- Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.details
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On perceptual expertise.Dustin Stokes - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (2):241-263.details
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Two Kinds of Information Processing in Cognition.Mark Sprevak - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (3):591-611.details
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Methods, minds, memory, and kinds.Alison Springle - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (5):635-661.details
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Attention and intentionalism.Jeff Speaks - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):325-342.details
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Naïve realism and the problem of causation.Michael Sollberger - 2008 - Disputatio 3 (25):1-19.details
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Does Loudness Represent Sound Intensity? (Preprint).Kim Soland - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-27.details
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Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument.Paul Skokowski - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):287-299.details
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Is the Pain in Jane Felt Mainly in Her Brain?Paul Skokowski - 2007 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 15 (1):58-71.details
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Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'.Nicholas Silins - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):329-367.details
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Is experience transparent?Charles Siewert - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):15-41.details
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In favor of (plain) phenomenology.Charles Siewert - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):201-220.details
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Maximality and microphysical supervenience.Theodore Sider - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):139-149.details
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The unity of moral attitudes: recipe semantics and credal exaptation.Derek Shiller - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):425-446.details
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Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology.Michael K. Shim - 2011 - Husserl Studies 27 (3):197-215.details
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Why do we need perceptual content?Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):776-788.details
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What panpsychists should reject: on the incompatibility of panpsychism and organizational invariantism.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1833-1846.details
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Functions and mental representation: the theoretical role of representations and its real nature.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):317-336.details
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Introspection and the Elementary Acts of Mind.William Seager - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (1):53-76.details
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Concessionary Dualism and Physicalism.William Seager - 2010 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67:217-237.details
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Distinguishing the senses.Michael Scott - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):257 – 262.details
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The unreliability of naive introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.details
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The Goldilocks Problem of the specificity of visual phenomenal content.Robert Schroer - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):476-495.details
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The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):665-682.details
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Reticence of visual phenomenal character: A spatial interpretation of transparency.Robert Schroer - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):393-414.details
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Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.details
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Pleasure, displeasure, and representation.Timothy Schroeder - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):507-530.details
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Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):114-133.details
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Phenomenal consciousness, attention and accessibility.Tobias Schlicht - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):309-334.details
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Non-Conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness.Tobias Schlicht - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):491 - 520.details
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Monsters Among Us.Timothy Schroeder - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (sup1):167-184.details
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Knowing Your Own Beliefs.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):41-62.details
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In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.details
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Experience and Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):699-747.details
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A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Noûs 36 (2):249-275.details
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Attention and Internal Monitoring: A Farewell to HOP.Wesley Sauret & William G. Lycan - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):363-370.details
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The role of selection in functional explanations.André Rosolem Sant'anna - 2014 - Manuscrito 37 (2):227-267.details
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The hybrid contents of memory.André Sant’Anna - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1263-1290.details
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Crossed Wires about Crossed Wires: Somatosensation and Immunity to Error through Misidentification.Léa Salje - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):35-56.details
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SINBaD neurosemantics: A theory of mental representation.Dan Ryder - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):211-240.details
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Representation and mental representation.Robert D. Rupert - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):204-225.details
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The Relativity Of Color.Peter W. Ross - 2000 - Synthese 123 (1):105-129.details
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The location problem for color subjectivism.Peter W. Ross - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):42-58.details
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Color science and spectrum inversion: A reply to Nida-Rumelin.Peter W. Ross - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):566-570.details
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Apperception, Sensation, and Dissociability.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (2):206-223.details
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Authority without privilege: How to be a Dretskean conciliatory skeptic on self-knowledge.Michael Roche & William Roche - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):1071-1087.details
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Red is the Hardest Problem.William S. Robinson - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):5-16.details
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Intrinsic qualities of experience: Surviving Harman's critique. [REVIEW]William S. Robinson - 1997 - Erkenntnis 47 (3):285-309.details
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Concepts and Perceptual Belief: How (Not) to Defend Recognitional Concepts.Bradley Rives - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (4):369-391.details
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A Kantian stance on the intentional stance.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2001 - Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):29-52.details
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