What's wrong with joining corona parties? In this article, I defend the idea that reasons to avoid such parties come in degrees. I approach this issue from a participation-based perspective. Specifically, I argue that the more people are already joining the party, and the more likely it is that the virus will spread among everyone, the stronger the participation-based reason not to join. In defense of these degrees, I argue that they covary with the expression of certain attitudes.

Proponents of the utilitarian animal welfare argument (AWA) for veganism maintain that it is reasonable to expect that adopting a vegan diet will decrease animal suffering. In this paper I argue otherwise. I maintain that (i) there are plausible scenarios in which refraining from meat-consumption will not decrease animal suffering; (ii) the utilitarian AWA rests on a false dilemma; and (iii) there are no reasonable grounds for the expectation that adopting a vegan diet will decrease animal suffering. The paper is (...) divided into four sections. In the first, I set out the utilitarian AWA in its original form. I give some background and I distinguish it from other, related arguments. In the second, I discuss the causal impotence objection, a popular objection to the utilitarian AWA. I explain how the objection works by means of a conceptual distinction between consumers and producers. In the third, I explain how proponents of the utilitarian AWA respond to this objection. In particular, I set out in some detail what I call the expected utility response. In the fourth and final section, I use the three objections noted above to explain why I do not find this response convincing. (shrink)

The consumption of traditional meat is currently being challenged by the rise of meat alternatives claimed to be more beneficial for the environment and non-human animals. One of the peculiarities of these products lies in their attempt to replace meat through the close imitation of its sensory qualities, which poses relevant philosophical questions: What are the purported reasons that motivate this imitation, instead of the promotion of different but sustainable foods that break with the imagery of meat eating? And, if (...) eating meat is considered morally wrong, what is the moral status of the simulation of a wrong act? Our aim is to address these questions to shed new light on the ethical claims that constitute, in fact, one of the major advantages of these products. Firstly, we introduce the aims and functions of simulating meat sensory qualities. Subsequently, we investigate whether the imitation of meat can be found morally acceptable on consequentialist grounds. Lastly, we raise the question of whether there is room for claiming that imitating meat is morally wrong even if its consequences are overall better, from the point of view of non-consequentialist ethical frameworks. We conclude that there are not compelling reasons for considering meat imitation as morally undesirable. (shrink)

Since Uber’s founding in 2009, individuals associated with Uber have engaged in (or been accused of engaging in) numerous categories of corporate malfeasance: failure to protect data privacy, theft of trade secrets, sexual misconduct (including sexual assault and sexual harassment), lack of worker safety, lack of consumer safety, and racial discrimination. Thus, Uber is a good test case for the question of whether corporate behavior can provide moral justification for a boycott. More specifically, an examination of the 2017 #deleteUber controversy (...) will invite the reader to consider questions such as the following: When is a personal boycott morally justified, and when (if ever) is a personal boycott morally obligatory? How are personal boycotts related to larger-scale organized boycotts? What are the factors that make an organized boycott morally justified (or unjustified)? Is there a sound argument for the conclusion that we should #deleteUber? (shrink)