- Internalismo e justificação epistêmica não inferencial.Kátia Etcheverry - 2015 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3):527-547.details
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Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Understanding Moral Disagreement: A Christian Perspectivalist Approach.Blake McAllister - 2021 - Religions 12 (5):318.details
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The Perspectival Problem of Evil.Blake McAllister - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (4):421-450.details
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Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification.Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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The Problem of Creation Ex Nihilo: A New Argument against Classical Theism.Felipe Leon - 2024 - In Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.), Ontology of Divinity. De Gruyter. pp. 291-304.details
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Not So Phenomenal!John Hawthorne & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (1):1-43.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Ontology of Divinity.Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.) - 2024 - De Gruyter.details
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Against the Phenomenal View of Evidence: Disagreement and Shared Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 54–62.details
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Reflective awareness, phenomenal conservatism, and phenomenal explanationism.Kevin McCain & Luca Moretti - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.details
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Contingent A Priori Knowledge.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.details
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Inferential seemings and the problem of reflective awareness.Luca Moretti - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):253-271.details
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Problems for Credulism.James Pryor - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 89–131.details
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Schroeder on reasons, experience, and evidence.Susanna Schellenberg & Juan Comesaña - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):607-616.details
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Intuition.Ole Koksvik - 2011 - Dissertation, Australian National Universitydetails
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Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition.Michael Huemer - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):147-158.details
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Consciousness and Knowledge.Berit Brogaard & Elijah Chudnoff - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Does Vagueness Exclude Knowledge?David Barnett - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):22 - 45.details
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Intuitions as evidence : an introduction.Marc A. Moffett - 2019 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.details
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A Defense of Restricted Phenomenal Conservatism.Harold Langsam - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (3):315 - 340.details
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Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater.David James Barnett - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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Perceptual experience and perceptual justification.Nicholas Silins - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Structure of Phenomenal Justification.Uriah Kriegel - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):282-297.details
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Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification.Chris Tucker - 2016 - In Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 43-60.details
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Phenomenal conservatism and self-defeat. [REVIEW]Michael Depaul - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):205-212.details
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Intuitions for inferences.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.details
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Phenomenal conservatism and self-defeat: a reply to DePoe.Michael Huemer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):1-13.details
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What are seemings?Andrew Cullison - 2010 - Ratio 23 (3):260-274.details
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Why open-minded people should endorse dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.details
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Against Phenomenal Conservatism.Nathan Hanna - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):213-221.details
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Internalist Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma.Ali Hasan - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):171-184.details
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How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism.Paul Silva - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.details
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Seemings and the possibility of epistemic justification.Matthew Skene - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):539-559.details
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Phenomenalist dogmatist experientialism and the distinctiveness problem.Harmen Ghijsen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1549-1566.details
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Critical Notice: Seemings and Justification, ed. Chris Tucker. [REVIEW]Jack Lyons - 2014 - Analysis 75 (1):153-164.details
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The Agony of Defeat?Nicholas Silins - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):505-532.details
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The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.details
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Experiential evidence?Jack C. Lyons - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1053-1079.details
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Experience, Seemings, and Evidence.Indrek Reiland - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):510-534.details
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Defeating looks.Kathrin Glüer - 2016 - Synthese 195 (7):2985-3012.details
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Husserl’s Conception of Experiential Justification: What It Is and Why It Matters.Philipp Berghofer - 2018 - Husserl Studies 34 (2):145-170.details
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Seemings as sui generis.Blake McAllister - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3079-3096.details
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Is phenomenal force sufficient for immediate perceptual justification?Lu Teng - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):637-656.details
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Seemings, truth-makers, and epistemic justification.Eilidh Harrison - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5689-5708.details
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Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Richard Fumerton & Ali Hasan - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Towards a phenomenological conception of experiential justification.Philipp Berghofer - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):155-183.details
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A Metacognitive Account of Phenomenal Force.Lu Teng - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (4):1081-1101.details
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Restoring Common Sense: Restorationism and Common Sense Epistemology.Blake McAllister - 2019 - In J. Caleb Clanton (ed.), Restoration & Philosophy. University of Tennessee Press. pp. 35-78.details
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Reflective Equilibrium Without Intuitions?Georg Brun - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):237-252.details
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