- Reflection and Responsibility.Pamela Hieronymi - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (1):3-41.details
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If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - 2018 - Noûs 54 (3):501-526.details
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Compensation and Moral Luck.Nora Heinzelmann - 2021 - The Monist 104 (2):251-264.details
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Semantic Knowledge, Semantic Guidance, and Kripke's Wittgenstein.Derek Green - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):186-206.details
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Epistemic Responsibility and Criminal Negligence.Alexander Greenberg - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):91-111.details
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Doxastic Responsibility is Owed to Others.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Research 44:63-77.details
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Biased Emotions: Implicit Bias, emotion & attributability.Kris Goffin - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1237-1255.details
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Conceptual responsibility.Trystan S. Goetze - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (1-2):20-45.details
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Alief in Action (and Reaction).Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585.details
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Alief in Action (and Reaction).Tamarszabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552-585.details
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Moral Responsibility, Voluntary Control, and Intentional Action.Kyle G. Fritz - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):831-855.details
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Moral Responsibility for Concepts.Rachel Fredericks - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1381-1397.details
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Evidentialism in action.A. K. Flowerree - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3409-3426.details
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Agency of belief and intention.A. K. Flowerree - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2763-2784.details
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Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms.Will Fleisher & Dunja Šešelja - 2023 - Philosophy of Science 90 (1):1-20.details
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Intellectual courage and inquisitive reasons.Will Fleisher - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1343-1371.details
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A Defense of Compulsory Vaccination.Jessica Flanigan - 2014 - HEC Forum 26 (1):5-25.details
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Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field & Bruno Jacinto - 2022 - Erkenntnis:1-53.details
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The possibility of epistemic responsibility.Miguel Ángel Fernández - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):109-131.details
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III—Doxastic Wrongs, Non-Spurious Generalizations and Particularized Beliefs.Cécile Fabre - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (1):47-69.details
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Emotions, Attitudes, and Reasons.Kelly Epley - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):256-282.details
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Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.details
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A classification of Newcomb problems and decision theories.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 27):6415-6434.details
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Changes in attitude.Daniel Drucker - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):151-169.details
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Responsabilidad, autoría Y voluntad: La propuesta de Moran.Miranda Del Corral - 2015 - Manuscrito 38 (1):207-230.details
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On Defining “Reliance” and “Trust”: Purposes, Conditions of Adequacy, and New Definitions.Karl de Fine Licht & Bengt Brülde - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):1981-2001.details
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Rationalization as performative pretense.Jason D'Cruz - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):980-1000.details
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Reflection Without Regress.Cory Davia - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):995-1017.details
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Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency.Cory Davia - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (2):179-196.details
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Frontier Kantianism: Autonomy and Authority in Ralph Waldo Emerson and Joseph Smith.Ryan W. Davis - 2018 - Journal of Religious Ethics 46 (2):332-359.details
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The matter of motivating reasons.J. J. Cunningham - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1563-1589.details
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Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?J. J. Cunningham - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3889-3910.details
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“Believing at will is possible”−or is it? Some remarks on Peels’s “truth depends on belief” cases and voluntariness.Claudio Cormick & Valeria Edelszten - 2023 - Manuscrito 46 (2):1-39.details
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Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism and its Implications for Epistemic Responsibility.Alix Cohen - 2013 - Kant Yearbook 5 (1):33-50.details
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The Source of Responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2023 - Ethics 133 (2):163–188.details
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On the role of knowers and corresponding epistemic role oughts.Cheryl Abbate - 2021 - Synthese:1-26.details
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Responsibility for Reason-Giving: The Case of Individual Tainted Reasoning in Systemic Corruption.Emanuela Ceva & Lubomira Radoilska - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):789-809.details
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What is Epistemic Blame?Jessica Brown - 2018 - Noûs 54 (2):389-407.details
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Epistemically blameworthy belief.Jessica Brown - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3595-3614.details
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Attributionism and Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias.Michael Brownstein - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):765-786.details
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Reliability and social knowledgerelevant responsibility.Leandro De Brasi - 2015 - Trans/Form/Ação 38 (1):187-212.details
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Active belief.Matthew Boyle - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary 35 (S1):119-147.details
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Reasonable standards and exculpating moral ignorance.Nathan Biebel - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (1):1-21.details
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Epistemic justification and the ignorance excuse.Nathan Biebel - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3005-3028.details
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What can we not do at will and why.Hagit Benbaji - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1941-1961.details
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Stereotyping as Discrimination: Why Thoughts Can Be Discriminatory.Erin Beeghly - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (6):547-563.details
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What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931.details
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The wrongs of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515.details
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The Importance of Forgetting.Rima Basu - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):471-490.details
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Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):9-23.details
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