- Radical Pragmatism in the Ethics of Belief.Samuel Montplaisir - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):403-419.details
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Deliberative Authority and Representational Determinacy: A Challenge for the Normative Realist.Tristram McPherson - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.details
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All Reasons are Fundamentally for Attitudes.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).details
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The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.details
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Do you see what I know? On reasons, perceptual evidence, and epistemic status.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):205-220.details
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Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):801-827.details
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Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.details
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Two roles for reasons: Cause for divorce?Wooram Lee - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1993-2008.details
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The Real Myth of Coherence.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1211-1230.details
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The independence of (in)coherence.Wooram Lee - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6563-6584.details
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Fittingness first?: Reasons to withhold belief.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3565-3581.details
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You ought to ϕ only if you may believe that you ought to ϕ.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82.details
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What Kind of Perspectivism?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (4):415-443.details
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Précis zu The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 71 (4):560-4.details
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Repliken.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 71 (4):578-83.details
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Review of Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality. [REVIEW]Benjamin Kiesewetter - forthcoming - Mind.details
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The Value of Rationality. [REVIEW]Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2019 - Ethics 129 (3):501-508.details
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Rationality as Reasons-Responsiveness.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):332-342.details
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Practical conflicts as a problem for epistemic reductionism about practical reasons.Benjamin Kiesewetter & Jan Gertken - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):677-686.details
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Gründe, Rationalität und Parenthetikalismus. [REVIEW]Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2020 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68 (3):481-491.details
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How Do Reasons Transmit to Non-Necessary Means?Benjamin Kiesewetter & Jan Gertken - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):271-285.details
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Contrary-to-Duty Scenarios, Deontic Dilemmas, and Transmission Principles.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - Ethics 129 (1):98-115.details
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Rationality as the Rule of Reason.Antti Kauppinen - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):538-559.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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Epistemic feedback loops (or: how not to get evidence).Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):368-393.details
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Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (3).details
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Expressivism and Explaining Irrationality: Reply to Baker.Sebastian Hengst - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2503-2516.details
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How there Could be Reasons for Affective Attitudes.Alexander Heape - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3-4):667-680.details
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Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action.James Fritz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1191-1210.details
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Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure.Daniel Fogal - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1033-1070.details
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The Property of Rationality: A Guide to What Rationality Requires?Julian Fink - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):117-140.details
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What the doctor should do: perspectivist duties for objectivists about ought.Davide Fassio - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1523-1544.details
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On the generality argument for the knowledge norm.Davide Fassio - 2018 - Synthese:1-22.details
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On the generality argument for the knowledge norm.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3459-3480.details
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Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7031-7059.details
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Are epistemic reasons perspective-dependent?Davide Fassio - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3253-3283.details
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A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):493-503.details
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Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules.Marc-Kevin Daoust & Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1741-1765.details
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False Beliefs and Misleading Evidence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):520-541.details
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Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (1):170-194.details
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The explanatory role of consistency requirements.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4551-4569.details
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The matter of motivating reasons.J. J. Cunningham - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1563-1589.details
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Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason.Ruth Chang (ed.) - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
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Rationality versus Normativity.John Broome - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):293-311.details
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Responses to Commentaries on ‘Rationality Versus Normativity’.John Broome - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):393-401.details
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Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.details
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The aim of belief and the aim of science.Alexander Bird - 2019 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 34 (2):171.details
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We Make Up the Rules as We Go Along: Improvisation as an Essential Aspect of Human Practices?Georg W. Bertram & Alessandro Bertinetto - 2020 - Open Philosophy 3 (1):202-221.details
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Internalism and culpable irrationality.Karl Gustav Bergman - 2024 - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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What Makes Something Surprising?Dan Baras & Oded Na’Aman - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):195-215.details
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