Purpose: To argue for the need to generate a third - order cybernetics to deal with the problematics of second- order cybernetics. Problem: The recent exponential increase in the use of the internet and other "media" to influence and shape dominant cultural experiences via "virtual reality" exploits a core facility of human psychology - that of being able to accept " substitutions " for the " Real Thing." In this paper, I want to raise some basic questions and dilemmas for (...) our living in the space of a third - order contextualisation that uses "virtuality" in an ever-increasing manner for the configuring and homogenisation of human experiences. In doing so, I also raise the question of the need for us to develop an adequate model of a " third - order cybernetics" for dealing with the ways in which human experience is contextualised and configured by phenomena that constitute the third - order system. Solution : Ernst von Glasersfeld's work makes it clear that psychologists and others enter into a great deal of confusion when they use terms like "self," "consciousness," "emotions," "memory," "the environment," and even "experience," because, as he points out, there is no convincing model for any of these commonly taken-for-granted phenomena of human living. His writings are taken as a unique source for the generation of an effective third - order cybernetics where the need for constant self-critical monitoring in regard to psychological praxis and third - order phenomena may take place. "Self-critical monitoring" means, in the first place, monitoring in a critical manner our tendencies to take for granted the notion of "self." One of the main problematics to deal with in second- order cybernetics is the way that "subjectivity" is taken for granted. Benefits: The temptation to collapse back down from a second- order cybernetics to first- order cybernetics will be resolved by creating an effective platform for third - order cybernetics that problematises the issue of "subjectivity" of the observer in the second- order cybernetics framework. This involves putting into question many of the common assumptions held about "who" it is that makes the observations at the second- order cybernetics. In other words, I attempt to highlight what is problematic regarding the observer 's subjectivity and how this analysis of what is taken for granted by the second- order cybernetics framework creates the basis of a framework for a third - order cybernetics. (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to review the discussion concerning various difficulties which surround the definition of depression and the methods of diagnosing and treating the disease against the background of the now dominant reductionist paradigm in psychiatry, as well as to answer the question whether a new approach to psychiatric disorders proposed by philosophers of psychiatry working within the phenomenologically inspired embodied and enactive paradigm indeed offers a solution to these difficulties. I present the issues specific to the (...) subject of depression in light of the more general problems related to biological psychiatry that have recently caused much debate. In the second part of the paper, I consider enactive, phenomenological and embodied theories of depression and the possibilities of new methods of treatment. My goal is to assess whether these theories indeed add anything important to the conceptions that are already present in psychiatry. I conclude that even if the embodied philosophy of psychiatry does not solve many of the problems faced by modern psychiatry, it can, nevertheless, provide a useful theoretical basis for future changes. (shrink)

This article addresses the issue of objectivism vs constructivism in two areas,biology and cognitive science, which areintermediate between the natural sciences suchas physics (where objectivism is dominant) andthe human and social sciences (whereconstructivism is widespread). The issues inbiology and in cognitive science are intimatelyrelated; in each of these twin areas, the objectivism vs constructivism issue isinterestingly and rather evenly balanced; as aresult, this issue engenders two contrastingparadigms, each of which has substantialspecific scientific content. The neo-Darwinianparadigm in biology is closely resonant (...) withthe classical cognitivist paradigm in cognitivescience, and both of them are intrinsicallyobjectivist. The organismic paradigm inbiology, based on the concept of autopoiesis,is consonant with the paradigm of enaction incognitive science; the latter paradigms are bothprofoundly constructivist.In cognitive science, the objectivism vsconstructivism issue is internal to thescientific field itself and reflexivity isinescapable. At this level, strong ontologicalobjectivism is self-contradictory and thereforeuntenable. Radical constructivism isself-coherent; but it also rehabilitatesa weak form of objectivism as a pragmaticallyviable alternative. In conclusion, there is aneven-handed reciprocity between objectivistand constructivist perspectives. Finally, thearticle examines the consequences of thisconclusion for fields other than cognitivescience: biology; physics and the naturalsciences; and the human and social sciences. (shrink)