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  1. Adaptive Rationality, Biases, and the Heterogeneity Hypothesis.Andrea Polonioli - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):787-803.
    Adaptive rationality theorists question the manner in which psychologists have typically assessed rational behavior and cognition. According to them, human rationality is adaptive, and the biases reported in the psychological literature are best seen as the result of using normative standards that are too narrow. As it turns out, their challenge is also quite controversial, and several aspects of it have been called into question. Yet, whilst it is often suggested that the lack of cogency comes about due to the (...)
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  • What Are Axiomatizations Good For?Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - 2019 - Theory and Decision 86 (3-4):339-359.
    Do axiomatic derivations advance positive economics? If economists are interested in predicting how people behave, without a pretense to change individual decision making, how can they benefit from representation theorems, which are no more than equivalence results? We address these questions. We propose several ways in which representation results can be useful and discuss their implications for axiomatic decision theory.
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  • On the Definition of Objective Probabilities by Empirical Similarity.Itzhak Gilboa, Offer Lieberman & David Schmeidler - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):79 - 95.
    We suggest to define objective probabilities by similarity-weighted empirical frequencies, where more similar cases get a higher weight in the computation of frequencies. This formula is justified intuitively and axiomatically, but raises the question, which similarity function should be used? We propose to estimate the similarity function from the data, and thus obtain objective probabilities. We compare this definition to others, and attempt to delineate the scope of situations in which objective probabilities can be used.
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  • A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents.Edward Elliott - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (5):467-506.
    The standard representation theorem for expected utility theory tells us that if a subject’s preferences conform to certain axioms, then she can be represented as maximising her expected utility given a particular set of credences and utilities—and, moreover, that having those credences and utilities is the only way that she could be maximising her expected utility. However, the kinds of agents these theorems seem apt to tell us anything about are highly idealised, being always probabilistically coherent with infinitely precise degrees (...)
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  • Rational Choice as a Toolbox for the Economist: An Interview with Itzhak Gilboa.Catherine Herfeld - 2014 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 7 (2):116-141.
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  • Evolution, Rationality, and Coherence Criteria.Andrea Polonioli - 2014 - Biological Theory 9 (3):309-317.
    How much irrationality should we ascribe to human cognition? Psychological evidence suggests that people’s reasoning is largely inaccurate, but according to an evolutionary argument for rationality, we have good reasons to believe that this is not so. To solve the conflict between psychological evidence and EAR, commentators have usually put the blame either on the psychological evidence, arguing that inaccurate reasoning appears only in the context of lab studies, or on the premises of EAR, charged with not being in line (...)
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  • Rational Beliefs in Rationalizability.Xiao Luo - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):189-198.
    In this paper I scrutinize the “rational beliefs” in the concept of rationalizability in strategic games [Bernheim, Pearce ]. I illustrate through an example that a rationalizable strategy may not be supported by a “rational belief”, at least under one plausible interpretation of “rational belief”. I offer an alternative formulation of “rational belief” in the concept of rationalizability, which yields a novel epistemic interpretation of the notion of point-rationalizability.
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  • Building the Theory of Ecological Rationality.Peter M. Todd & Henry Brighton - 2016 - Minds and Machines 26 (1-2):9-30.
    While theories of rationality and decision making typically adopt either a single-powertool perspective or a bag-of-tricks mentality, the research program of ecological rationality bridges these with a theoretically-driven account of when different heuristic decision mechanisms will work well. Here we described two ways to study how heuristics match their ecological setting: The bottom-up approach starts with psychologically plausible building blocks that are combined to create simple heuristics that fit specific environments. The top-down approach starts from the statistical problem facing the (...)
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