- Fitting Attitudes And Essentially Contestable Concepts.Cain Todd - 2012 - Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2 - suppl.).details
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The Virtues of Reactive Attitudes.Lisa Tessman - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 55 (3):437-456.details
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How Final and Non-Final Valuing Differ.Levi Tenen - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (4):683-704.details
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An Account of Extrinsic Final Value.Levi Tenen - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):479-492.details
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Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):364-376.details
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Buck-passing accounts of value.Jussi Suikkanen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):768-779.details
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Integrity as Incentive-Insensitivity: Moral Incapacity Means One can’t be Bought.Etye Steinberg - forthcoming - Topoi:1-11.details
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Devoting ourselves to the manifestly unattainable.Nicholas Southwood & David Wiens - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):696-716.details
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Time-slice rationality and filling in plans.Justin Snedegar - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):595-607.details
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Contrastivism About Reasons and Ought.Justin Snedegar - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (6):379-388.details
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Deliberation, Reasons, and Alternatives.Justin Snedegar - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):682-702.details
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One dogma of philosophy of action.Matthew Noah Smith - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2249-2266.details
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Evidentialism doesn’t make an exception for belief.Keshav Singh - 2021 - Synthese 198 (6):5477-5494.details
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Reducing Reasons.Matthew Silverstein - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (1):1-22.details
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The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):209-226.details
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Reasons Wrong and Right.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):371-399.details
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Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):1-19.details
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Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):343-361.details
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Ecumenical epistemic instrumentalism.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):2613-2639.details
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Consequentialism and Moral Worth.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (2):117-136.details
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Where Reasons and Reasoning Come Apart.Eva Schmidt - 2021 - Noûs 55 (4):762-781.details
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Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.details
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Rationality as the Capacity for Understanding.Karl Schafer - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):639-663.details
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So why can’t you intend to drink the toxin?Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):294-311.details
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Emotional Regulation and Responsibility.Tom Roberts - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):487-500.details
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Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism).Florencia Rimoldi & Federico Penelas - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations.Steven L. Reynolds - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):19-35.details
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Faith, Belief, and Control.Lindsay Rettler - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):95-109.details
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In defense of doxastic blame.Lindsay Rettler - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2205-2226.details
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The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.details
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Fittingness, Value and trans-World Attitudes.Andrew E. Reisner - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly (260):1-22.details
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A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism.Andrew E. Reisner - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):1-9.details
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Abandoning the buck passing analysis of final value.Andrew E. Reisner - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):379 - 395.details
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Having to do with knowledge.Baron Reed - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):549-554.details
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Hutcheson's Contributions to Action Theory.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2022 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 20 (2):103-120.details
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A Humean explanation of acting on normative reasons.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1269-1292.details
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Aiming at the truth and aiming at success.Lubomira Radoilska - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):111-126.details
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Evidentialism, Transparency, and Commitments.Christian Piller - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):332-350.details
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Beware of Safety.Christian Piller - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (4):01-29.details
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Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?Glen Pettigrove - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (3):191-207.details
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Responsible Belief, Influence, and Control: Response to Stephen White.Rik Peels - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Research 44:53-62.details
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Educating for ignorance.Rik Peels & Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7949-7963.details
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Contrastive Intentions.Andrew Peet - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (4):24.details
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Assertoric content, responsibility, and metasemantics.Andrew Peet - 2021 - Mind and Language 37 (5):914-932.details
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The very idea of rational irrationality.Spencer Paulson - 2024 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 23 (1):3-21.details
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Fitting Attitude Theory and the Normativity of Jokes.Stephanie Patridge & Andrew Jordan - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1303-1320.details
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What do we epistemically owe to each other? A reply to Basu.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):1005-1022.details
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A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
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A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
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Not quite neo-sentimentalism.Tristram Oliver-Skuse - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (6):877-899.details
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