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  1. Is science like a crossword puzzle? Foundherentist conceptions of scientific warrant.Rik Peels - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):82-101.
    This paper argues that the crossword puzzle analogy is great for scientific rationality, but not scientific warrant. It provides a critical analysis of foundherentist conceptions of scientific warrant, especially that of Susan Haack, and closely related positions, such as non-doxastic coherentism. Foundherentism takes the middle ground between foundationalism and coherentism. The main idea is that warrant, including that of scientific theories, is like warrant of crossword entries: the degree to which a theory is warranted depends on one’s observations, the extent (...)
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  • Take five? A coherentist argument why medical AI does not require a new ethical principle.Seppe Segers & Michiel De Proost - 2024 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 45 (5):387-400.
    With the growing application of machine learning models in medicine, principlist bioethics has been put forward as needing revision. This paper reflects on the dominant trope in AI ethics to include a new ‘principle of explicability’ alongside the traditional four principles of bioethics that make up the theory of principlism. It specifically suggests that these four principles are sufficient and challenges the relevance of explicability as a separate ethical principle by emphasizing the coherentist affinity of principlism. We argue that, through (...)
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  • Getting off the Wheel.Patrick Bondy & Dustin Olson - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):620-637.
    Roderick Chisholm argues that in giving an account of knowledge, we must either begin with an account of what knowledge is, and proceed on that basis to identify the particular things that we know, or else start with instances of knowledge, and proceed on that basis to formulate a definition of knowledge. Either approach begs the question against the other. This is the epistemic wheel. This article responds to Chisholm's challenge. It begins with cases of knowledge attribution and builds its (...)
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  • The foundationalism–coherentism opposition revisited: The case for complementarism. [REVIEW]Yves Bouchard - 2007 - Foundations of Science 12 (4):325-336.
    In this paper, I show the complementarity of foundationalism and coherentism with respect to any efficient system of beliefs by means of a distinction between two types of proposition drawn from an analogy with an axiomatic system. This distinction is based on the way a given proposition is acknowledged as true, either by declaration (F-proposition) or by preservation (C-proposition). Within such a perspective, i.e., epistemological complementarism, not only can one see how the usual opposition between foundationalism and coherentism is irrelevant, (...)
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