- Schellenberg’s Capacitism about Phenomenal Evidence and the Alien Experience Problem.Zijian Zhu - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (2):1019-1040.details
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Moral perception, inference, and intuition.Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1495-1512.details
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On the evolutionary debunking of morality.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2010 - Ethics 120 (3):441-464.details
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Why conceptual competence won’t help the non-naturalist epistemologist.Preston J. Werner - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):616-637.details
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Moral perception.Preston J. Werner - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1):e12640.details
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Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience.Preston J. Werner - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (3):294-317.details
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Precision and Perceptual Clarity.Jonna Vance - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):379-395.details
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Precision and Perceptual Clarity.Jonna Vance - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):379-395.details
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Emotion and the new epistemic challenge from cognitive penetrability.Jona Vance - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):257-283.details
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Religious Diversity.Hamid Vahid - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (2):219-236.details
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Cognitive penetration, the downgrade principle, and extended cognition.Hamid Vahid - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):439-459.details
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Deontological Conservatism and Perceptual Justification.Hamid Vahid - 2017 - Theoria 83 (3):206-224.details
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The ontology of epistemic reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.details
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Contingent A Priori Knowledge.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.details
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Evidential support, reliability, and Hume's problem of induction.Chris Tucker - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):503-519.details
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Varieties of Moral Intuitionism.Elizabeth Tropman - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (2):177-194.details
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What seemings seem to be.Samuel A. Taylor - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):363-384.details
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Is justification easy or impossible? Getting acquainted with a middle road.Samuel A. Taylor - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2987-3009.details
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Acquaintance, Attention, and Introspective Justification.Samuel A. Taylor - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-22.details
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Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.details
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Respect and the reality of apparent reasons.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3129-3156.details
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Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.details
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An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.details
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Perception as Guessing Versus Perception as Knowing: Replies to Clark and Peacocke.Susanna Siegel - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (4):761-784.details
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The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):731-743.details
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The Epistemology of Religion.Martin Smith - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):135-147.details
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On the Global Ambitions of Phenomenal Conservatism.Declan Smithies - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (3):206-244.details
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Undermining versus rebutting: options for responding to evolutionary debunking arguments.Emily Slome - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
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Epistemically self-defeating arguments and skepticism about intuition.Paul Silva - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):579-589.details
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Explaining Perceptual Entitlement.Nicholas Silins - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (2):243-261.details
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Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?Paul Silva - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):371-387.details
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Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution.Paul Silva - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.details
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Schroeder on reasons, experience, and evidence.Susanna Schellenberg & Juan Comesaña - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):607-616.details
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Putting psychology before metaphysics in moral responsibility: Reactive attitudes and a “gut feeling” that can trigger and justify them.Robert Schroer & Jeanine Weekes Schroer - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):357-387.details
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Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.details
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O problema da penetrabilidade cognitiva da percepção: Um Caso de vício intelectual?José Renato Salatiel - 2020 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 61 (147):769-787.details
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Undermining, circularity, and disagreement.Andrew Rotondo - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):563-584.details
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Seeing the Invisible: How to Perceive, Imagine, and Infer the Minds of Others.Luke Roelofs - 2017 - Erkenntnis 83 (2):205-229.details
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A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism.Olle Risberg & Folke Tersman - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (2):189-207.details
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Justification as the appearance of knowledge.Steven L. Reynolds - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383.details
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Against an Inferentialist Dogma.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1397-1421.details
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Pre-cueing, the Epistemic Role of Early Vision, and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
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Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):550-575.details
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Intuition as a Capacity for a Priori Knowledge.Henry W. Pickford - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations 13 (28):147-169.details
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The Evidence of the Senses is no Evidence from the Senses.Tommaso Piazza - 2013 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 16 (1):174-191.details
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Saving the Last Person from Radical Scepticism: How to Justify Attributions of Intrinsic Value to Nature without Intuition or Empirical Evidence.Alexander Pho & Allen Thompson - 2023 - Environmental Values 32 (1):91-111.details
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Strong internalism, doxastic involuntarism, and the costs of compatibilism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):3171-3191.details
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On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.details
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On an Epistemic Cornerstone of Skeptical Theism: in Defense of CORNEA.Timothy Perrine - 2022 - Sophia 61 (3):533-555.details
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