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Analogy and Conceptual Change, or You can't step into the same mind twice

In Eric Dietrich Art Markman (ed.), Cognitive Dynamics: Conceptual change in humans and machines. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 265--294 (2000)

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  1. Relations, Objects, and the Composition of Analogies.Dedre Gentner & Kenneth J. Kurtz - 2006 - Cognitive Science 30 (4):609-642.
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  • Discrete Thoughts: Why Cognition Must Use Discrete Representations.Eric Dietrich & Arthur B. Markman - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (1):95-119.
    Advocates of dynamic systems have suggested that higher mental processes are based on continuous representations. In order to evaluate this claim, we first define the concept of representation, and rigorously distinguish between discrete representations and continuous representations. We also explore two important bases of representational content. Then, we present seven arguments that discrete representations are necessary for any system that must discriminate between two or more states. It follows that higher mental processes require discrete representations. We also argue that discrete (...)
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  • When Science Confronts Philosophy: Three Case Studies.Eric Dietrich - 2020 - Axiomathes 1:1-22.
    This paper examines three cases of the clash between science and philosophy: Zeno’s paradoxes, the Frame Problem, and a recent attempt to experimentally refute skepticism. In all three cases, the relevant science claims to have resolved the purported problem. The sciences, construing the term broadly, are mathematics, artificial intelligence, and psychology. The goal of this paper is to show that none of the three scientific solutions work. The three philosophical problems remain as vibrant as ever in the face of robust (...)
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  • Is Experience Stored in the Brain? A Current Model of Memory and the Temporal Metaphysic of Bergson. [REVIEW]Stephen E. Robbins - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (1):15-43.
    In discussion on consciousness and the hard problem, there is an unquestioned background assumption, namely, our experience is stored in the brain. Yet Bergson argued that this very question, “Is experience stored in the brain?” is the critical issue in the problem of consciousness. His examination of then-current memory research led him, save for motor or procedural memory, to a “no” answer. Others, for example Sheldrake, have continued this negative assessment of the research findings. So, has this assumption actually been (...)
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  • Analogical Insight: Toward Unifying Categorization and Analogy.Eric Dietrich - 2010 - Cognitive Processing 11 (4):331-346.
    The purpose of this paper is to present two kinds of analogical representational change, both occurring early in the analogy-making process, and then, using these two kinds of change, to present a model unifying one sort of analogy-making and categorization. The proposed unification rests on three key claims: (1) a certain type of rapid representational abstraction is crucial to making the relevant analogies (this is the first kind of representational change; a computer model is presented that demonstrates this kind of (...)
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  • Developing Structured Representations.Leonidas A. A. Doumas & Lindsey E. Richland - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):384-385.
    Leech et al.'s model proposes representing relations as primed transformations rather than as structured representations (explicit representations of relations and their roles dynamically bound to fillers). However, this renders the model unable to explain several developmental trends (including relational integration and all changes not attributable to growth in relational knowledge). We suggest looking to an alternative computational model that learns structured representations from examples.
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  • Analogy as Relational Priming: The Challenge of Self-Reflection.Andrea Cheshire, Linden J. Ball & Charlie N. Lewis - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):381-382.
    Despite its strengths, Leech et al.'s model fails to address the important benefits that derive from self-explanation and task feedback in analogical reasoning development. These components encourage explicit, self-reflective processes that do not necessarily link to knowledge accretion. We wonder, therefore, what mechanisms can be included within a connectionist framework to model self-reflective involvement and its beneficial consequences.
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  • Analogical Insight: Toward Unifying Categorization and Analogy.Eric Dietrich - 2010 - Cognitive Processing 11 (4):331-.
    The purpose of this paper is to present two kinds of analogical representational change, both occurring early in the analogy-making process, and then, using these two kinds of change, to present a model unifying one sort of analogy-making and categorization. The proposed unification rests on three key claims: (1) a certain type of rapid representational abstraction is crucial to making the relevant analogies (this is the first kind of representational change; a computer model is presented that demonstrates this kind of (...)
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  • Analogical Reminding and the Storage of Experience: The Paradox of Hofstadter-Sander.Stephen Robbins - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):355-385.
    In their exhaustive study of the cognitive operation of analogy, Hofstadter and Sander arrive at a paradox: the creative and inexhaustible production of analogies in our thought must derive from a “reminding” operation based upon the availability of the detailed totality of our experience. Yet the authors see no way that our experience can be stored in the brain in such detail nor do they see how such detail could be accessed or retrieved such that the innumerable analogical remindings we (...)
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  • Analogies Without Commonalities? Evidence of Re-Representation Via Relational Category Activation.Nicolás Oberholzer, Máximo Trench, Kenneth J. Kurtz & Ricardo A. Minervino - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • Toward Extending the Relational Priming Model: Six Questions.Eric Dietrich - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):383-384.
    Six questions are posed that are really specific versions of this question: How can Leech et al.'s system be extended to handle adult-level analogies that frequently combine concepts from semantically distant domains sharing few relational labels and that involve the production of abstractions? It is Leech et al. who stress development; finding such an extension would seem to have to be high on their priority list.
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