The categorical imperative can be construed as a universalization test for moral permissibility. False negatives of the categorical imperative would be maxims failing this test, despite the permissibility of their actions; maxims like: ‘I’ll withdraw all my savings on April 15th’. Examples of purported false negatives familiar from the literature can be grouped into three general categories, and dispatched by applying category-specific methods for proper formulation of their maxims, or for proper testing. Methods for reformulating failing maxims, such as the (...) addition of appropriate conditional clauses, do not generate false-positive counterexamples in other instances. (shrink)

Resumo: Este texto tem por objeto a análise da intuição, das especificidades das definições bergsonianas e suas distinções em relação à visão moderna, sobretudo da doutrina kantiana, buscando mostrar os pontos de rompimento e avanço de Bergson em relação a essa concepção. O que se nota, em um primeiro momento, é como a obra de Bergson está de certo modo intimamente ligada a alguns temas clássicos da teoria do conhecimento já amplamente trabalhados na obra de Kant, razão pela qual esse (...) autor está presente desde o início de seu pensamento, desde o Ensaio sobre os dados da consciência, estendendo-se mesmo por quase todo o conjunto de sua obra. De fato, se se abordar os textos de Bergson pela sua referência à história da filosofia, será Kant, sem dúvida, que aparecerá como seu grande interlocutor; na maior parte das vezes como contrapondo a uma crítica que pode ser estendida a toda tradição filosófica, sobretudo àquela que teria subjugado a metafísica aos métodos e orientações da ciência. É natural, com efeito, que o autor da Crítica da Razão Pura surja como personagem importante na obra de Bergson. O pensamento de Kant está assentado em um momento importante quanto aos "rumos" da filosofia, especialmente no que diz respeito ao alcance da metafísica. E, se Bergson expressara, em sua doutrina, todo um esforço para reaver o lugar de direito da metafísica, ampliando mesmo, para além dos limites da análise científica, seu alcance, é certamente Kant que ele haveria de encontrar em suas investigações.: This text aims to analyze intuition, the specificities of the Bergsonian definitions relevant to it, and their distinctions relative to the modern view. Above all, we discuss the doctrine of Kant and seek to show Bergson's points of rupture and advancement in relation to this conception. What is noticeable at first glance is how Bergson's work is in a certain way intimately linked to some classical themes of the theory of knowledge already extensively treated in Kant's work. Kant is present from the beginning of Bergson's thought, ever since his An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, and his influence extends through almost all of Bergson's work. In fact, if one approaches the texts of Bergson in terms of his references to the history of philosophy, it is no doubt Kant who appears as the great interlocutor, in most cases advancing a critique that can be extended to the whole philosophical tradition, especially to that part which would subjugate metaphysics to the methods and orientations of science. It is natural, indeed, that the author of the Critique of Pure Reason emerges as an important character in Bergson's work. Kant's thinking appeared at an important moment in terms of the "directions" of philosophy, especially with regard to the attainment of metaphysics. Bergson expressed in his doctrine an effort to reclaim the rightful place of metaphysics, even extending its reach beyond the limits of scientific analysis, and thus it is certain that he would encounter Kant in his investigations. (shrink)

Examina-se aqui uma solução de tipo “idealista” para o problema da possibilidade do múltiplo, a qual, assim parece, levaria à exigência da admissão de um espaço e um tempo inatos. Eliminando-se qualquer pretensa concessão inatista por parte de Kant, porém, observa-se que o resultado alcançado, neste caso, favorece a originalidade do idealismo transcendental. Consideration on “multiple” in the first CritiqueIt is examined here a solution, of an idealist kind, to the problem concerning the possibility of the manifold, which, it seems, (...) would lead to the requirement of the admission of an inate space and time. However, by excluding any pretense inatist concession from Kant’s perspective, it is observed that the achieved result, in this case, supply the originality of transcendental idealism. (shrink)

The one-world interpretation of Kant's idealism holds that appearances and things in themselves are, in some sense, the same things. Yet this reading faces a number of problems, all arising from the different features Kant seems to assign to appearances and things in themselves. I propose a new way of understanding the appearance/thing in itself distinction via an Aristotelian notion that I call, following Kit Fine, a ‘qua-object.’ Understanding appearances and things in themselves as qua-objects provides a clear sense in (...) which they can be the same things while differing in many of their features. (shrink)

the article explores the putatively non-metaphysical – non-voluntarist, and even non-causal – concept of freedom outlined in Hegel’s work and discusses its influential interpretation by robert Pippin as an ‘essentially practical’ concept. I argue that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom must be distinguished from that of Kant and Fichte, since it does not rely on a prior understanding of self-consciousness as an originally teleological relation and it has not the nature of a claim ‘from a practical point of view’.

