- Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Self-Experience.Darryl Mathieson - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.details
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What is the Structure of Self-Consciousness and Conscious Mental States?Rocco J. Gennaro - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):295-309.details
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Transparência, reflexão e vicissitude.Waldomiro J. Silva Filho - 2011 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 52 (123):213-236.details
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Perception from the First‐Person Perspective.Robert J. Howell - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):187-213.details
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24 Reflections on Infinite Utility and Deliberation in Pascal’s Wager.Alan Hájek - 2024 - In Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.), Ontology of Divinity. De Gruyter. pp. 493-510.details
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Ontology of Divinity.Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.) - 2024 - De Gruyter.details
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The Essential Tension in Phenomenal Consciousness.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2020 - Philosophical Papers 49 (1):159-190.details
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A New Understanding of the First-Person and Third-Person Perspectives.Alla Choifer - 2018 - Philosophical Papers 47 (3):333-371.details
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Internalist Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma.Ali Hasan - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):171-184.details
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Self-Knowledge, Choice Blindness, and Confabulation.Hayley F. Webster - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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Self-Ignorance.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2012 - In Consciousness and the Self.details
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First-person belief and empirical certainty.David B. Martens - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):118-136.details
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The Limits of the Doxastic.Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 36-57.details
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Concepts, Belief, and Perception.Alex Byrne - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schroder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Dualism all the way down: why there is no paradox of phenomenal judgment.Helen Yetter-Chappell - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-24.details
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Critical Reasoning and the Inferential Transparency Method.Benjamin Winokur - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):23-42.details
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Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.details
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Extended belief and extended knowledge.Åsa Wikforss - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):460-481.details
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Respuesta a Sebastián: en defensa de la naturaleza de las creencias de primera persona.Javier Vidal - 2018 - Critica 50 (150):65-89.details
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Beliefs’ self-knowledge: an objection to the method of transparency.Javier Vidal - 2019 - Humanities Journal of Valparaiso 14:429-448.details
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Knowledge of language in action.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):68-89.details
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Revelation and physicalism.Kelly Trogdon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2345-2366.details
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Being Familiar with What One Wants.Uku Tooming - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):690-710.details
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Transparency and Partial Beliefs.Weng Hong Tang - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):153-166.details
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Judgment Internalism: An Argument from Self-Knowledge.Jussi Suikkanen - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):489-503.details
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Evans on transparency: a rationalist account.Daniel Stoljar - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2067-2085.details
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Conscious belief as constructed memory: an empirical challenge to dispositionalism.Vishnu Sridharan - 2015 - Mind and Society 14 (1):21-33.details
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Thought insertion: Abnormal sense of thought agency or thought endorsement?Paulo Sousa & Lauren Swiney - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):637-654.details
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Kant’s “I think” and the agential approach to self-knowledge.Houston Smit - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):980-1011.details
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Belief and Self‐Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):393-421.details
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The Evil Demon Inside.Nicholas Silins - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):325-343.details
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Introspection and inference.Nicholas Silins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):291-315.details
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The Relevance of Explanatory First-Person Approaches (EFPA) for Understanding Psychopathological Phenomena. The Role of Phenomenology.Philipp Schmidt - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.details
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Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.details
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Attention and Internal Monitoring: A Farewell to HOP.Wesley Sauret & William G. Lycan - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):363-370.details
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Transparency and introspective unification.Kateryna Samoilova - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).details
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First-person privilege, judgment, and avowal.Kateryna Samoilova - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):169-182.details
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How might degrees of belief shift? On action conflicting with professed beliefs.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):732-742.details
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Radical enactivism and self-knowledge.Giovanni Rolla - 2018 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (141):723-743.details
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A Wittgensteinian View of Mind and Self-Knowledge.Ángel García Rodríguez - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):993-1013.details
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Psichologizmas, reliatyvizmas ir savęs paneigimas Husserlio Prolegomenuose.Paulius Rimkevičius - 2016 - Problemos 89:153-166.details
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XIII—Self-Knowledge as a Personal Achievement.Ursula Renz - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (3):253-272.details
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Modes of Introspective Access: a Pluralist Approach.Adriana Renero - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):823-844.details
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An Outline for Ambivalence of Value Judgment.Hili Razinsky - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (3):469-488.details
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The Lycan–Stich Argument and the Plasticity of “Belief”.Krzysztof Poslajko - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1257-1273.details
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Direct phenomenal beliefs, cognitive significance, and the specious present.Ted Poston - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):483-489.details
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BonJour and the Myth of the Given.Ted Poston - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):185-201.details
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The value of privileged access.Jared Peterson - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):365-378.details
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Groups that fly blind.Jared Peterson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-24.details
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