The generic notion of “religion” and its conceptual demarcation from “the secular” have been critically examined by a number of scholars from the “critical religion” perspective. The interrogation of the term “religion,” and other related terms, questions modern formations of knowledge and power in general. This paper constitutes part of the project which examines norms and imperatives which govern sociological discourse on religion. Max Weber and Emile Durkheim are particularly significant figures in sociology of religion. The aim of this paper (...) is to historicize the category “religion” employed by Weber and Durkheim, in the specific social context of Germany and France in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It hopes to contribute to a greater understanding of the ideological foundation of sociological theories of religion. (shrink)

Although Max Weber does not specifically analyze the topic of esteem, his investigation of the Protestant ethic offers interesting insights into it. The change in mentality it engendered essentially contributed to enhancing the meaning and importance of esteem in modern society. In his analysis, Weber ascertains that esteem was fundamental to being accepted and integrated into the social life of congregations. Nevertheless, he also highlights that esteem was supported by a form of self-esteem which was not simply derived from a (...) good social reputation, but also achieved through a deep and continual self-analysis as well as a strict discipline in the ethical conduct of life. The present analysis reconstructs the different aspects of the relationship between social and self-esteem and analyzes the consequences of that relationship by focusing on the exemplary case of the politician’s personality and ethic. (shrink)

Working within an Archerian morphogenetic framework, I suggest that we need to pay more attention to practices. Instead of the mainstream focus on practice as action, I argue that we should pay attention to practices as a key structural and cultural element of analysis. Practices cannot be simply read-off from beliefs, that is, they are not an inevitable practical counterpart to belief. Although belief is relevant, it does not provide the full explanation for the presence of practices. Therefore, the same (...) or similar beliefs can result in significantly different practices depending on factors such as advances in technology and changes in modes of dissemination of theological doctrine. To illustrate my argument, I consider historical work on comparative religious practices, specifically the distinction between rituals and routines. A focus on the latter, as the conditions of possibility for the former, leads to some implications for the thesis of the morphogenesis of contemporary society. An analysis of the relationship between religious rituals and routines stresses the importance of placing both in their wider cultural and structural context. (shrink)