O trabalho que aqui se propões tem por objetivo analisar as obras de Immanuel Kant buscando sintetizar suas contribuições para a compreensão da filosofia enquanto atitude filosófica, num diálogo com as pedagogias ativas, bem como refletir sobre os métodos para o seu ensino. A pesquisa partirá de um viés bibliográfico a fim de trazer os conceitos de autonomia e esclarecimento para uma reflexão sobre os métodos adequados para o despertar de uma consciência filosófica. Embora distante de sua finalidade, a educação (...) deve manter-se em constante busca por melhorias, pelo desenvolvimento da humanidade em todas as suas esferas. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to examine the possible relationships between the different dimensions of aesthetics on the one hand, and medical practice and medical ethics on the other hand. Firstly, I consider whether the aesthetic perception of the human body is relevant for medical practice. Secondly, a possible analogy between the artistic process and medical action is examined. The third section concerns the comparison between medical ethical judgements and aesthetic judgement of taste. It is concluded that the mutual (...) relevance between the aesthetic sphere, moral judgement and medical practice can be understood only if we recognize these spheres as distinct. (shrink)

En este artículo se examina la noción kantiana de las demostraciones matemáticas. Esta noción se encuentra desarrollada en el apartado titulado “Disciplina de la razón pura en su uso dogmático” de la _Crítica de la razón pura. _En este texto, Kant explica por qué los procedimientos exitosos en el conocimiento matemático resultan impracticables en metafísica. En primer lugar se estudian dos pasajes en los que el filósofo describe dos demostraciones: la demostración de la congruencia de los ángulos de la base (...) de un triángulo isósceles, y la demostración de que la suma de los ángulos internos de cualquier triángulo es igual a dos rectos. A continuación, se examina la descripción de la demostración matemática como una prueba apodíctica en la intuición. Este análisis muestra que la demostración matemática no constituye la misma clase de procedimiento presentado como demostración en los §§57 y 59 de la _Crítica del Juicio._. (shrink)

This article draws on the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant to explore whether a corporate ‘duty of beneficence’ to non-shareholders is consistent with the orthodox ‘shareholder theory’ of the firm. It examines the ethical framework of Milton Friedman’s argument and asks whether it necessarily rules out the well-being of non-shareholders as a corporate objective. The article examines Kant’s distinction between ‘duties of right’ and ‘duties of virtue’ (the latter including the duty of beneficence) and investigates their consistency with the shareholder (...) theory. The article concludes that it is possible within the ethical framework of shareholder theory for managers to pursue directly the happiness of non-shareholders. Furthermore, shareholders have a duty to hold management to account for the moral consequences of the firm’s activities on non-shareholding stakeholders. (shrink)

This article will address the Kantian concept of respect for persons from the constructivist approach of philosopher Carla Bagnoli. Her proposal is an inspiring and elaborate update of the concept, but some aspects suggest difficulties. I will argue that these difficulties would have to do with issues that would need to be clarified and with some tensions, understood as arising from certain interpretations and redefinitions, that would also raise the need to consider a revision of what constitutes the status of (...) a person. I will point out that these tensions simultaneously concern the idea of agency. (shrink)

Através desse diálogo tivemos o objetivo de propor uma compreensão do homem através da explicitação do sentido ético de edificação. Apresentamos a cidadania do mundo como uma finalidade moral do homem, que estava presente e oculta na fundamentação metafísica do humanismo. Agora, se o antropológico se fortalece por meio da realização ética do mundo, defendemos que o dever do melhor não é uma finalidade moral que se realiza em um infinito separado da finitude humana. O antropológico só é cidadão se (...) ele se compreende como uma finitude sem infinito separado, ou seja, como um fim em si, como um lugar de chegada. (shrink)

The article is dedicated to the politico-theological critique of Judaism from the position of Christianity. It shows the affinity of Marx’s early critique of liberal state and of Hannah Arendt’s criticism of formal legalistic thinking in the contemporary judicial treatment of Nazism (and of similar international political crimes). Marx’s critique of nation-state finds its unlikely continuation in Arendt’s critique of international law. The politico-theological argument is explicit in Marx and implicit in Arendt, but both develop the Hegelian criticism of liberal (...) state which shows its reliance on the abstract law, on the one hand, and on the egotistic abstract individual, on the other. The theological undercurrent of the argument is both sign of its limitations, and of the subsisting relevance of the politico-theological framework, even in the similarly novel circumstances of the twentieth century. It is only within and through the theological critique and critique of theology that these issues would stand a chance of resolution. (shrink)

