Intuition or rational trust? Resumen: Según la concepción tradicional, la justificación de las creencias lógicas básicas —entendida tanto inferencial como no-inferencialmente— no logra evitar ni la circularidad, ni la regresión al infinito. Justificar reglas básicas lógicas inferencialmente conlleva usar principios lógicos con lo que se genera un círculo vicioso. Apelar a fuentes básicas como la intuición, no sortea todas las dificultades. Argumentaré que es preciso recurrir a una “habilitación”, una sub-clase dentro de las garantías epistémicas. Si además aceptamos que intuir (...) es algo que hacemos y no algo que nos pasa, podemos sostener que la intuición, de hecho, se apoya en una confianza racional. Palabras clave: justificación, conocimiento lógico, garantía racional, intuición, habilitación.: According to the traditional conception, the justification of basic logical beliefs —understood both inferentially and non-inferentially— cannot avoid either circularity or regression to infinity. To justify logical basic rules inferentially involves using logical principles, so a vicious circle is generated. Appealing to basic sources such as intuition, does not avoid such problems. I will argue that it is necessary to resort to an entitlement, a sub-class within the epistemic warrants. If we also accept that intuiting is something that we do and not something that happens to us, we can sustain that intuition, indeed, is based on a rational trust. Keywords: justification, logical knowledge, rational warrant, intuition, entitlement. (shrink)

El objeto de este artículo es analizar el problema de la justificación del conocimiento básico y ofrecer una solución basada en un tipo de justificación deflacionaria no-evidencialista a partir de la noción de habilitación de T. Burge y la de _garantía racional_ de C. Wright. El problema, en el caso del conocimiento básico lógico, es que justificar las reglas lógicas inferencialmente supone utilizar principios lógicos, con lo cual se genera un círculo vicioso. Examinamos la viabilidad del enfoque no-inferencialista de Wright (...) y sostendremos que una garantía racional es una respuesta viable para el problema de la justificación del conocimiento lógico básico. (shrink)

A priori theories of justification of logic based on meaning often lead to trouble, in particular to issues concerning circularity. First, I present Boghossian’s a prioriview. Boghossian maintains the rule-circular justifications from a conceptual role semantics. However, rule-circular justifications are problematic. Recently, Boghossian (Boghossian, 2015) has claimed that rules should be thought of as contents and contents as abstract objects. In this paper, I discuss Boghossian’s view. My argumentation consists of three main parts. First, I analyse several arguments to show (...) that in fact, Boghossian’s inferentialist solution is not fully satisfying. Second, I discuss the matter further, if one accepts that basic logical rules are constitutive of meaning, that is, they constitute the logical concepts and the content of a rule is an abstract object, then abstract objects — like, for example, rules — could be constitutive of meaning. The question is whether conceptual priority is in the judgment or in the object and what theory of content is pursued. Grasping content as a matter of knowing how a word or concept behaves in inferences is not completely explicative. Finally, I contend that rules come to exist as a result of certain kinds of mental action. These actions function as constitutive norms. Logical rules are not abstract objects but ideal. What one construes as norms or rules of content may involve idealization, but this is because we share a language. (shrink)

This article offers an overview of inferential role semantics. We aim to provide a map of the terrain as well as challenging some of the inferentialist’s standard commitments. We begin by introducing inferentialism and placing it into the wider context of contemporary philosophy of language. §2 focuses on what is standardly considered both the most important test case for and the most natural application of inferential role semantics: the case of the logical constants. We discuss some of the (alleged) benefits (...) of logical inferentialism, chiefly with regards to the epistemology of logic, and consider a number of objections. §3 introduces and critically examines the most influential and most fully developed form of global inferentialism: Robert Brandom’s inferentialism about linguistic and conceptual content in general. Finally, in §4 we consider a number of general objections to IRS and consider possible responses on the inferentialist’s behalf. (shrink)