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  1. A Modified Self-Knowledge Model of Thought Insertion.Sruthi Rothenfluch - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):157-181.
    Thought insertion is a condition characterized by the impression that one's thoughts are not one’s own and have been inserted by others. Some have explained the condition as resulting, in part, from impaired or defective self-knowledge, or knowledge of one’s mental states. I argue that such models do not shed light on the most puzzling feature of thought insertion: the patient’s experience that an introspected thought does not feel like her own. After examining ways in which existing versions of the (...)
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  • The Feeling of Personal Ownership of One’s Mental States: A Conceptual Argument and Empirical Evidence for an Essential, but Underappreciated, Mechanism of Mind.Stan Klein - 2015 - Psychology of Consciousness: Research, Practice, and Theory 2 (4):355-376.
    I argue that the feeling that one is the owner of his or her mental states is not an intrinsic property of those states. Rather, it consists in a contingent relation between consciousness and its intentional objects. As such, there are (a variety of) circumstances, varying in their interpretive clarity, in which this relation can come undone. When this happens, the content of consciousness still is apprehended, but the feeling that the content “belongs to me” no longer is secured. I (...)
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  • Failing to Self-Ascribe Thought and Motion: Towards a Three-Factor Account of Passivity Symptoms in Schizophrenia.David Miguel Gray - 2014 - Schizophrenia Research 152 (1):28-32.
    There has recently been emphasis put on providing two-factor accounts of monothematic delusions. Such accounts would explain (1) whether a delusional hypothesis (e.g. someone else is inserting thoughts into my mind) can be understood as a prima facie reasonable response to an experience and (2) why such a delusional hypothesis is believed and maintained given its implausibility and evidence against it. I argue that if we are to avoid obfuscating the cognitive mechanisms involved in monothematic delusion formation we should split (...)
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  • Schizophrenia and the Epistemology of Self-Knowledge.Hanna Pickard - 2010 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (1):55 - 74.
    Extant philosophical accounts of schizophrenic alien thought neglect three clinically signifi cant features of the phenomenon. First, not only thoughts, but also impulses and feelings, are experienced as alien. Second, only a select array of thoughts, impulses, and feelings are experienced as alien. Th ird, empathy with experiences of alienation is possible. I provide an account of disownership that does justice to these features by drawing on recent work on delusions and selfknowledge. Th e key idea is that disownership occurs (...)
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  • Schizophrenia and the Estranged Self.Jordi Fernández & Suzanne Bliss - 2016 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 22 (4):615-621.
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  • Thought Insertion: Abnormal Sense of Thought Agency or Thought Endorsement?Paulo Sousa & Lauren Swiney - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):637-654.
    The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises new issues that enrich (...)
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  • The Comparator Account on Thought Insertion, Alien Voices and Inner Speech: Some Open Questions.Agustin Vicente - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):335-353.
    Recently, many philosophers and psychologists have claimed that the explanation that grounds both passivity phenomena in the cognitive domain and passivity phenomena that occur with respect to overt actions is, along broad lines, the same. Furthermore, they claim that the best account we have of such phenomena in both scenarios is the “comparator” account. However, there are reasons to doubt whether the comparator model can be exported from the realm of overt actions to the cognitive domain in general. There is (...)
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  • Subjective Misidentification and Thought Insertion.Matthew Parrott - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (1):39-64.
    This essay presents a new account of thought insertion. Prevailing views in both philosophy and cognitive science tend to characterize the experience of thought insertion as missing or lacking some element, such as a ‘sense of agency’, found in ordinary first-person awareness of one's own thoughts. By contrast, I propose that, rather than lacking something, experiences of thought insertion have an additional feature not present in ordinary conscious experiences of one's own thoughts. More specifically, I claim that the structure of (...)
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  • Thought Insertion and Self-Knowledge.Jordi Fernández - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (1):66-88.
    I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will (...)
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  • Making Sense of an Endorsement Model of Thought‐Insertion.Michael Sollberger - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):590-612.
    Experiences of thought-insertion are a first-rank, diagnostically central symptom of schizophrenia. Schizophrenic patients who undergo such delusional mental states report being first-personally aware of an occurrent conscious thought which is not theirs, but which belongs to an external cognitive agent. Patients seem to be right about what they are thinking but mistaken about who is doing the thinking. It is notoriously difficult to make sense of such delusions. One general approach to explaining the etiology of monothematic delusions has come to (...)
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  • On Understanding the Self of the Schizophrenics.Jorge Gonçalves - 2017 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 23 (5):1013-1019.
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  • The Spectra of Soundless Voices and Audible Thoughts: Towards an Integrative Model of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations and Thought Insertion.Clara S. Humpston & Matthew R. Broome - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):611-629.
    Patients with psychotic disorders experience a range of reality distortions. These often include auditory-verbal hallucinations, and thought insertion to a lesser degree; however, their mechanisms and relationships between each other remain largely elusive. Here we attempt to establish a integrative model drawing from the phenomenology of both AVHs and TI and argue that they in fact can be seen as ‘spectra’ of experiences with varying degrees of agency and ownership, with ‘silent and internal own thoughts’ on one extreme and ‘fully (...)
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  • On How a Child’s Awareness of Thinking Informs Explanations of Thought Insertion.Garry Young - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):848-862.
    Theories of thought insertion have tended to favour either the content of the putatively alien thought or some peculiarity within the experience itself as a means of explaining why the subject differentiates one thought from another in terms of personal ownership. There are even accounts that try to incorporate both of these characteristics. What all of these explanations share is the view that it is unexceptional for us to experience thought as our own. The aim of this paper is to (...)
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  • Authorship of Thoughts in Thought Insertion: What is It for a Thought to Be One's Own?Max Seeger - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):837-855.
    In thought insertion, subjects experience thoughts which they claim not to be their own. What they claim, it is typically said, is that the thought is not theirs in the sense that they are not the agent or author of the thought. But what does it mean to be the agent or author of a thought? The most intuitive idea is that for a thought to be one's own means for the thought to causally originate within the subject. I defend (...)
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  • Does Consciousness Entail Subjectivity? The Puzzle of Thought Insertion.Alexandre Billon - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.
    (2013). Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 291-314. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625117.
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