Neoliberalism is invariably presented as a governing regime of market and competition-based systems rather than as a set of migratory practices that are re-setting the ethical standards of the academy. This article seeks to explore the way in which neoliberalism is shifting the prevailing values of the academy by drawing on two illustrations: the death of disinterestedness and the obfuscation of authorship. While there was never a golden age when norms such as disinterestedness were universally practiced they represented widely accepted (...) aesthetic ideals associated with academic life. By contrast, neoliberal academics embrace a new set of assumptions and norms that stand in sharp relief to many of the values that were previously espoused. Practices that might have been regarded as ethically dubious by earlier generations of academics, such as grantsmanship, self-justificatory expressions of interestedness and tangential claims to authorship, are now regarded as legitimate and positive virtues in a more aggressive age of hyper-performativity. (shrink)

The past 25 years have seen a rapid growth of knowledge about brain mechanisms involved in visual mental imagery. These advances have largely been made independently of the long history of philosophical – and even psychological – reckoning with imagery and its parent concept ‘imagination’. We suggest that the view from these empirical findings can be widened by an appreciation of imagination’s intellectual history, and we seek to show how that history both created the conditions for – and presents challenges (...) to – the scientific endeavor. We focus on the neuroscientific literature’s most commonly used task – imagining a concrete object – and, after sketching what is known of the neurobiological mechanisms involved, we examine the same basic act of imagining from the perspective of several key positions in the history of philosophy and psychology. We present positions that, firstly, contextualize and inform the neuroscientific account, and secondly, pose conceptual and methodological challenges to the scientific analysis of imagery. We conclude by reflecting on the intellectual history of visualization in the light of contemporary science, and the extent to which such science may resolve long-standing theoretical debates. (shrink)

Este artigo tem por objetivo propor um diálogo entre o conceito de “thaumázein”, partindo do diálogo Teeteto de Platão, e a noção de “sublime” de Friedrich Schiller, aproximando-os a partir da noção de “páthos”. A função deste debate será pensar as associações entre os termos e sua função dentro da iniciação à filosofia. Em um primeiro momento, será discutido o contexto no qual “thaumázein” aparece em Platão para, em seguida, apresentar brevemente a noção de “sublime” de Schiller a modo de (...) ampliá-lo e localizar sua função dentro de uma perspectiva educacional do filósofo. (shrink)

This paper specifically deals with the relation between respect and li禮in the Confucian context. Li has both negative and positive sources. On the positive level, ritual propriety enables one to ex...

Resumo: A expressão “moralidade do costume” aparece pela primeira vez em Aurora e é significativamente reproduzida em Para a genealogia da moral. Uma pesquisa dos textos nos quais tal expressão é utilizada revela sua centralidade no estudo genealógico nietzschiano, e como ela está ligada a uma decisiva comparação com a filosofia prática de Kant.: The expression “morality of custom” first appears in Daybreak and is significantly reproduced in the Genealogy of Morality. A study of texts in which such an expression (...) is used reveals its centrality in the Nietzschean genealogical approach, as well as how it is linked to a decisive comparison with Kant's practical philosophy. (shrink)

I argue in this paper that some of the most basic commitments of Kantian ethics can be understood as grounded in the dynamic of sense that Merleau-Ponty describes in his Phenomenology of Perception. Specifically, I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s account supports the importance of universalizability as a test for the moral permissibility of particular acts as well as the idea that the binding character of the moral law is given as something like a fact of reason. But I also argue that (...) Merleau-Ponty’s account of reversibility suggests an important dimension of moral experience that is given in the experience of contact and that is underthematized in moral philosophies like Kant’s that emphasize the role of universalizability. Finally, I advance a positive account of moral experience that is centered on the idea of tact as ambiguous imperative. (shrink)

Recent literature on forgiveness suggests that a successful account of the phenomenon must satisfy at least three conditions: it must be able to explain how forgiveness can be articulate, uncompromising, and elective. These three conditions are not logically inconsistent, but the history of reflection on the ethics of forgiveness nonetheless suggests that they are in tension. Accounts that emphasize articulateness and uncompromisingness tend to suggest an excessively deflationary understanding of electiveness, underestimating the degree to which forgiveness is a gift. Accounts (...) that emphasize electiveness, on the other hand, tend to weaken the safeguards that keep forgiveness distinct from condonation, excuse, or mere servility. I argue in this paper that we can do justice to the three conditions by understanding forgiveness in terms of the concept of institution that Maurice Merleau-Ponty developed in his work from the early- to mid-1950s. (shrink)

