries by Hoffman and by Martin and Sterzer seek to supplement my account by drawing attention to factors it does not (...) emphasize. In this reply I agree with most of their claims, but propose some important qualifications. Meanwhile, the commentaries by Lyon and Farrenikova and by Colombo challenge some core commitments of my account. I agree with many of their claims, but defend some of these core commitments. On the epistemological front, Bortolotti and Murphy-Hollies endorse the overall shape of my account and make some productive connections to ideas concerning agency-first epistemology and self know-how. Caporuscio brings into play the idea of self-shaping, which connects to self know-how, but argues against certain core claims of my account. I endorse many of these claims about agency-first, self know-how, and self-shaping, but propose some important qualifications. Finally, Fink agrees that psychedelic experiences can have some epistemic benefits, but argues that these do not pertain to epistemic justification, and that the main benefit is increased understanding. I am sympathetic to Fink’s proposal about understanding, but criticize some of his arguments for the thesis of Psychedelic Justification Impossibilism. (shrink)

In the transdisciplinary field of ‘mindfulness,’ originally a Buddhist concept (Pāli sati; Sanskrit smṛti; Chinese nian 念; Tibetan dran pa), the two tendencies represented by Buddhist traditional a...

To seek fundamental truths, analytic metaphysicians generally start with observed phenomena. From here they typically move outwards, using discursive thought to posit scientifically informed theories about the ultimate reality behind appearances. Mystics, too, seek to uncover the reality behind appearances. However, their meditative methods typically start with experience and go inwards to a fundamental reality sometimes described as a pure conscious unity. Analytic metaphysicians may be tempted to dismiss the mystical approach as unworthy of investigation. In this paper I will (...) outline and address four challenges that sceptics are likely to advance, arguing that none is persuasive. I shall also attempt to clarify the role and scope of meditation in establishing the viability of mystical data in the construction of any potential metaphysic about fundamental reality. (shrink)

This work develops a phenomenological account of mindfulness, and related phenomena. It is divided into two main parts. The aim of part one is to articulate a pre-phenomenological sketch of mindfulness by drawing on passages from some of the classic works of Western literature and everyday life, through an interpretation of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and by the means of a critical analysis of the contemporary attempts to account for these phenomena. Part two adds further detail to the sketch by entering (...) a dialogue with the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. A key distinctions made here is between the transcendental horizon and the open horizon. This difference allows cultivating mindfulness to be defined as the practice of tuning-out of the transcendental horizon and tuning-in to the open horizon. Mindfulness—the potential fruit of tuning-in-tuning-out—is defined as the feeling of being tuned-in to the open horizon.A key findings of this research is that tuning-in-tuning-out is a difference practice than the phenomenological epoché; whereas the latter discloses the transcendental horizon, the former discloses the open horizon—on which the transcendental horizon is dependent. These findings open up the possibility of a phenomenological description of certain phenomena that are closely related to mindfulness. Some of these phenomena are: Mindful attention, which is defined as the function of foregrounding a sub-horizon within the open horizon and the pushing of the other sub-horizons into the background. Concentration : the narrowing down of the open horizon to one of its sub-horizons. Insight : the activity of isolating a sub-horizon, discerning its thingly possibilities, zooming out, isolating a second sub-horizon and discerning its thingly possibilities, and then contrasting the two in such a way that their difference becomes vividly present. (shrink)

This PhD thesis concerns introspective approaches to the study of the mind. Across three standalone papers, I examine the significance of introspective data and advise on appropriate kinds of training for the production of such data. An overview document first introduces major themes, methods and arguments of the thesis. Paper 1 then begins the argumentative work, interrogating the constraining function of introspection in cognitive science. Here, I evaluate “enactivist” claims about the significance of introspection, clarifying central enactivist suggestions to draw (...) out the broader importance of introspection in science and philosophy. Paper 2 then examines the proposed employment of Buddhist meditation practices in the production of rigorous introspective data. I defend such proposals against concerns that meditators yield ungeneralizable data, given the transformative character of these attention-training techniques. I argue that some meditation-trained transformations are actually epistemically-beneficial, undermining popular associations between transformation and “distortion”. Paper 3 then reviews difficulties involved in integrating meditative training into research. I emphasise the importance of specific contextual supports to meditation as critical ingredients of introspective proficiency, showing how difficulties replicating these threaten to limit the scope of meditation’s scientific benefits. I layout methodological responses to this that can maximise meditation’s positive impact going forwards. (shrink)

I argue that if the claims Buddhist philosophy makes about meditation virtuosos are plausible, then Buddhism may rebut most of the strongest arguments for free will skepticism found in Western analytic philosophy, including the hard incompatiblist's argument (which combines the arguments for hard determinism, such as the consequence argument, with those for hard indeterminism, such as the randomness argument), Pereboom's manipulation argument, and Galen Strawson's impossibility argument. The main idea is that the meditation virtuoso can cultivate a level of mind (...) control that is impervious to the causal origins of her mental states, on the basis of which ability an account of free will may be erected, consistent with the claim that Buddhist enlightenment consists in some sort of radical conception of the ultimately impersonal nature of the agent. (shrink)