En el marco del debate sobre el ideal de ciencia libre de valores, Philip Kitcher propone un ideal de ciencia bien ordenada. La fundamentación política y meta ética del ideal tiene dos versiones: la primera se inspira en el enfoque de John Rawls mientras que la segunda refiere a la idea de democracia como experiencia conjunta comunicada de John Dewey. El artículo sostiene que el planteo de Kitcher evidencia ciertas tensiones con la visión deweyana pues aquel mantiene una concepción formal (...) de la democracia y una visión objetivista de sus valores estructurales precisamente dos puntos que intentaba superar refiriendo a Dewey. (shrink)

On many science-related policy questions, the public is unable to make informed decisions, because of its inability to make use of knowledge obtained by scientists. Philip Kitcher and James Fishkin have both suggested therefore that on certain science-related issues, public policy should not be decided on by actual democratic vote, but should instead conform to the public’s counterfactual informed democratic decision. Indeed, this suggestion underlies Kitcher’s specification of an ideal of a well-ordered science. This article argues that this suggestion misconstrues (...) the normative significance of CIDDs. At most, CIDDs might have epistemic significance, but no authority or legitimizing force. (shrink)

Building, restoring and maintaining well-placed trust between scientists and the public is a difficult yet crucial social task requiring the successful cooperation of various social actors and institutions. Kitcher’s takes up this challenge in the context of liberal democratic societies by extending his ideal model of “well-ordered science” that he had originally formulated in his. However, Kitcher nowhere offers an explicit account of what it means for the public to invest epistemic trust in science. Yet in order to understand how (...) his extended model and its implementation in the actual world address the problem of trust as well as to evaluate it critically, an explicit account of epistemic public trust in science needs to be given first. In this article we first present such an account and then scrutinize his project of building public trust in science in light of it. We argue that even though Kitcher’s ideal model and his proposals for its implementation in the real world face a number of problems, they can be addressed with the resources of our account. (shrink)