In business as elsewhere, “ugly people” are treated worse than ”pretty people.” Why is this so? This article investigates the ethics of aesthetic injustice by addressing four questions: 1. What is aesthetic injustice? 2. How does aesthetic injustice play out? 3. What are the characteristics that make people being treated unjustly? 4. Why is unattractiveness (considered to be) bad? Aesthetic injustice is defined as unfair treatment of persons due to their appearance as perceived or assessed by others. It is plays (...) out in a variety of harms, ranging from killing (genocide), torture, violence, exclusion (social or physical), discrimination, stigmatization, epistemic injustice, harassment, pay inequity, bullying, alienation, misrecognition, stereotyping, and to prejudice. The characteristics that make people treated unjustly are (lack of) attractiveness, averageness, proportion, and homogeneity. Furthermore, prejudice, psychological biases, logical fallacies, and unwarranted fear of disease are some reasons why unattractiveness is (considered to be) bad. In sum, this study synthesizes insights from a wide range of research and draws attention to aesthetic injustice as a generic term for a form of injustice that deserves more systematic attention. Having a definition, description, and explanation of the concept makes it easier to target the problems with aesthetic injustice. As the business world is an arena of ubiquitous aesthetic injustice business ethics can take the lead in identifying, explaining, and addressing the problem. (shrink)

Which traits are beautiful? And is their beauty perceptual? It is argued that moral virtues are partly beautiful to the extent that they tend to give rise to a certain emotion— ecstasy—and that compassion tends to be more beautiful than fair-mindedness because it tends to give rise to this emotion to a greater extent. It is then argued, on the basis that emotions are best thought of as a special, evaluative, kind of perception, that this argument suggests that moral virtues (...) are partly beautiful to the extent that they tend to give rise to a certain kind of evaluative perceptual experience. (shrink)

In this article, an account of the architecture of the cognitive contamination system is offered, according to which the contamination system can generate contamination represen- tations in circumstances that do not satisfy the norms of contamination, including in cases of mere visual contact with disgusting objects. It is argued that this architecture is important for explaining the content, logic, distribution, and persistence of maternal impression beliefs – according to which fetal defects are caused by the pregnant mother’s experiences and actions (...) – which in turn provide important evidence of the architecture of the cognitive contamination system. (shrink)

I argue that the main existing accounts of the relationship between the beauty of environmental entities and their moral standing are mistaken in important ways. Beauty does not, as has been suggested by optimists, confer intrinsic moral standing. Nor is it the case, as has been suggested by pessimists, that beauty at best provides an anthropocentric source of moral standing that is commensurate with other sources of pleasure. I present arguments and evidence that show that the appreciation of beauty tends (...) to cause a transformational state of mind that is more valuable than mere pleasure, but that leads us to falsely represent beautiful entities as being sentient and, in turn, as having intrinsic moral standing. To this extent, beauty is not, then, a source of intrinsic moral standing; it’s a source of a more important anthropocentric value than has hitherto been acknowledged. (shrink)