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Object Seeing and Spatial Perception

In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 134-162 (2018)

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  1. Seeing-as, seeing-o, and seeing-that.Søren Overgaard - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2973-2992.
    Philosophers tend to assume a close logical connection between seeing-as reports and seeing-that reports. But the proposals they have made have one striking feature in common: they are demonstrably false. Going against the trend, I suggest we stop trying to lump together seeing-as and seeing-that. Instead, we need to realize that there is a deep logical kinship between seeing-as reports and seeing-objects reports.
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  • Perceiving properties versus perceiving objects.Boyd Millar - 2022 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (2):99-117.
    The fact that you see some particular object seems to be due to the causal relation between your visual experience and that object, rather than to your experiences’ phenomenal character. On the one hand, whenever some phenomenal element of your experience stands in the right sort of causal relation to some object, your experience presents that object (your experience’s phenomenology doesn’t need to match that object). On the other hand, you can’t have a perceptual experience that presents some object unless (...)
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  • Introduction: striving for objectivity in space.Tony Cheng & Paul Snowdon - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):791-797.
    In this special issue, we put together papers that explore the theme “objectivity, space, and mind” from various angles. In the introduction we minimally discuss what are involved in this theme.
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  • The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, by Susanna Schellenberg. [REVIEW]Craig French - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):339-349.
    The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, by SchellenbergSusanna. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 272.
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  • Bálint’s syndrome, Object Seeing, and Spatial Perception.Craig French - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (3):221-241.
    Ordinary cases of object seeing involve the visual perception of space and spatial location. But does seeing an object require such spatial perception? An empirical challenge to the idea that it does comes from reflection upon Bálint's syndrome, for some suppose that in Bálint's syndrome subjects can see objects without seeing space or spatial location. In this article, I question whether the empirical evidence available to us adequately supports this understanding of Bálint's syndrome, and explain how the aforementioned empirical challenge (...)
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  • The Visual Role of Objects' Facing Surfaces.William E. S. Mcneill - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):411-431.
    It is often assumed that when we see common opaque objects in standard light this is in virtue of seeing their facing surfaces. Here I argue that we should reject that claim. Either we don't see objects' facing surfaces, or—if we hold on to the claim that we do see such things—it is at least not in virtue of seeing them that we see common opaque objects. I end by showing how this conclusion squares both with our intuitions and with (...)
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  • Perceiving Immaterial Paths.Clare Mac Cumhaill - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):687-715.
    In what sense does empty space feature in visual experience? In the first part of this essay I sketch a view advanced by Soteriou and Richardson on which one's visual awareness of empty space is explained by appeal to ‘structural’ features of the phenomenology of visual experience, in particular the phenomenology of experiencing one's visual field as bounded. I suggest that although this ‘structuralist’ view is silent on whether empty space has a phenomenal appearance, the very appeal to structural features (...)
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