The place of Richard Dedekind in the history of logicism is a controversial matter. The conception of logic incorporated in his work is certainly old-fashioned, in spite of innovative elements that would play an important role in late 19th and early 20th century discussions. Yet his understanding of logic and logicism remains of interest for the light it throws upon the development of modern logic in general, and logicist views of the foundations of mathematics in particular. The paper clarifies Dedekind's (...) views and their relation to transcendental logic, makes explicit the role of the principle of comprehension (unrestricted) and offers a reconstrucion ot his dichotomy conception. The last section explores the differences with Frege (half epistemic, half metaphysical) making clear that there were different brands of logicism, and that logicism does not necessarily lead to singularism or “essentialistic objectualism”. (shrink)