- Parfit über Intuitionismus und die Herausforderung moralischer Uneinigkeit.Kay Hüwelmeyer - 2016 - Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 3 (2):287-324.details
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Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.details
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Unacknowledged Permissivism.Julia Jael Smith - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):158-183.details
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Aha! Trick Questions, Independence, and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Michael Arsenault & Zachary C. Irving - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):185-194.details
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Argumentation and the epistemology of disagreement.Harvey Siegal - unknowndetails
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Disagreement and the value of self-trust.Robert Pasnau - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2315-2339.details
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Debunking and Disagreement.Folke Tersman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):754-774.details
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You just believe that because….Roger White - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.details
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Is reflective equilibrium enough?Thomas Kelly & Sarah McGrath - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):325-359.details
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Disagreement: What’s the Problem? or A Good Peer is Hard to Find.Nathan L. King - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):249-272.details
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Reconsidering authority.Michael Strevens - 2007 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 3. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 294-330.details
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Epistemic Peer Disagreement.Filippo Ferrari & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - 2019 - In M. Fricker, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, D. Henderson & P. J. Graham (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge.details
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Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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The Obligation to Diversify One's Sources: Against Epistemic Partisanship in the Consumption of News Media.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - In Joe Saunders & Carl Fox (eds.), Media Ethics, Free Speech, and the Requirements of Democracy. Routledge. pp. 240-264.details
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Norms of assertion.Graham Oppy - 2007 - In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. London: Routledge. pp. 5--226.details
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Skeptical Theism and Phenomenal Conservatism.Jonathan Matheson - 2014 - In Justin McBrayer Trent Dougherty (ed.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 3-20.details
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Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Jonathan Matheson - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):269-279.details
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On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers.Roger White - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):233-250.details
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Peerage.Earl Conee - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):313-323.details
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Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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Desacuerdos Básicos entre Pares Epistémicos.Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2018 - Ideas Y Valores 67 (168):81-99.details
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Peer disagreement and counter-examples.Ruth Weintraub - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1773-1790.details
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Distant Peers.Mark Vorobej - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (5):708-722.details
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Confidence, Evidence, and Disagreement.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):173-183.details
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Moral disagreement and moral skepticism.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):302-333.details
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Trust and the value of overconfidence: a Bayesian perspective on social network communication.Aron Vallinder & Erik J. Olsson - 2014 - Synthese 191 (9):1991-2007.details
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Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution.Hamid Vahid - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):296-314.details
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The Level-Splitting View and the Non-Akrasia Constraint.Marco Tiozzo - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):917-923.details
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Religious belief and the epistemology of disagreement.Michael Thune - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (8):712-724.details
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Testimony as Evidence: More Problems for Linear Pooling. [REVIEW]Katie Steele - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):983-999.details
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Consensual Decision-Making Among Epistemic Peers.Stephan Hartmann, Carlo Martini & Jan Sprenger - 2009 - Episteme 6 (2):110-129.details
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Respecting all the evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.details
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Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1369-1386.details
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Epistemic Peerhood and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Robert Mark Simpson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):561-577.details
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Unconfirmed peers and spinelessness.Ben Sherman - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):425-444.details
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An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):690-715.details
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The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement.Eric Sampson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:23-46.details
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What is (Dis)Agreement?Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):223-236.details
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Aesthetic Autonomy and Self-Aggrandisement.Jon Robson - 2014 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 75:3-28.details
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A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism.Olle Risberg & Folke Tersman - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (2):189-207.details
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On the supposed dilemma of conciliationism.Stefan Reining - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):305-328.details
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Disagreement and Conceptual Understanding.Gurpreet Rattan - 2018 - Theoria 84 (2):179-210.details
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Disagreement and the First‐Person Perspective.Gurpreet Rattan - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):31-53.details
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A higher-order approach to disagreement.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):80-100.details
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Defusing epistemic relativism.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):397-412.details
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Dynamic permissivism.Abelard Podgorski - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1923-1939.details
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Fundamental disagreements and the limits of instrumentalism.John Pittard - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5009-5038.details
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When to defer to majority testimony – and when not.Philip Pettit - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):179–187.details
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The procedural epistemic value of deliberation.Fabienne Peter - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1253-1266.details
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Strong internalism, doxastic involuntarism, and the costs of compatibilism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):3171-3191.details
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