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  1. What the doctor should do: perspectivist duties for objectivists about ought.Davide Fassio - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    Objectivism is the view that how an agent ought to act depends on all kinds of facts, regardless of the agent’s epistemic position with respect to them. One of the most important challenges to this view is constituted by certain cases involving specific conditions of uncertainty—so-called three-options cases. In these cases it seems overwhelmingly plausible that an agent ought to do what is recommendable given her limited perspective, even though the agent knows that this is not objectively the best course (...)
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  • Planning Facts Through Law: Legal Reasonableness as Creative Indexicality and Trans-Categorical Re-Configuration.Mario Ricca - 2020 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 33 (4):1089-1123.
    Legal reasonableness and its theoretical analysis are often gauged on judicial activity. However, the judicial exercise of reasonableness is always a post-factum activity. People produce facts, and then courts are called to ascertain and qualify their conduct to determine its legal consequences. The use of reasonableness appears, in this way, almost inherently grafted onto a pre-existing divide between facts and legal rules. Reasonableness would appear to be mainly engaged in the balancing of the semantic spectrums of law’s provisions and their (...)
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  • Revisiting the Argument From Action Guidance.Philip Fox - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (3).
    According to objectivism about the practical 'ought', what one ought to do depends on all the facts; according to perspectivism, it depends only on epistemically available facts. This essay presents a new argument against objectivism. The first premise says that it is at least sometimes possible for a normative theory to correctly guide action. The second premise says that, if objectivism is true, this is never possible. From this it follows that objectivism is false. Perspectivism, however, turns out to be (...)
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  • In Defense of Prospectivism About Moral Obligation: A Reply to My Meticulous Critics.Michael Zimmerman - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (4):444-461.
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