This paper revisits how late 20th-century attempts to account for conceptual and other difficult art-work by defining the concept ‘art’ have failed to offer a useful strategy for educators seeking a non-instrumental justification for teaching the arts. It is suggested that this theoretical ground is nonetheless instructive and provides useful background in searching for a viable approach to justification. It is claimed that, though definition may fail and grand theories not coalesce, one would be wise to emulate Passmore (1954, 1990) (...) who argues for an aesthetic approach to works of art and who proceeds like the fox, from a specific work that becomes more complex through analysis. His approach is employed in describing a performance series by the Cellist of Sarajevo, which raises further questions regarding what it means to start from a specific art-work and how doing so exemplifies Fleming’s (2006) suggestion that in justifying the arts we connect them to our ethical lives. Passmore’s strategy is then extended to the aesthetic experience of reading this essay and the paper concludes with the author’s personal anecdote in response to Higgins’ (2008) call for genuinely aesthetic defences of aesthetic education. (shrink)

Let us imagine that a man loses his keys one night and starts looking for them under the light of a street lamp. When people join him to help him search, they ask where it was that he thinks he might have let them fall; with a frustrated look on his face, he then points into the dark distance and says, by way of explanation, “I am looking under the lamppost because this is where the light is!” This story, introduced (...) by Janice Ross, provides us with a metaphorical description of an ongoing situation in arts education advocacy1: Certainly, I can only look for the arts in education where there is something about them that can be seen. Yet there may be aspects of them concealed beyond the reach of the vision.. (shrink)

Increased attention to the relationship between democracy and education in the UK has been accompanied over the past thirteen years by an interest in how art can be used to promote democratic citizenship.While this approach has led to increased funding for the arts, it is not without its problems,and has often entailed an apolitical and instrumentalist view of both art and education. This paper turns to the political philosophy of Mouffe and Rancière, the work of Rancière in aesthetics, and Biesta’s (...) educational philosophy to develop an alternative way of understanding the significance of art for democracy and education. Building on their work, I take a performative and collective view of democratic subjectivity as the basis on which to construct this alternative understanding. I further argue that this conceptualisation can aid our understanding of democratic learning and our ability to provide opportunities for it through art and educational practice. (shrink)

The value of the arts is often measured in terms of human creativity against instrumental rationality, while art for art's sake defends against a utility of art. Such critiques of the technical and formulaic are themselves formulaic, repeating the dualism of the head and the heart. How should we account for this formula? We should do so by investigating its determination within metaphysical and social relations, ancient and modern, and by comprehending the notion of freedom carried therein. This opens up (...) the value of the arts to a modern metaphysics and modern notion of freedom. This value, and this freedom, find currency in a notion of philosophical and political education, and especially in a modern conception of liberal arts education, where freedom is to learn. (shrink)

Various educational strategies use narrative artworks to pursue ethical training purposes. Based on the works of Dewey and Greene I show how these strategies do not always contribute to an aesthetic education ‒one that promotes experiences with artworks in which we develop sensitivities and capacities necessary to more richly, deeply and intensely experience what these and other artworks have to be experienced‒ and therefore end up having an instrumental use. This is the case with the most commonly used strategies: the (...) exemplary modelling strategy ‒which seeks to inspire students through characters that show an admirable moral character‒ and the moral deliberation strategy ‒which extracts dilemmas or moral problems from which characters from the works face to discuss them with the students. From Diamond’s work I show that, at the same time, it is precisely the non-aesthetic nature of these strategies that limits their chances of becoming a fully fledged ethical education. Hence, ethical education through the narrative arts is only fully developed when it is also an aesthetic education, and aesthetic education in the narrative arts is only fully developed when it also deals with matters of moral significance and is therefore also an ethical education. (shrink)