- Reasons-responsiveness, modality and rational blind spots.Heering David - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):293-316.details
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Responsibility and the recursion problem.Ben Davies - 2021 - Ratio 35 (2):112-122.details
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Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency.Cory Davia - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (2):179-196.details
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Imagining a non-biological machine as a legal person.David J. Calverley - 2008 - AI and Society 22 (4):523-537.details
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Dretske on the metaphysics of freedom.Scott A. Davison - 1994 - Analysis 54 (2):115-123.details
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Determinism and evil.Martin Davies - 1980 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):116 – 127.details
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Actual Sequences, Frankfurt-Cases, and Non-accidentality.Heering David - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (10):1269-1288.details
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The Moral Permissibility of Automated Responses during Cyberwarfare.David Danks & Joseph H. Danks - 2013 - Journal of Military Ethics 12 (1):18-33.details
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Descartes and the Possibility of Enlightened Freedom.Daniel Fogal - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (4):499-534.details
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Semicompatibilism and Moral Responsibility for Actions and Omissions: In Defence of Symmetrical Requirements.Taylor W. Cyr - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):349-363.details
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Semicompatibilism: no ability to do otherwise required.Taylor W. Cyr - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):308-321.details
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The Robustness Requirement on Alternative Possibilities.Taylor W. Cyr - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (3):481-499.details
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Is Semicompatibilism Unstable?Taylor W. Cyr - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):245-264.details
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Manipulation Arguments and Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (1):57-73.details
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Moral responsibility for actions and omissions: a new challenge to the asymmetry thesis.Taylor W. Cyr - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3153-3161.details
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Moral Responsibility Without General Ability.Taylor W. Cyr & Philip Swenson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):22-40.details
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When do circumstances excuse? Moral prejudices and beliefs about the true self drive preferences for agency-minimizing explanations.Simon Cullen - 2018 - Cognition 180 (C):165-181.details
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Judgments about moral responsibility and determinism in patients with behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia: Still compatibilists.Florian Cova, Maxime Bertoux, Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde & Bruno Dubois - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):851-864.details
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Do intuitions about Frankfurt-style cases rest on an internalist prejudice?Florian Cova & Hichem Naar - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (3):290-305.details
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Experimental Philosophy and the Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism: A Survey.Florian Cova & Yasuko Kitano - 2014 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 22:17-37.details
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Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Explanation Condition for Moral Responsibility: a Reply to Swenson.Florian Cova - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (4):427-446.details
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Frankfurt-Style Cases User Manual: Why Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases Do Not Necessitate Tech Support.Florian Cova - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):505-521.details
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Responsibility.J. Angelo Corlett - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):1-33.details
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On Young’s Version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.Daniel Coren - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):585-594.details
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Freedom, Gratitude, and Resentment: Olivi and Strawson.Daniel Coren - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (3):1-21.details
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Alternate Possibilities and Moral Asymmetry.Daniel Avi Coren - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (2):145-159.details
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The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid. [REVIEW]Rebecca Copenhaver - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):115-121.details
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Abilities, freedom, and inputs: a time traveller's tale.Olivia Coombes - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Edinburghdetails
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Blame It on the AI? On the Moral Responsibility of Artificial Moral Advisors.Mihaela Constantinescu, Constantin Vică, Radu Uszkai & Cristina Voinea - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (2):1-26.details
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Difference‐Making in Epistemology.Juan Comesaña & Carolina Sartorio - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):368-387.details
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A Realidade Social: uma ontologia de segunda natureza.Denis Coitinho - 2018 - Pensando: Revista de Filosofia 9 (17):305-333.details
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Openness, Accidentality and Responsibility.Daniel Cohen - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):581-597.details
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Finking Frankfurt.Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (3):363--74.details
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Thinking about luck.E. J. Coffman - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):385-398.details
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Practical Decision and the Cognitive Requirements for Blameworthiness.E. J. Coffman - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):119-135.details
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How (not) to attack the luck argument.E. J. Coffman - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):157-166.details
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Narrative responsibility and artificial intelligence.Mark Coeckelbergh - 2021 - AI and Society:1-14.details
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Narrative responsibility and artificial intelligence.Mark Coeckelbergh - 2023 - AI and Society 38 (6):2437-2450.details
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Reasons-responsiveness and degrees of responsibility.D. Justin Coates & Philip Swenson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):629-645.details
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An Actual-Sequence Theory of Promotion.D. Justin Coates - 2013 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (3):1-8.details
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Molinism: Explaining our Freedom Away.Nevin Climenhaga & Daniel Rubio - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):459-485.details
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The appearance of freedom.Randolph Clarke - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):51 – 57.details
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Libertarianism, action theory, and the loci of responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (2):153-174.details
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It’s Up to You.Randolph Clarke - 2020 - The Monist 103 (3):328-341.details
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Intentional omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):158-177.details
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Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism.Cory J. Clark, Bo M. Winegard & Roy F. Baumeister - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:397001.details
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Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.Randolph Clarke - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):323-351.details
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Abilities to Act.Randolph Clarke - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):893-904.details
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Agent causation and the problem of luck.Randolph Clarke - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421.details
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Tolerance, acceptance and the virtue of orthonomy: a reply to Lawrence Blum and Brenda Almond.Michelle Ciurria - 2011 - Journal of Moral Education 40 (2):255-264.details
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