- Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?J. J. Cunningham - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3889-3910.details
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Epistemic Disagreement and Practical Disagreement.Christopher Cowie - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):191-209.details
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Distinctive substantial self-knowledge and the possibility of self-improvement.Josep E. Corbí - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-22.details
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Can We Believe for Practical Reasons?Juan Comesaña - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):189-207.details
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Teaching & Learning Guide for: ‘Border Disputes: Recent Debates along the Perception–Cognition Border’.Sam Clarke & Jacob Beck - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (10):e12949.details
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Intentions, Intending, and Belief: Noninferential Weak Cognitivism.Philip Clark - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):308-327.details
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Autonomous reasons for intending.Randolph Clarke - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):191 – 212.details
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Causal Blame.Eugene Chislenko - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (4):347-58.details
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Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason.Ruth Chang (ed.) - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
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Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontologism.Andrei Buckareff - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 17.details
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Doxastic decisions and controlling belief.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (1):102-114.details
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Acceptance and Managerial Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (3):359-378.details
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Action-Individuation and Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Theoria 77 (4):312-332.details
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Responses.John Broome - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3431-3448.details
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Active belief.Matthew Boyle - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary 35 (S1):119-147.details
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On knowing one's own resistant beliefs.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):212-225.details
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Dissonance and Doxastic Resistance.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):957-974.details
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Dissonance and Irrationality: A Criticism of The In‐Between Account of Dissonance Cases.Cristina Borgoni - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):48-57.details
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Reasonable standards and exculpating moral ignorance.Nathan Biebel - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (1):1-21.details
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Epistemic justification and the ignorance excuse.Nathan Biebel - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3005-3028.details
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Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.details
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What can we not do at will and why.Hagit Benbaji - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1941-1961.details
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Mapping the epistemic arguments for religious toleration.Gilles Beauchamp - 2022 - Religious Studies 58 (1):217-235.details
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What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931.details
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The wrongs of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515.details
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The Importance of Forgetting.Rima Basu - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):471-490.details
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Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):9-23.details
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Cogito and Moore.David James Barnett - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-27.details
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Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist.Nomy Arpaly - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):22-32.details
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The questioning-attitude account of agnosticism.Avery Archer - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-15.details
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Epistemic freedom revisited.Gregory Antill - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):793-815.details
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What is reliance?Facundo M. Alonso - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):163-183.details
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Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 181-205.details
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What is (In)coherence?Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:184-206.details
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Deliberative Control and Eliminativism about Reasons for Emotions.Conner Schultz - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Belief as Commitment to the Truth.Keshav Singh - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), The Nature of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Do Reasons Expire? An Essay on Grief.Berislav Marušić - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.details
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Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The ethics of belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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El problema de las razones inadecuadas.Miranda del Corral - 2014 - Factótum 11:103-111.details
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The Powers that bind : doxastic voluntarism and epistemic obligation.Neil Levy & Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson (ed.), The Ethics of Belief. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 12-33.details
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On Fundamental Responsibility.Anna Sara Malmgren - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):198-213.details
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Matters of Interpersonal Trust.Andrew Kirton - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Manchesterdetails
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How inference isn’t blind: Self-conscious inference and its role in doxastic agency.David Jenkins - 2019 - Dissertation, King’s College Londondetails
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Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern Californiadetails
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Knowledge as a Thick Concept: New Light on the Gettier and Value Problems.Brent G. Kyle - 2011 - Dissertation, Cornell Universitydetails
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Descartes on Will and Suspension of Judgment: Affectivity of the Reasons for Doubt.Jan Forsman - 2017 - In Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Istvan Toth (eds.), The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. Budapest, Hungary: pp. 38-58.details
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Responsibility Beyond Belief: The Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility.Christopher Michael Cloos - 2018 - Dissertation, details
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A Spinozist Aesthetics of Affect and Its Political Implications.Christopher Davidson - 2017 - In Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Istvan Toth (eds.), The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. Budapest, Hungary: Eötvös Loránd University Press. pp. 185-206.details
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Maximalism and Rational Control.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscriptdetails
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