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Descriptive-causal generalizations : "empirical laws" in the social sciences?

In Harold Kincaid (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science. Oxford University Press (2012)

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  1. (1 other version)Possibilist Explanation: Explaining How-Possibly Through Laws.Gustavo A. Castañon - 2021 - Erkenntnis:835-852.
    ‘Possibilist Explanation’ is a promising account of scientific explanation which avoids the familiar problems of “how-possibly explanations”. It explains an event by showing how-actually it was epistemically possible, instead of why it was epistemically necessary. Its explanandum is the epistemic possibility of an actual event previously considered epistemically impossible. To define PE, two new concepts are introduced: ‘permissive condition’ and ‘possibilist law’. A permissive condition for an event is something that does not entail the event itself, but a necessary condition (...)
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  • How should philosophy of social science proceed?: Chrysostomos Mantzavinos : Philosophy of the social sciences: Philosophical theory and scientific practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 344pp, £18.99 PB.Harold Kincaid - 2011 - Metascience 21 (2):391-394.
    How should philosophy of social science proceed? Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9592-7 Authors Harold Kincaid, Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama at Birmingham, 900 13th Street South, Birmingham, AL 35294-1260, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  • (1 other version)Possibilist Explanation: Explaining How-Possibly Through Laws.Gustavo A. Castañon - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):835-852.
    Abstract‘Possibilist Explanation’ is a promising account of scientific explanation which avoids the familiar problems of “how-possibly explanations”. It explains an event by showing how-actually it was epistemically possible, instead of why it was epistemically necessary. Its explanandum is the epistemic possibility of an actual event previously considered epistemically impossible. To define PE, two new concepts are introduced: ‘permissive condition’ and ‘possibilist law’. A permissive condition for an event is something that does not entail the event itself, but a necessary condition (...)
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