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  1. Sequent Systems for Negative Modalities.Ori Lahav, João Marcos & Yoni Zohar - 2017 - Logica Universalis 11 (3):345-382.
    Non-classical negations may fail to be contradictory-forming operators in more than one way, and they often fail also to respect fundamental meta-logical properties such as the replacement property. Such drawbacks are witnessed by intricate semantics and proof systems, whose philosophical interpretations and computational properties are found wanting. In this paper we investigate congruential non-classical negations that live inside very natural systems of normal modal logics over complete distributive lattices; these logics are further enriched by adjustment connectives that may be used (...)
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  • Proof-Theoretic Semantics.Peter Schroeder-Heister - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Implicit Definition and the Application of Logic.Thomas Kroedel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):131-148.
    The paper argues that the theory of Implicit Definition cannot give an account of knowledge of logical principles. According to this theory, the meanings of certain expressions are determined such that they make certain principles containing them true; this is supposed to explain our knowledge of the principles as derived from our knowledge of what the expressions mean. The paper argues that this explanation succeeds only if Implicit Definition can account for our understanding of the logical constants, and that fully (...)
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  • The Original Sin of Proof-Theoretic Semantics.Bogdan Dicher & Francesco Paoli - forthcoming - Synthese:1-26.
    Proof-theoretic semantics is an alternative to model-theoretic semantics. It aims at explaining the meaning of the logical constants in terms of the inference rules that govern their behaviour in proofs. We argue that this must be construed as the task of explaining these meanings relative to a logic, i.e., to a consequence relation. Alas, there is no agreed set of properties that a relation must have in order to qualify as a consequence relation. Moreover, the association of a consequence relation (...)
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