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The Genealogy of Content or the Future of an Illusion.Alex Rosenberg - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):537-547.details
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Fitting color into the physical world.Peter W. Ross - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):575-599.details
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Color science and spectrum inversion: A reply to Nida-Rumelin.Peter W. Ross - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):566-570.details
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Apperception, Sensation, and Dissociability.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (2):206-223.details
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Authority without privilege: How to be a Dretskean conciliatory skeptic on self-knowledge.Michael Roche & William Roche - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):1071-1087.details
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The ins and outs of introspection.Philip Robbins - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (6):617–630.details
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Red is the Hardest Problem.William S. Robinson - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):5-16.details
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Hidden Nature Physicalism.William S. Robinson - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):71-89.details
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Concepts and Perceptual Belief: How (Not) to Defend Recognitional Concepts.Bradley Rives - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (4):369-391.details
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We Are Not All ‘Self-Blind’: A Defense of a Modest Introspectionism.Georges Rey - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (3):259-285.details
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What is an altered state of consciousness?Antti Revonsuo, Sakari Kallio & Pilleriin Sikka - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):187 – 204.details
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Inverted Earth Revisited.Huiming Ren - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (5):1093-1107.details
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Content, Consciousness, and Cambridge Change.Matthew Rellihan - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (4):325-345.details
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A Kantian stance on the intentional stance.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2001 - Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):29-52.details
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Critical review: The Emotional Construction of Morals.Erick Ramirez - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):461-475.details
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Cultural Affordances: Scaffolding Local Worlds Through Shared Intentionality and Regimes of Attention.Maxwell J. D. Ramstead, Samuel P. L. Veissière & Laurence J. Kirmayer - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.details
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Science, substance and spatial appearances.Thomas Raleigh - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2097-2114.details
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Tolerant enactivist cognitive science.Thomas Raleigh - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):226-244.details
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Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Contrasts, and Externalism.Thomas Raleigh - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):602-627.details
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Crane and the mark of the mental.Andrea Raimondi - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):683-693.details
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The phenomenal content of experience.Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.details
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The Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception and Theory-Ladenness.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):87-103.details
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Affordances and Phenomenal Character in Spatial Perception.Simon Prosser - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):475-513.details
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Rationality, biology and optimality.Carolyn Price - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (5):613-634.details
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The Paraphenomenal Hypothesis.David Pitt - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):735-741.details
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A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.details
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The Moral Cognition/Consciousness Connection.Mark Phelan & Adam Waytz - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):293-301.details
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Species of emergence.Gregory R. Peterson - 2006 - Zygon 41 (3):689-712.details
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Dewey on Naturalism, Realism and Science.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S25-S35.details
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Cognitive self-management requires the phenomenal registration of intrinsic state properties.Frederic Peters - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1113-1135.details
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Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues.Frederic Peters - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (4):441-461.details
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Vehicle-representationalism and hallucination.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1727-1749.details
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The Singular Relational plus Relativistic Content View.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (1):93-114.details
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The Phenomenology of Remembering Is an Epistemic Feeling.Denis Perrin, Kourken Michaelian & André Sant’Anna - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.details
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There is nothing it is like to see red: holism and subjective experience.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - Synthese:1-30.details
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There is nothing it is like to see red: holism and subjective experience.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - Synthese 195 (10):4637-4666.details
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The Five Marks of the Mental.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
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Representationalism and the problem of vagueness.Ryan Perkins & Tim Bayne - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):71-86.details
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Is knowledge a natural kind?Tuomas K. Pernu - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):371 - 386.details
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Episodic memory and the feeling of pastness: from intentionalism to metacognition.Denis Perrin & André Sant’Anna - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-26.details
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Capacitism as a New Solution to Mary's puzzle.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations 14 (32):252-263.details
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Action control, forward models and expected rewards: representations in reinforcement learning.Jami Pekkanen, Jesse Kuokkanen, Otto Lappi & Anna-Mari Rusanen - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14017-14033.details
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Inverted intuitions: Occupants and roles.Michael Peirce - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):273-298.details
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Representationalism and Blindsight.Graham Peebles - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (3):541-556.details
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Phenomenology and the unity of consciousness.Graham Peebles - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5455-5477.details
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Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):205-240.details
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Intentionalism and perceptual presence.Adam Pautz - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):495-541.details
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Do theories of consciousness rest on a mistake?Adam Pautz - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):333-367.details
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