Dignity, according to some recent arguments, is a useless concept, giving vague expression to moral intuitions that are better captured by other, better defined concepts. In this paper, I defend the concept of dignity against such skeptical arguments. I begin with a description of the defining features of the Kantian conception of dignity. I then examine one of the strongest arguments against that conception, advanced by Arthur Schopenhauer in On the Basis of Morality. After considering some standard accounts of dignity, (...) showing how they fail adequately to address Schopenhauer’s concern, I propose and defend a new account of dignity, drawing on the ontology of Jean-Luc Nancy. (shrink)

I offer you some theories of intellectual obligations and rights (virtue Ethics): initially, RBT (a Right to Believe Truth, if something is true it follows one has a right to believe it), and, NDSM (one has no right to believe a contradiction, i.e., No right to commit Doxastic Self-Mutilation). Evidence for both below. Anthropology, Psychology, computer software, Sociology, and the neurosciences prove things about human beliefs, and History, Economics, and comparative law can provide evidence of value about theories of rights. (...) However, insofar as we have methods within Philosophy to help us formulate precise concepts of 'belief' and 'rights', methods that also help us to prove links (or absence thereof) amongst families of concepts of rights and belief, our discipline is in and of itself capable of sound reasoning about issues as puzzling as the following. Suppose a Jane who does not believe in God yet who believes she ought to so believe: Jane is undergoing doxastic moral regret (moral regret for lack of faith). We have all known such Janes and perhaps at one time or another even been one. Paradox: given RBT and NDSM, Jane as described not only does not exist, Jane cannot exist. Thus, to enrich the ways in which Philosophy need not get all its evidence from other academic disciplines, I present a brief introduction to what I call Neutral Universal Frames (NUFs). NUFs solve hard puzzles about interactions among modal concepts of belief and rights, concepts that occur in RBT, NDSM and the description of our Janes. NUFs for theories precisely articulated via any two or more modal concepts are a powerful and immensely general set of tools enabling us to define rich theories of truth ("models on frames") to test philosophical theories for internal consistency and to prove the existence of connections (or absence thereof) amongst alternative articulations of philosophical theories. NUFs thereby add to the constructive knowledge producing way Logics intersect with Philosophy of Religion. And we will soon see why Jane, be she named 'Jane' or known simply as you: cannot exist. Read on at your own risk. (shrink)

La formulación tradicional de los derechos humanos se basa en la libertad y la igualdad, pero Emmanuel Lévinas hace de la diferencia absoluta la fuente y el fundamento de tales derechos. Los Derechos Humanos aparecen entonces como los derechos del Otro y extienden el alcance de la responsabilidad hasta comprometer la propia libertad. La primera parte de este trabajo muestra cómo la preocupación por los derechos humanos fue una constante en la existencia y el pensamiento de Lévinas. La segunda parte (...) está dedicada a exponer la fundamentación levinasiana de los derechos humanos con base en la illeidad. (shrink)

A riqueza do debate ocorrido entre os filósofos Luc Ferry e Marcel Gauchet, em janeiro de 1999, deu origem a este artigo, em que os autores exploram os temas e as questões discutidas naquela ocasião. O artigo apresenta as diferentes posições dos dois pensadores franceses, cuja preocupação maior é pensar as condições de possibilidade da religião e do religioso nos tempos atuais. Tempos em que, segundo os debatedores, predomina a individualização da crença e nos quais a presença de uma religiosidade (...) sempre mais inquieta, difusa e incerta convive com o enfraquecimento institucional das religiões. Longe de desaparecer num universo cada vez mais laicizado, o religioso, como indagação sobre o sentido último da vida ou como aspiração ao absoluto, tende a permanecer como um substrato insuperável. Como, então, pensar o religioso após a religião? O texto apresenta as diferentes e divergentes posições de Ferry e Gauchet acerca da pertinência do uso de termos clássicos como "sagrado", "divino", "transcendente", dentre outros, para tratar os constituintes dessa religiosidade contemporânea e inquieta, própria de uma época na qual se torna impossível a edificação de um mundo de parte a parte estruturado pela religião e na qual o religioso impregnaria todos os setores da vida pública e privada. Palavras-chave: Religião; Religiosidade; Secularização; Autonomia; Heteronomia.This paper analyses the questions and problems that was discussed during an important debate between the French philosophers Marcel Gauchet and Luc Ferry, which take place at Paris on January, 1999. The paper discusses the different conceptions of these thinkers about the status of religion and the religious in nowadays. Days that witnesses the individualization of religious belief and the presence of a restless, uncertain and spread religiosity which however, lives side by side with an institutional weakening of the historical religions. Far from disappearing in a more and more laicized world, the religious as an inquiring about searching on ultimate sense for our lives seems to remain as a permanent individual issue. Nevertheless, how is it possible to conceive the religious after the deregulation of historical religions? Classical terms like "sacred", "divine", "transcendent" and "absolute" are sufficient to qualify and analyze the elements of this restless and uncertain religiosity, which seems to be constitutive of societies that do not need religious legitimacy anymore. Keywords: Religion; religious; secularization; autonomy; heteronomy. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem como objetivo mostrar que a teoria kantiana da possibilidade de juízos a priori, o conteúdo essencial da sua crítica da razão pura, foi elaborada no intuito de garantir a solubilidade dos problemas necessários da razão pura e que essa teoria pode ser interpretada como uma semântica transcendental (a priori). The problems of pure reason and the transcendental semanticsThis article aims at showing that Kant´s theory of possibility of a priori judgments, which is the essential content of (...) his critique of pure reason, was elaborated in order to guarantee the solubility of necessary problems of pure reason and that this theory can be interpreted as atranscendental semantics. (shrink)

