In this article, we argue two points in relation to the challenge to human distinctiveness emerging as artificial intelligence systems and humanlike robots simulate various human capabilities. First, that, in the context of theological anthropology, it is advisable to respond to this challenge by turning toward the human body. Second, following this point, we propose the responsive body hypothesis, suggesting that what makes us distinct from androids are capacities that rise from and depend on our responsive bodies.

Artificial intelligence algorithms, fueled by continuous technological development and increased computing power, have proven effective across a variety of tasks. Concurrently, quantum computers have shown promise in solving problems beyond the reach of classical computers. These advancements have contributed to a misconception that quantum computers enable hypercomputation, sparking speculation about quantum supremacy leading to an intelligence explosion and the creation of superintelligent agents. We challenge this notion, arguing that current evidence does not support the idea that quantum technologies enable hypercomputation. (...) Fundamental limitations on information storage within finite spaces and the accessibility of information from quantum states constrain quantum computers from surpassing the Turing computing barrier. While quantum technologies may offer exponential speed-ups in specific computing cases, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that focusing solely on quantum-related problems will lead to technological singularity and the emergence of superintelligence. Subsequently, there is no premise suggesting that general intelligence depends on quantum effects or that accelerating existing algorithms through quantum means will replicate true intelligence. We propose that if superintelligence is to be achieved, it will not be solely through quantum technologies. Instead, the attainment of superintelligence remains a conceptual challenge that humanity has yet to overcome, with quantum technologies showing no clear path toward its resolution. (shrink)

In 1947, the Cornell psychiatrist Keeve Brodman and a handful of colleagues began developing what would become one of the most widely used health questionnaires of its time—the Cornell Medical Index (CMI). A rigidly standardized form, the CMI presented 195 yes-no questions designed to capture the health status of “the total patient.” Over the following decades, Brodman’s project of standardizing medical history taking gradually evolved into a project of mathematizing and computerizing diagnosis: out of the CMI grew the Medical Data (...) Screen (MDS), one of the first computerized methods of deriving diagnoses from patient data. This essay follows the life course of these tools through the second half of the twentieth century. It argues for a genealogy of biomedical computing and computerized diagnosis that takes more seriously the continuities between computer-based digital practices and paper-based analog ones. The computerized MDS evolved from, and rested upon, paper data practices associated with questionnaires and surveys. The interlocking histories of the CMI and the MDS prompt a reconsideration of the material and temporal parameters within which the history of computerized medicine has conventionally been understood. (shrink)

In this article, a concise argument for computational rationality as a basis for artificial moral agency is advanced. Some ethicists have long argued that rational agents can become artificial moral agents. However, most of their views have come from purely philosophical perspectives, thus making it difficult to transfer their arguments to a scientific and analytical frame of reference. The result has been a disintegrated approach to the conceptualisation and design of artificial moral agents. In this article, I make the argument (...) for computational rationality as an integrative element that effectively combines the philosophical and computational aspects of artificial moral agency. This logically leads to a philosophically coherent and scientifically consistent model for building artificial moral agents. Besides providing a possible answer to the question of how to build artificial moral agents, this model also invites sound debate from multiple disciplines, which should help to advance the field of machine ethics forward. (shrink)