- Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
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Why are Epistemic Reasons Normative?Laura Frances Callahan - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.details
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The Sources of Political Normativity: the Case for Instrumental and Epistemic Normativity in Political Realism.Carlo Burelli & Chiara Destri - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (3):397-413.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.John Brunero - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):313-317.details
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Reasons as explanations.John Brunero - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.details
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Intention Persistence.John Brunero - 2021 - Wiley: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):747-763.details
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Introduction: Practical reasoning and normativity.Bruno Verbeek & Nicholas Southwood - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):223-225.details
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Instrumental rationality, symmetry and scope.John Brunero - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):125-140.details
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Fittingness and Good Reasoning.John Brunero - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (2).details
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Against Cognitivism about Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):311-325.details
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Wide or narrow scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.details
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Reasoning with preferences?John Broome - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59:183-208.details
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Rationalizing flow: agency in skilled unreflective action.Michael Brownstein - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):545-568.details
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Is Rationality Normative?John Broome - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (23):161-178.details
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Does rationality give us reasons?John Broome - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):321–337.details
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Does Rationality Give Us Reasons? 1.John Broome - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):321-337.details
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Rationality, Normativity, and Transparency.Jason Bridges - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):353-367.details
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Perceptual justification and assertively representing the world.Jochen Briesen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2239-2259.details
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Rational Planning Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:25-48.details
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Painfulness, Desire, and the Euthyphro Dilemma.Michael S. Brady - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):239-250.details
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Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.details
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Intention, practical rationality, and self‐governance.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):411-443.details
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The Two Faces of Evidentialism.Anthony Robert Booth - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (3):401-417.details
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Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons.Anthony Robert Booth - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):1-14.details
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Internalism and Externalism about Reason.Kosuke Bishago - 2016 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 49 (2):27-47.details
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Shared Belief and the Limits of Empathy.Monika Betzler & Simon Keller - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (2):267-291.details
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Internalism and culpable irrationality.Karl Gustav Bergman - 2024 - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Selim Berker - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):427-470.details
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What can we not do at will and why.Hagit Benbaji - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1941-1961.details
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Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom.Matthew S. Bedke - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (1):85-111.details
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The Econ within or the Econ above? On the plausibility of preference purification.Lukas Beck - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):423-445.details
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A Non-factualist defense of the Reflection principle.Stephanie Beardman - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):2981-2999.details
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Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox.David James Barnett - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262.details
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Rational Moral Ignorance.Zach Barnett - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):645-664.details
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Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater.David James Barnett - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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Is Memory Merely Testimony from One's Former Self?David James Barnett - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (3):353-392.details
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Intuitions about Disagreement Do Not Support the Normativity of Meaning.Derek Baker - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (1):65-84.details
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Moral Rationalism and the Normativity of Constitutive Principles.Zachary Bachman - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (1):1-19.details
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Approximate Coherentism and Luck.Boris Babic - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (4):707-725.details
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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2007 - Introduction 2 (23):153-160.details
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Why Care about Being an Agent.Caroline T. Arruda - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):488-504.details
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Constitutivism and the Self-Reflection Requirement.Caroline T. Arruda - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1165-1183.details
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Which Reasons? Which Rationality?Daniel Fogal & Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.details
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Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Instrumental rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:280-309.details
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What is (In)coherence?Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:184-206.details
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Reasons as Evidence.Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.details
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Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency.Luca Ferrero - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:303-333.details
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Cognitivism about Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:18-44.details
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Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.Derek Clayton Baker - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.details
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