L'immagine del "grembo materno della natura" da cui la ragione umana si deve emancipare per guadagnare la libertà è usata da Kant in uno scritto polemico contro Herder, Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte , che può essere considerato una risposta al libro decimo delle Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, uscito nel 1785. Seguendo il racconto biblico, anche Kant pone la prima coppia umana in un "giardino", un luogo sicuro e ben fornito di alimenti; ma il vero inizio della storia (...) è fatto consistere nella rottura di questo equilibrio ad opera della ragione che gradualmente si è sottratta alla tutela della natura, imparando un po' alla volta a dominarla. Kant dichiara di condividere l'ideale rousseauiano di una cultura che non neghi la natura dell'uomo ma la promuova in quella che dovrà diventare la sua condizione fondamentale di esistenza, che è la libertà. Pone tuttavia questo ideale come termine finale del processo storico, non come condizione da recuperare nella sua purezza iniziale, ritornando alle origini, come invece appariva nella visione della storia proposta da Herder, che avrebbe su questo punto frainteso il pensiero di Rousseau. The image of the "womb of nature", from which human reason must emancipate itself in order to gain freedom, is used by Kant in a pamphlet against Herder. This was the Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte , which can be considered a response to the tenth book of Herder's Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, published in 1785. Following the biblical account, Kant imagines the first two human beings in a "garden", a place safe and well-stocked with food; but the real beginning of history consists in the disruption of this balance produced by reason. Human reason gradually removes itself from the protection of nature, learning gradually to dominate nature. Kant shares Rousseau's idea of a culture that does not deny the nature of man, but promotes it in order to attain the fundamental condition of human existence, which is freedom. However, this ideal remains only as the final term of historical process, not as a condition to be regained in its original purity. The latter was the vision of history proposed by Herder, who on this point misunderstood the thought of Rousseau. (shrink)

En su ética de la responsabilidad argumenta Jonas a favor de un imperativo categórico, pero heterónomo: que la humanidad sea. Según este, habría un deber procreativo de la humanidad. Este deber ya incluiría las condiciones de una vida genuinamente humana. En primer lugar, el artículo sostiene que este imperativo no es capaz de lidiar satisfactoriamente con el desafío impuesto por el problema de la no-identidad, popularizado de Parfit. Si la elección entre dos políticas hoy, implica la no existencia de generaciones (...) en el futuro, o una existencia en malas condiciones o incluso en condiciones de un infierno terrenal, el imperativo de Jonas debiese llevar a escoger la segunda política. Esto es contraintuitivo. En segundo lugar, el artículo sostiene que la integración de los intereses de las generaciones futuras en la ética sí se puede realizar desde una interpretación kantiana. Y finalmente el artículo sostiene que el cumplimiento del deber de que la humanidad sea, puede llevar a violar la autonomía de las personas en el presente en pos de la generación de valor en el futuro. (shrink)

Heidegger’s critique of European nihilism seeks to expose self-legislation as the governing principle of central manifestations of modernity such as science, technology, and the interpretation of art as aesthetics. Need we accept the conclusion that modern constitutional democracies are intrinsically nihilistic, insofar as they give political and legal form to the principle of collective self-legislation? An answer to this question turns on the concept of power implied in constituent and constituted power. A confrontation of the genealogies of modern subjectivity proposed (...) by Heidegger and Blumenberg suggests that there is indeed a metaphysical core to the concept of constituent power developed by various political theorists, including Schmitt and Habermas. By contrast, closer consideration of the paradoxical relation between constituent and constituted power illuminates the ambiguity of collective self-legislation, which means both enactment of a legal order by a collective self and the enactment of a collective self by a legal order. To the extent that constitutional democracies are a way of preserving rather than dissolving this ambiguity, they imply an interpretation of power and human finitude that parries the charge of nihilism. (shrink)

