- In defense of Epistemic Modesty.Farid Masrour - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):312-331.details
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The ontology of concepts: Abstract objects or mental representations?Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):561-593.details
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Should we trust our intuitions? Deflationary accounts of the analytic data.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):299-323.details
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Causation and fact granularity.Dan Marshall - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8029-8045.details
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Analysis as Translation.Diego Marconi - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):347-360.details
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Two Notions of Metaphysical Modality.Antonella Mallozzi - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 6):1-22.details
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Social Construction and Achieving Reference.Ron Mallon - 2017 - Noûs 51 (1):113-131.details
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Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):263-327.details
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Why the Canberra plan won’t help you do serious metaphysics.Raamy Majeed - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4865-4882.details
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Pleading ignorance in response to experiential primitivism.Raamy Majeed - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):251-269.details
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Conceptual Instability and the New Epistemic Possibility.Raamy Majeed - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):613-627.details
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Carnap Ponders Canberra: Creating a Theory of Meaning Based on Carnap's Criteria of Cognitive Significance and the Canberra Plan.Andrew Whiteley Magrath - 2013 - Open Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):429-433.details
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Defending David Lewis’s modal reduction.Barry Maguire - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):129-147.details
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On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism.B. J. C. Madison - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (3):173-183.details
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What is Analytic Metaphysics For?James Maclaurin & Heather Dyke - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):291-306.details
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Response to Akagi, Hughes, and Springle. [REVIEW]Edouard Machery - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):608-623.details
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Counterfactual epistemic scenarios.John Mackay - 2023 - Noûs 57 (1):188-208.details
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Does Shafer-Landau have a problem with supervenience?Robert Mabrito - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):297 - 311.details
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Truth and multiple realizability.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.details
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Stalnaker on zombies. [REVIEW]William G. Lycan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):473-479.details
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Two notions of being: Entity and essence.E. J. Lowe - 2008 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62:23-48.details
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The rationality of metaphysics.E. J. Lowe - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):99-109.details
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Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics.E. J. Lowe - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):587-592.details
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New directions in metaphysics and ontology.E. J. Lowe - 2008 - Axiomathes 18 (3):273-288.details
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“Putting the linguistic method in its place”: Mackie’s distinction between conceptual and factual analysis.Tammo Lossau - 2019 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 22 (1):92-105.details
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Information is intrinsically semantic but alethically neutral.Bruce Raymond Long - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3447-3467.details
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The Argument from Moral Experience.Don Loeb - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):469-484.details
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Comments on Jaegwon Kim’s Mind and the Physical World.Barry Loewer - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):655–662.details
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Inference to the Best explanation.Peter Lipton - 2004 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 193.details
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Moral error theory.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):93–109.details
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Moral realism, normative reasons, and rational intelligibility.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (1):47-69.details
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Debunking morality: Evolutionary naturalism and moral error theory.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (4):567-581.details
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Truth in Fiction.Franck Lihoreau (ed.) - 2010 - Ontos Verlag.details
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A defense of intuitions.S. Matthew Liao - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):247 - 262.details
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Are Philosophers Good Intuition Predictors?Shen-yi Liao - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (7):1004-1014.details
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The modal status of materialism.Joseph Levine & Kelly Trogdon - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):351 - 362.details
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The evidential status of philosophical intuition.Janet Levin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):193-224.details
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Structural problems for reductionism.Stephan Leuenberger - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3571-3593.details
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XI- Naturalism and Placement, or, What Should a Good Quinean Say about Mathematical and Moral Truth?Mary Leng - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (3):237-260.details
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The Meaning of Meaning-Fallibilism.Catherine Legg - 2005 - Axiomathes 15 (2):293-318.details
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Naturalism and Wonder: Peirce on the Logic of Hume's Argument Against Miracles.Catherine Legg - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):297-318.details
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Metaphysics — Low in Price, High in Value: A Critique of Global Expressivism.Catherine Legg & Paul Giladi - 2018 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 54 (1):64.details
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Argument-Forms which Turn Invalid over Infinite Domains: Physicalism as Supertask?Catherine Legg - 2008 - Contemporary Pragmatism 5 (1):1-11.details
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Choosing normative properties: a reply to Eklund’s Choosing Normative Concepts.Stephanie Leary - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (5):455-474.details
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The sense of incredibility in ethics.Nicholas Laskowski - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):93-115.details
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Reductivism, Nonreductivism and Incredulity About Streumer’s Error Theory.N. G. Laskowski - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):766-776.details
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Parfit, Derek. On What Matters. Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 488. $45.00 .Singer, Peter, ed. Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 288. $45.00. [REVIEW]Nicholas Laskowski - 2018 - Ethics 128 (2):496-505.details
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Epistemic modesty in ethics.Nicholas Laskowski - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1577-1596.details
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Filosofía práctica impura y normativa.Guillermo Lariguet - 2014 - Co-herencia 11 (20):187-213.details
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Scientific structuralism: On the identity and diversity of objects in a structure.James Ladyman - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):23–43.details
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