Can Kant's theory of freedom be defended in contemporary "incompatibilist" terms, as Henry Allison believes, or is it vulnerable to Hegelian criticisms of the "compatibilist" sort that Allen Wood presents? I argue that the answer to both of these questions is negative, and that there is a third option, namely that Kant's real theory of freedom is not as well off as Allison contends, nor as weak as Wood claims. Allison tries to save Kant's theory of freedom from both what (...) he takes to be traditional and improper interpretations, notably including Hegel's and Wood's, of what that theory means, as well as from traditional and improper objections to its defensibility. I argue in part with Wood (and Hegel) against Allison on the issue of the meaning of Kant's theory, and in part with Allison against Wood (and Hegel) on the issue of the defensibility of Kant's theory. (shrink)

The reference to “values” as normatively guiding structures is widespread in contemporary political and societal discussions. Values are expected to improve stability and provide ethical orientation in modern civilizations which are shaped by manifold cultural influences. At the same time values are often underdetermined, not well legitimized and difficult to interpret in concrete cases. The article takes up such appeals to “values” and contrasts them with Kant’s concept of moral value. Moral value, according to Kant, remains dependent on the moral (...) law as a formal procedure. Key issues for the understanding of moral value in Kant refer to overdetermined action and to the acquisition of maxims in life practice. An analysis of these aspects comes to the conclusion that the Kantian concept of moral value bypasses problems associated with the appeal to “values” and is promising for dealing with moral conflicts in modern societies. (shrink)