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  1. Trivalent conditionals, Kratzer style.Paul Egre, Lorenzo Rossi & Jan Sprenger - manuscript
    This paper extends a trivalent semantics for indicative conditionals to a language including the modal operators "might" and "must". Specifically, we combine Cooper's (1968) truth-functional, trivalent analysis of the conditional connective with Kratzer's (1986, 2012) idea that if-clauses restrict modal operators. By hard-wiring both trivalence and the restriction operation into the truth conditions of conditional-modal expressions, we obtain an attractive theory that yields plausible predictions for the interaction of conditionals and modals, explains the intuitive appeal of the Restrictor View and (...)
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  • The material and the suppositional conditional.Jan Sprenger - manuscript
    The material conditional and the suppositional analysis of the indicative conditional are based on different philosophical foundations and they leave important successes of their competitor unexplained. This paper unifies both accounts within a truth-functional, trivalent model of the suppositional analysis. In this model, we observe that the material and the suppositional conditional exhibit the same logical behavior while they have different truth conditions and different probabilities. The result is a unified semantic analysis that closes an important gap in the suppositional (...)
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  • Trivalent Semantics for Conditional Obligations.Paul Egre, Lorenzo Rossi & Jan Sprenger - manuscript
    This paper provides a new framework for formalizing conditional obligations in natural language: it pairs a unary deontic operator with trivalent semantics for the indicative conditional and Kratzer's idea that the antecedents of conditionals restrict the scope of modals in the consequent. Combining these three ideas, we obtain a fully compositional theory of "if" and "ought'" that validates plausible principles for deontic reasoning. Moreover, it resolves classical challenges such as the "if A then ought A" problem, the paradox of the (...)
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