A necessidade do Estado como ordem cogente para organizar a disposição para o convívio em nossa natureza é colocada como uma disposição natural na “Ideia de uma História Universal sob um ponto de vista Cosmopolita” em 1784, mas em 1795 em “Rumo à Paz Perpétua” e na “Doutrina do Direito”, se tornará uma ideia racional cujo fim é o republicanismo, o governo sob uma constituição republicana é o ideal normativo para todo e qualquer povo em sua autolegislação jurídica. Todavia, no (...) plano internacional ocorrem as guerras entre os Estado, e o princípio do cosmopolitismo é possível apenas pela ideia de uma condição jurídica e política criada pelos Estados, os artigos da paz perpétua fundamentam a possibilidade de uma federação de nações que através do Direito Cosmopolita promova a paz pela limitação jurídica da guerra. (shrink)

Transcendental philosophy was not born like Athena out of Zeus’s head, mature and in full armour from the very beginning. That is why in both prefaces to the Critique of Pure Reason (1781 and 1787) Kant introduces the concept of transcendental philosophy as an “idea.” The idea understood architectonically develops slowly and only gradually acquires a definite form. As witnessed by the works of Kant himself and of his predecessors and followers, the idea of transcendental philosophy has undergone a series (...) of changes and adjustments compared to the initial plan. In this context, my goal is not simply exegesis and historical investigation of transcendental philosophy, but also to look at it from a systematic and methodological perspective. I examine the concept of transcendental philosophy from the viewpoint of programmatic metaphilosophy. The first part discusses programmatics as a distinct subsection of metaphilosophy. I argue that Kant’s architectonic methodology and the methodology of Lakatos can be used to understand the inception, development and degradation of philosophical systems. In the second part I look at the project of transcendental philosophy and the stages of its development from the standpoint of architectonics. The third part shows that Lakatos’s methodology can provide a detailed insight into the elements of transcendental philosophy, a clear idea of its logic and identify the component parts that can be improved and developed. In spite of the different levels of detailing and epistemological prerequisites, the methodologies of Kant and Lakatos can be combined to achieve a metaphilosophically informed and progressive understanding of philosophical projects. (shrink)

In the past two decades, epistemologists have significantly expanded the focus of their field. To the traditional question that has dominated the debate — under what conditions does belief amount to knowledge? — they have added questions about testimony, epistemic virtues and vices, epistemic trust, and more. This broadening of the range of epistemic concern has coincided with an expansion in conceptions of epistemic agency beyond the individualism characteristic of most earlier epistemology. We believe that these developments have not gone (...) far enough. While the weak anti-individualism we see in contemporary epistemology may be adequate for the kinds of cases it tends to focus on, a great deal of human knowledge production and transmission does not conform to these models. Furthermore, the dispositions and norms that are knowledge-conducive in the familiar cases may not be knowledge-conducive generally. In fact, dispositions that, at an individual level, count as epistemic vices may be epistemic virtues in common social contexts. We argue that this overlooked feature of human social life means that epistemology must become more deeply and pervasively social. (shrink)

This article offers a reading of the “transcendental” character of Alain Badiou’s and Giorgio Agamben’s ontologies. While neither Badiou nor Agamben are “transcendental” philosophers in the Kantian sense, this article argues that their respective projects of ontology both recover aspects of the “classical” conception of the transcendentals. Not unlike how pre-modern philosophers conceived of oneness, truth and goodness as transcendental properties of all things, both Badiou’s and Agamben’s ontologies present various structures which can be universally predicated of all being. However, (...) as opposed to the essentialist or even theological tendencies of traditional metaphysics, Badiou’s and Agamben’s ontologies are committedly “inessential” and atheistic at their very core. By replacing the divine names of the one, the true and the good in traditional metaphysics with a new yet quasi-classical transcendental notion of “the void” as a universal predicate of all beings, Badiou’s and Agamben’s works may be regarded as projects that go beyond both the pre-Kantian “theological” and the post-Kantian “subjective” conceptions of transcendental philosophy, thereby marking a new development in the history of western metaphysics. (shrink)

George Santayana appears emotionally distant and personally uncommitted in many of his writings. In what may have been a related phenomenon, he does not seem to have committed to any school of philosophy, but rather to draw from many of the available schools when it suited him. In this article, we assess his constantly changing use of different philosophies and its implications for both philosophy and politics.

