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  1. Non-Branching Personal Persistence.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2307-2329.
    Given reductionism about people, personal persistence must fundamentally consist in some kind of impersonal continuity relation. Typically, these continuity relations can hold from one to many. And, if they can, the analysis of personal persistence must include a non-branching clause to avoid non-transitive identities or multiple occupancy. It is far from obvious, however, what form this clause should take. This paper argues that previous accounts are inadequate and develops a new proposal.
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  • Is Psychology What Matters in Survival?Johan E. Gustafsson - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):504-516.
    According to the Psychological-Continuity Account of What Matters, you are justified in having special concern for the well-being of a person at a future time if and only if that person will be psychologically continuous with you as you are now. On some versions of the account, the psychological continuity is required be temporally ordered, whereas, on other versions, it is allowed to be temporally unordered. In this paper, I argue that the account is implausible if the psychological continuity is (...)
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  • Johansson on Fission.Douglas Ehring - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (2):155-163.
    Johansson, in “Parfit on Fission,” rejects Parfit’s thesis that fission demonstrates that identity does not matter in survival based on the following assumption (call the person who fissions, “Mr. Fissiony” and the fission products, “Lefty” and “Righty”): It is determinately true that Mr. Fissiony is identical to Lefty or that he is identical to Righty, but it is indeterminate whether Mr. Fissiony is identical to Lefty and it is indeterminate whether Mr. Fissiony is identical to Righty. Johansson argues that there (...)
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  • Personal Identity and Trivial Survival.Andrea Sauchelli - 2019 - Theoria 85 (5):402-411.
    Your replica is created on Mars and you, on Earth, are destroyed. Parfit claims that your replica may still have what prudentially matters for you – provided that you are psychologically connected and continuous with your replica. If someone accidentally destroys the tapes containing your psychological profile used in the production of your replica and this same action fortuitously produces a functionally equivalent tape, Ehring claims that Parfit should maintain that the resulting new individual may still have what matters. Nihilism (...)
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