- “Hallucination, Mental Representation, and the Presentational Character”.Costas Pagondiotis - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 361.details
|
|
Pure Russellianism.Sean Crawford - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (2):171-202.details
|
|
Plotinus' Self-Reflexivity Argument against Materialism.Zain Raza - forthcoming - Ancient Philosophy Today.details
|
|
The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.details
|
|
Normativity of Meaning: An Inferentialist Argument.Shuhei Shimamura & Tuomo Tiisala - 2023 - Synthese 202 (4):1-21.details
|
|
Naturalizing the content of desire.Peter Https://Orcidorg288X Schulte - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):161-174.details
|
|
Knowing mental states: The asymmetry of psychological prediction and explanation.Kristin Andrews - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Georges Rey - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Classical Computational Models.Richard Samuels - 2018 - In Mark Sprevak & Matteo Colombo (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. Routledge. pp. 103-119.details
|
|
The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation in Its Place.Daniel D. Hutto, Erik Myin, Anco Peeters & Farid Zahnoun - 2018 - In Mark Sprevak & Matteo Colombo (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. Routledge. pp. 272-282.details
|
|
A Deflationary Account of Mental Representation.Frances Egan - 2020 - In Joulia Smortchkova, Krzysztof Dołrega & Tobias Schlicht (eds.), What Are Mental Representations? New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Representational development need not be explicable-by-content.Nicholas Shea - 2016 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence. Cham: Springer.details
|
|
Mentale Gehalte und erweiterter Geist: Warum das Argument der Nichtabgeleitetheit scheitert.Fabian Hundertmark - 2015 - In Jan G. Michel, Kim J. Boström & Michael Pohl (eds.), Ist der Geist im Kopf? Beiträge zur These des erweiterten Geistes. Brill/mentis. pp. 133-160.details
|
|
Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin, Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013; 206pp. [REVIEW]D. Campbell - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):174-176.details
|
|
Interpreting ordinary uses of psychological and moral terms in the AI domain.Hyungrae Noh - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-33.details
|
|
On the Ambiguity of Imagery and Particularity of Imaginings.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2023 - Topoi:1-9.details
|
|
Argument, Inference and Dialectic: Collected Papers on Informal Logic.Robert Pinto - 2001 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
|
|
Talking about Talking : an Ecological-Enactive Perspective on Language.J. C. Van den Herik - 2019 - Erasmus University Rotterdam.details
|
|
Representation in Cognitive Science.Nicholas Shea - 2018 - Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Environments of Intelligence. From Natural Information to Artficial Interaction.Hajo Greif - 2017 - London: Routledge.details
|
|
The language of thought hypothesis.Murat Aydede - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Origins of the Qualitative Aspects of Consciousness: Evolutionary Answers to Chalmers' Hard Problem.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. Springer. pp. 259--269.details
|
|
Intelligence involves intensionality: An explanatory issue for radical enactivism (again).Silvano Zipoli Caiani - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-23.details
|
|
The normativity of the mental.Nick Zangwill - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):1-19.details
|
|
Meaning and Normativity. [REVIEW]Julie Yoo - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):310-324.details
|
|
A naturalistic interpretation of the Kripkean modality.Feng Ye - 2009 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (3):454-470.details
|
|
Rule following: A pedestrian approach.Masahiro Yamada - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):283-311.details
|
|
Reconsidering perceptual content.William T. Wojtach - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):22-43.details
|
|
Machine mentality and the nature of the ground relation.Darren Whobrey - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (3):307-346.details
|
|
The temporal dimension of thought: Cortical foundations of predicative representation.Markus Werning - 2005 - Synthese 146 (1-2):203-224.details
|
|
Complex First? On the Evolutionary and Developmental Priority of Semantically Thick Words.Markus Werning - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):1096-1108.details
|
|
Fodorian semantics: A reply to Adams and Aizawa. [REVIEW]Ted A. Warfield - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (2):205-14.details
|
|
Colour hallucination: In defence of externalist representationalism.Elisabeth Lucia Waczek & Wolfgang Barz - 2022 - Analysis 82 (1):3-7.details
|
|
Troubles with Phenomenal Intentionality.Alberto Voltolini - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):237-256.details
|
|
Seeing in Mirrors.Alberto Voltolini - forthcoming - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.details
|
|
Extended mathematical cognition: external representations with non-derived content.Karina Vold & Dirk Schlimm - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):3757-3777.details
|
|
Is Thinking a Matter of Knowing?Víctor Martín Verdejo Aparicio - 2013 - Agora 32 (1).details
|
|
Reasons for pragmatism: affording epistemic contact in a shared environment.Ludger van Dijk & Erik Myin - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):973-997.details
|
|
Constructing a Naturalistic Theory of Intentionality.J. H. van Hateren - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (1):473-493.details
|
|
Comment on Ryder's SINBAD neurosemantics: Is teleofunction isomorphism the way to understand representations?Marius Usher - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):241-248.details
|
|
A Statistical Referential Theory of Content: Using Information Theory to Account for Misrepresentation.Marius Usher - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (3):311-334.details
|
|
Confusion is Corruptive Belief in False Identity.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):204-227.details
|
|
The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge.Sanford C. Goldberg - 1999 - Synthese 118 (2):165 - 199.details
|
|
The extended mind argument against phenomenal intentionality.Cody Turner - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (4):747-774.details
|
|
Neural Representations Observed.Eric Thomson & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (1):191-235.details
|
|
Indeterminacy in recent theories of content.Donna M. Summerfield & Pat A. Manfredi - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (2):181-202.details
|
|
The Problem Of Self-Knowledge.Karsten R. Stueber - 2002 - Erkenntnis 56 (3):269-296.details
|
|
The extended replicator.Kim Sterelny, Kelly C. Smith & Michael Dickison - 1996 - Biology and Philosophy 11 (3):377-403.details
|
|
Supermachines and superminds.Eric Steinhart - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (1):155-186.details
|
|