The new theory of reference has won popularity. However, a number of noted philosophers have also attempted to reply to the critical arguments of Kripke and others, and aimed to vindicate the description theory of reference. Such responses are often based on ingenious novel kinds of descriptions, such as rigidified descriptions, causal descriptions, and metalinguistic descriptions. This prolonged debate raises the doubt whether different parties really have any shared understanding of what the central question of the philosophical theory of reference (...) is: what is the main question to which descriptivism and the causal-historical theory have presented competing answers. One aim of the paper is to clarify this issue. The most influential objections to the new theory of reference are critically reviewed. Special attention is also paid to certain important later advances in the new theory of reference, due to Devitt and others. (shrink)

Theoria, Volume 88, Issue 2, Page 406-433, April 2022.

In practice, the inquiry into whether Socrates/William Tell/Robin Hood really existed hinges on the origin of the causal sequence leading up to the present use of the name employed for the personage in question, even though the occurrence of a Kripkean ‘baptism’ is not a logical consequence of most assertions employing that name, but only an ‘implication’ like the sort that makes examples of Moore's paradox (e.g. 'It is raining, but I have no idea whether it is raining’) strike ordinary (...) language users as ‘inconsistent’. But with any express assertions or denials of the existence of the personage named, the attribution of Kripkean sense to the name is unavoidable. (shrink)