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  1. The natural basis of political obligation.George Klosko - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (1):93-114.
    Though questions of political obligation have long been central to liberal political theory, discussion has generally focused on voluntaristic aspects of the individual's relationship to the state, as opposed to other factors through which the state is able to ground compliance with its laws. The individual has been conceptualized as naturally without political ties, whether or not formally in a state of nature, and questions of political obligation have centered on accounting for political bonds.Footnotes* For helpful comments on and discussion (...)
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  • Ethics in economics: From classical economics to neo-liberalism.W. Ver Eecke - 1982 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 9 (2):146-167.
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  • Inequalities Not Conceded Yet: A Rejoinder to Gauthier's Reply.David Braybrooke - 1982 - Dialogue 21 (3):445-448.
    Gauthier's thinking about the social contract continues to develop vigorously. Had I aimed my criticisms at the stage of his thinking that he had reached at the time of his reply to them, rather than at earlier stages already in print, I would have organized my argument differently. Yet the earlier stages were interesting enough—and remain so—to deserve attention for their own sake. Moreover, my criticisms, even as they stand, have some effects that transcend those stages. They undermine the assumption (...)
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  • Inefficient Unanimity.Geoffrey Brennan & Loren Lomasky - 1984 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 1 (1):151-163.
    ABSTRACT The notion of consensus plays an important epistemological role in modern welfare economics, in that unanimous consent is a (unique) conceptual test for those changes that are ‘Pareto-desirable’ (that is, make someone better off and no-one else worse). In this paper, we seek to show that unanimous consent does not logically imply Pareto-desirability—that a rational individual may fail to veto policy changes that make him/her worse off. The central element in the proof of this proposition is the observation that (...)
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