- Engaging with Pike: God, Freedom, and Time.John Martin Fischer, Patrick Todd & Neal Tognazzini - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):247-270.details
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Why Frankfurt-Examples Don’t Need to Succeed to Succeed.Felipe Leon & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):551-565.details
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Uncompromising source incompatibilism.Seth Shabo - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383.details
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Beyond Verbal Disputes: The Compatibilism Debate Revisited.Peter Https://Orcidorg288X Schulte - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):669-685.details
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Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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The Bounds of freedom.Galen Strawson - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 441-460.details
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A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism.David Widerker - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.details
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Igniting the flicker of freedom: Revisiting the Frankfurt scenario.Garry Young - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (2):171-180.details
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Blameworthiness, non-robust alternatives, and the principle of alternative expectations.David Widerker - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):292–306.details
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Ceteris Paribus, I Could Have Done Otherwise.Ann Whittle - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):73-85.details
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Willusionism, epiphenomenalism, and the feeling of conscious will.Sven Walter - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2215-2238.details
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Forking Paths and Freedom: A Challenge to Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Robyn Repko Waller & Russell L. Waller - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1199-1212.details
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Prophets against Ockhamism. Or: why the hard fact/soft fact distinction is irrelevant to the problem of foreknowledge.Raphael van Riel - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (2):119-135.details
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Incompatibilism and the logic of transfer.Danilo šuster - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (33):45-54.details
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Grounding the Luck Objection.Neal A. Tognazzini - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):127-138.details
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Soft facts and ontological dependence.Patrick Todd - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):829-844.details
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Against Limited Foreknowledge.Patrick Todd - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):523-538.details
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The Dialectic Role of the Flickers of Freedom.Kevin Timpe - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):337-368.details
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A critique of Frankfurt-libertarianism.Kevin Timpe - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):189-202.details
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Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest.Matthew Talbert - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (1):89-109.details
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Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):658-671.details
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Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.details
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The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Moral Responsibility.Helen Steward - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):241-271.details
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Fairness, Agency and the Flicker of Freedom.Helen Steward - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):64 - 93.details
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Semi-compatibilism and stalemate.Daniel Speak - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):95-102.details
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Moral responsibility: The difference of Strawson, and the difference it should make.Andrew Sneddon - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):239-264.details
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Abortion, Property, and Liberty.William Simkulet - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (4):373-383.details
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Mad, bad, or disagreeing? On moral competence and responsibility.Maureen Sie - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (3):262 – 281.details
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The fate of the direct argument and the case for incompatibilism.Seth Shabo - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):405-424.details
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Robustness Revised: Frankfurt Cases and the Right Kind of Power to Do Otherwise.Seth Shabo - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):89-106.details
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It wasn’t up to Jones: unavoidable actions and intensional contexts in Frankfurt examples.Seth Shabo - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):379-399.details
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Flickers of freedom and modes of action: A reply to Timpe.Seth Shabo - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (1):63-74.details
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Action explanation and the free will debate: How incompatibilist arguments go wrong1.Scott Sehon - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):351-368.details
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Weak reasons-responsiveness meets its match: in defense of David Widerker’s attack on PAP.Ira M. Schnall - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):271 - 283.details
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Weak reasons-responsiveness meets its match: in defense of David Widerker’s attack on PAP.Ira M. Schnall - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):271-283.details
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Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility.Markus E. Schlosser - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.details
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Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability.Stefan Rummens & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (2):233-249.details
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The limits of limited-blockage Frankfurt-style cases.Michael Robinson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):429-446.details
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Modified Frankfurt-type counterexamples and flickers of freedom.Michael Robinson - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):177-194.details
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Free Will and Contextualism.Steven Rieber - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):223-252.details
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Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118.details
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Frankfurt examples, derivative responsibility, and the timing objection1.Derk Pereboom - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):298-315.details
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Can’t We All Just be Compatibilists?: A Critical Study of John Martin Fischer’s My Way.John Perry - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (2):157-166.details
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Does doxastic responsibility entail the ability to believe otherwise?Rik Peels - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3651-3669.details
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Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases.David Palmer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):261 - 272.details
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Freedom With a Human Face.Timothy O'Connor - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):207-227.details
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Close calls and the confident agent: Free will, deliberation, and alternative possibilities.Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):627-667.details
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Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: Experiments on folk intuitions.Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates & Trevor Kvaran - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242.details
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Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.details
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Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy.Michael S. McKenna - 1997 - Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (3):71-85.details
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