- Linguistic Justice and Analytic Philosophy.Francesco Chiesa & Anna Elisabetta Galeotti - 2018 - Philosophical Papers 47 (1):155-182.details
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The Epistemic Condition.Daniel J. Miller - 2023 - In Maximilian Kiener (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Responsibility. Routledge.details
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Mental agency and rational subjectivity.Lucy Campbell & Alexander Greenberg - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):224-245.details
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Mental agency and rational subjectivity.Lucy Campbell & Alexander Greenberg - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):224-245.details
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Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.details
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Refusing the COVID-19 vaccine: What’s wrong with that?Anne Meylan & Sebastian Schmidt - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (6):1102-1124.details
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Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.details
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Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias.Lindsay Rettler & Bradley Rettler - 2020 - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. pp. 125-145.details
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Attributionist Theories of Moral Responsibility.Matthew Talbert - 2022 - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 50-70.details
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Pluralism and Perspectivism in the American Pragmatist Tradition.Matthew Brown - 2019 - In Michela Massimi (ed.), Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Springer Verlag.details
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Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.details
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On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.details
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Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (1):1-24.details
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Doxastic Dilemmas and Epistemic Blame.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Philosophical Issues.details
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Nonhuman Moral Agency: A Practice-Focused Exploration of Moral Agency in Nonhuman Animals and Artificial Intelligence.Dorna Behdadi - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburgdetails
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Telic Perfectionism and the Badness of Pain.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - In Mauro Rossi & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Perspectives on Ill-Being. Oxford University Press.details
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Resolving to Believe: Kierkegaard’s Direct Doxastic Voluntarism.Z. Quanbeck - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy.Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Toth (eds.) - 2017 - Budapest, Hungary: Eötvös Loránd University Press.details
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Free Will and Epistemology: a Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Robert Lockie - 2018 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Against Voluntarism about Doxastic Responsibility.Stephen J. White - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Research 44:33-51.details
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The Cognitive Boundaries of Responsibility.Martin Weichold - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):226-267.details
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Deontology and Descartes’s Demon.Brian Weatherson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):540-569.details
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Shame and the Scope of Moral Accountability.Shawn Tinghao Wang - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (3):544-564.details
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How do you know that you settled a question?Tillmann Vierkant - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):199-211.details
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Delusions and Not-Quite-Beliefs.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):29-37.details
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What We Do When We Judge.Josefa Toribio - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):345-367.details
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Active desire.Uku Tooming - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):945-968.details
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The Attributionist Approach to Moral Luck.Matthew Talbert - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):24-41.details
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The illusion of discretion.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1635-1665.details
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Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):190-222.details
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Integrity as Incentive-Insensitivity: Moral Incapacity Means One can’t be Bought.Etye Steinberg - forthcoming - Topoi:1-11.details
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Acceptance and the ethics of belief.Laura K. Soter - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (8):2213-2243.details
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Subjective rightness.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):64-110.details
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Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance.Holly M. Smith - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):115-146.details
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Expanding the Active Mind.Jan Slaby - 2021 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 53 (2):193-209.details
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Können wir uns dazu entscheiden, etwas zu glauben?Simon Walgenbach - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):583-592.details
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Intellectual Agency and Responsibility for Belief in Free Speech Theory.Robert Mark Simpson - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (3):307-330.details
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The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).details
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Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):1-19.details
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Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):343-361.details
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Können wir uns entscheiden, etwas zu glauben? Zur Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit eines doxastischen Willens.Sebastian Schmidt - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):571-582.details
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Freedom and (theoretical) reason.Margaret Schmitt - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):25-41.details
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In Defense of Moral Evidentialism.Sharon Ryan - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):405-427.details
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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations.Steven L. Reynolds - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):19-35.details
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In defense of doxastic blame.Lindsay Rettler - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2205-2226.details
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Belief, blame, and inquiry: a defense of doxastic wronging.Z. Quanbeck - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (10-11):2955-2975.details
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Lucky artists.Christopher Prodoehl - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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Maximalism and Moral Harmony.Douglas W. Portmore - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):318-341.details
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Strong internalism, doxastic involuntarism, and the costs of compatibilism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):3171-3191.details
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