The paper argues that much of Kant’s largely formalistic account of aesthetic appreciation stands on the idea that the judger is able to engage with the object of her judgment purely sensibly and hence non-conceptually or non-cognitively. This is to say that the judger must be able to ground her judgment on the immediate sensory affection by the object or on the object’s sensible form. The paper also argues that these two purely sensible grounds, accessible in the aesthetic examination of (...) objects, underlie the feeling involved in such judgments. In broader terms, the paper outlines how Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment suggests what might be called a contemplative model of perception. (shrink)

In his book Action in Perception, Alva Noë poses what he refers to as the “problem of perceptual presence” and develops his enactive view as solution to the problem. Noë describes the problem of perceptual presence as the problem of how to conceive of the presence of that which, “strictly speaking,” we do not perceive. I argue that the “problem of perceptual presence” is ambiguous between two problems that need to be addressed by invoking very different resources. On the one (...) hand, there is the problem of how to conceive of the presence of objects as wholes, front side and back, and their constant properties. On the other hand, there is the problem of how to account for the presence of unattended detail. I focus on the first problem, which Noë approaches by invoking Husserlian ideas. I argue that Noë’s enactive view encounters difficulties, which can be dealt with by complementing it with Edmund Husserl’s idea of fulfillment and generally restoring the view to its original Husserlian context. Contrary to Noë’s purport, this involves regarding the view not as a theory of perception and perceptual content but as part of a descriptive–clarificatory project of conceptual analysis. The Husserlian phenomenologist analyzes, e.g., the concept of shape or color by investigating the fulfillment conditions pertinent to shape or color. In general, my critique of Noë’s enactive view serves to caution philosophers against unprincipled uses of Husserlian ideas. (shrink)

The tradable refugee quota scheme constitutes one proposal for institutionalising the general right to asylum. The scheme allows states to purchase and sell quotas of refugees that are initially assigned to them through a collectivised status-determination process. In this paper I focus on examining the ethical dimensions of one particular component of the tradable refugee quota scheme: the market. I consider three objections against the quota trading practices: ‘the preference objection’, ‘the dignity objection’, and ‘the exploitation objection’. The first objection (...) suggests that the tradable quota scheme is problematic due to the fact that it fails to consider refugees’ desires regarding the final country in which asylum is provided. The second objection claims that the scheme demeans refugees and violates their dignity. The final objection claims that the scheme leads to the exploitation of weak countries. I argue that the objections fail to show that the tradable quota scheme is inherently problematic. I conclude that either the examined objections can be rejected or it is possible to address the concerns through specific institutional arrangements. (shrink)

Heidegger’s essays “The Origin of the Work of Art” and “The Question Concerning Technology” provide a revealing insight into the importance of exemplarity to artworks. Originally the notion that exemplarity is essential to art is Kantian: As Kant puts it, since originality can produce “original nonsense, [beautiful art’s] products must be models, i.e. exemplary.” However, what Heidegger recognizes is that even if exemplarity allows us to take art seriously in spite of its excesses, it exposes the artwork to new dangers: (...) on the one hand, to the “world withdrawal of the work” as occurs in consignment to the museum shelf, and on the other, to the conditions of Enframing as “challenging-forth,” under which art is taken as a means to an end—dangers which point to the division of artworks between “fine” art and “popular” art. Since Heidegger’s approach favors the former, we will try to gain new critical insight by considering his arguments in the light of a “popular” work that allows us to formulate an exemplarity of popular art as the necessary complement to that of traditional art. By means of an understanding of the exemplarities (in the plural) of artworks, we will be able to reconsider the significance of Heidegger’s notions of reliability, Enframing, and poiesis for our current technological conditions. (shrink)

RESUMO Trabalhar o tema da amizade a partir de textos de Hume e Kant, no âmbito do debate do Iluminismo constitui o objeto deste trabalho. O Iluminismoé o período em que o desejo de esclarecimento e a atitude crítica têm seu ápice, na racionalidade moderna. A partir do espaço constituído pela amizade, da imbricação do Iluminismo como lugar de produção e profissão da verdade e da moral, esse trabalho questiona: Quais eram as relações entre a amizade e esclarecimento nesses textos (...) do Iluminismo? De que forma essa amizade atravessava a governamentalidade do século XVIII e imbricava no governo dos indivíduos? A análise dos textos indica a constituição de uma forma peculiar de amizade que funcionava como tecnologia e estratégia de esclarecimento dos indivíduos, e consequentemente na gestão de outros aspectos, em favor de uma "governamentalidade moderna" que buscava agir tanto no nível individual, do corpo, quanto no nível populacional, da vida. Mais que retrato fiel do século XVIII, do Iluminismo ou da Amizade, esse trabalho experimenta traçar mapas de intensidade para que se possa utilizar desse escrito como aparato de ação e pensamento, ativo e criativo. (shrink)

