ABSTRACTAlthough scholars increasingly recognize the debts of twentieth-century Roman Catholic theologians to Søren Kierkegaard, no one has yet traced this influence to Joseph Ratzinger. As is frequently observed, Ratzinger’s most famous book, Introduction to Christianity, opens with a meditation on a Kierkegaardian parable from Either/or. We argue that Ratzinger’s use of Kierkegaard extends well beyond this opening image, to some central moments in his articulation of the idea of God, Christology, and theological anthropology. Upon closer inspection, we argue, Ratzinger’s use (...) of these arguments is owing to the fact that his diagnosis of the ills of contemporary society and the orientation of contemporary Christian theology is the same as that of Kierkegaard, despite their seemingly different contexts. Identifying the Kierkegaardian influence on Introduction to Christianity helps draw our attention to the necessarily ‘introductory’ character of Christianity, which otherwise risks being lost. (shrink)

In Sartre’s 1946 article “The Humanism of Existentialism,” Sartre places existentialists into two categories, Christian or atheist, and contends that existentialism works differently for each of them. This paper argues that such a distinction should not have been made because existentialist beliefs, views, and themes do not differ based on one’s religiosity. This paper specifically examines three examples in Sartre’s article which undermine his position, and further argues that Sartre made an equivocation fallacy by conflating two different types of essence, (...) one’s innate essence and one’s character essence. The paper then explores six central existentialist themes to demonstrate that in their existentialist beliefs both the theist and the atheist agree. Those six themes are authenticity, sincerity vs. bad faith, the absurdity of life, the meaning of life, choice, and responsibility. The paper also examines the issue of moral objectivity vs. non-objectivity, and argues that not only is this not an existentialist issue, but even if it were one’s belief on moral objectivity does not cleanly correspond to one’s religious beliefs, so here again there is no basis to distinguish the Christian and the atheist. The paper concludes that any disagreement between existentialists who are Christian and those who are atheist comes down to differences in their religious beliefs, not their existentialist views. (shrink)