I consider whether a contradiction may be deducible from the proposition that God does not exist. First, I expose a candidate counterexample to a key premise in Swinburne’s argument against the deducibility of a contradiction from God’s non-existence. Second, I present two new strategies one might use to deduce a contradiction. Both strategies make use of Tarski's T-schema together with developments in other theistic arguments. One argument is a conceptualist argument from necessary truth for a necessary mind, and the other (...) is a two-stage contingency argument for the same conclusion. The purpose of this article is not to decisively defend these arguments, but to expose new territory relevant to investigating the nature of God's necessity. (shrink)

This article provides a response to John Perry and Sarah Lane Ritchie's article, “Magnets Magic, and Other Anomalies: In Defense of Methodological Naturalism.” In so doing, it provides a defense of some of the arguments I made in my article, “Should a Christian Adopt Methodological Naturalism?” I begin by addressing some of the confusion about my position. However, it is not simply my intention to address confusions. There remain some fundamental differences between my position and Perry and Ritchie's. It is (...) on these differences that I wish to focus––differences that enable me to maintain my critique of methodological naturalism without falling prey to the problems they raise. Constructively, I advance the argument that the Christian scientist should be open to the possibility of theology‐engaged science, as well as the science‐engaged theology that Perry and Ritchie advocate. (shrink)

According to the Nomological Argument, observed regularities in nature are best explained by an appeal to a supernatural being. A successful explanation must avoid two perils. Some explanations provide too little structure, predicting a universe without regularities. Others provide too much structure, thereby precluding an explanation of certain types of lawlike regularities featured in modern scientific theories. We argue that an explanation based in the creative, intentional action of a supernatural being avoids these two perils whereas leading competitors do not. (...) Although our argument falls short of a full defense, it does suggest that the Nomological Argument is worthy of philosophical attention. (shrink)