The abstract status of Kant's account of his ‘general logic’ is explained in comparison with Gödel's general definition of a formal logical system and reflections on ‘abstract’ (‘absolute’) concepts. Thereafter, an informal reconstruction of Kant's general logic is given from the aspect of the principles of contradiction, of sufficient reason, and of excluded middle. It is shown that Kant's composition of logic consists in a gradual strengthening of logical principles, starting from a weak principle of contradiction that tolerates a sort (...) of contradictions in predication, and then proceeding to the (constructive) principle of sufficient reason, and to a classical-like logic, which includes the principle of excluded middle. A first-order formalisation is applied to this reconstruction, which reveals implicit modalities in Kant's account of logic, and confirms the implementability of Kant's logic into a sound and complete formal system. (shrink)

In this paper I examine problems besetting forms of philosophical and social critique that are motivated by the 'hermeneutics of suspicion' and normatively oriented to the goal of 'unmasking'. I argue that there is an urgent need to correct the one-sided emphasis on 'unmasking', and we can do this by reorienting critique to the practice of individual and social transformation. The argument goes like this. The practice of unmasking critique has split off from utopian projects in whose service it was (...) originally placed, and has become the vehicle of a self-consuming, practice-crippling skepticism that - from Friedrich von Schlegel to Paul de Man and Richard Rorty - goes by the name of irony or ironist theory. Postmodernism, in one of its aspects, is the latest form of this skepticism. I interpret postmodernism as the manifestation of a crisis of confidence (in our ideals and in our agency) and as an ironization of critique. Drawing upon Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Foucault, I reformulate the normative demands of critique such that its practice avoids the problem of self-reference while responding to the problem of self-reassurance. Key Words: confidence • critique • irony • postmodernism • reason • skepticism. (shrink)

The question of what might constitute “good dying” is a sensitive subject that is being discussed and is socially and politically controversial. My contribution discusses whether a reference to concepts such as autonomy and dignity in the debate over suicide and euthanasia is in fact convincing. Important impulses for the train of thought stem from Kantian philosophy. I will argue that suicide, as presented by Kant, is not an expression of autonomy, but exactly the opposite: an expression of heteronomy.

_ Source: _Page Count 20 What is the relationship between justice and moral permissibility? If an action constitutes an injustice, does that decisively rule it out, morally speaking, or merely count heavily against it? This paper argues that although the injustice of an action counts heavily against performing it, this effect can sometimes be overridden by consequentialist concerns. This suggests that injustice does not conclusively rule out actions that generate it, which in turn suggests that an approach to justice that (...) conceives of it as an object of intrinsic moral value more accurately reflects the behavior of justice than do more traditional deontological approaches. (shrink)

Na Crítica da Razão Pura e em outros lugares, Kant apresenta uma aguda distinção entre natureza e razão prática. De acordo com Kant, não é possível deduzir ou derivar todos os sentidos dos imperativos morais dos conhecimentos empíricos sobre o mundo. Alguns intérpretes (como John MacDowell) argumentam que a concepção de razão prática em Kant pode ser ilusória se baseada em uma visão da natureza indefinida, decorrente de um ponto de vista newtoniano. Nesse texto discutirei a relação entre razão prática (...) e natureza na Crítica da faculdade de julgar de Kant. Argumentarei que na segunda parte da obra, Kant introduz um conceito de natureza muito mais rico que as críticas lhe têm atribuído. (shrink)

Particular views have been proposed on soul's powers and their functions when analyzing and criticizing pure intellect, especially in transcendental inference. The existence of particular elements and method of psychology in the first critique has led some Kantian scholars to discuss transcendental psychology and its validity and significance. The transcendental psychology of critique is neither the authenticity of psychology nor apparently intellectual psychology and applied logic. Rather, it discusses prior elements and components of cognition which are rooted in human soul. (...) However, we cannot deny the existence of important common features between transcendental psychology, discursive psychology and epistemology. Since transcendental psychology discusses soul's powers involved in acquiring knowledge, it also discusses kinds of ideas and the doctrine of self-understanding. The present paper tries to introduce and evaluate Kant's transcendental psychology. (shrink)

resumo Esse artigo busca mostrar, em contraste com uma tradição já estabelecida, que a filosofia clássica alemã, longe de fazer do indivíduo simples apêndice do Estado, propõe uma verdadeira teoria do Estado de direito , e isso, antes mesmo que esta tenha sido formulada pelos juristas liberais. Mas se trata de uma teoria crítica, que põe em evidência o caráter ilusório da idéia liberal segundo a qual a sociedade civil poderia furtarse inteiramente à tutela do Estado. Para Fichte e para (...) Hegel, mas também para Kant, apenas um Estado verdadeiro, com os atributos de sua potência, pode ser um verdadeiro Estado de Direito. palavras-chave Fichte; Kant; Hegel; sociedade civil; liberalismo; Estado de direito. (shrink)